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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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SEPTEMBER · MCMXII Price 2/6 N° 8

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INDIA AND THE EMPIRE

I

THE great Durbar is now long past. It was, perhaps, the greatest spectacle ever seen. Never before has homage to a king combined the disciplined and orderly ceremonial of the West with the gorgeous pageantry of the East on so vast a scale, or been witnessed by so great a multitude. For the Durbar was seen not by the crowds at Delhi alone: science has made the scene, with all its brilliance of sun and colour, familiar to the peoples of the world.

After the Coronation displays the Durbar has been taken rather as a matter of course by the mass of the British people. They have wondered at its magnificence; they have marvelled that a simple pageant should mean so much to India—that thousands should prostrate themselves in humble adoration before the throne where the King's Majesty had sat. But the British are a matter-of-fact race, and they have been content to accept the explanations of those who are reputed to understand these things.

But to many the Durbar has awakened an uneasy sense of misgiving about their responsibility for the country where such things are possible. An island peopled by democrats, critical as never before of the customs and institutions of the past, is linked with a mediaeval land, where many of the forms of government are similar to those practised in Europe five centuries ago. In the turmoil of public life there is not much time for speculation about the problems which such a connexion involves, and we have been born to regard British rule in India as the natural order of things. But the Durbar, following on anarchical unrest, has raised

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the spectre of the future. Whither are we drifting? Can the existing relations between two countries, one containing 45,000,000 human beings, the other 315,000,000 of a different colour, a different civilization, a different status, continue indefinitely? No such partnership can have its terms revised, or be severed without tremendous effects on the vital interests of both sides.


This paper is an attempt to answer the questionings aroused by the Durbar; to explain why the British are the rulers of India, how they have governed it, and what, if any, are the principles which must determine their future policy towards it.

II

THE history of nations is determined by three main forces, the natural temperament of the people, their geographical environment, and their contact with other peoples. The inhabitants of India, while they can in no sense be said to be a nation, exhibit certain common characteristics which clearly differentiate them from all the other great groups of humanity in Asia or elsewhere, and which are the product of these three forces.

Indians, like the rest of us, are a compound race, in which there are three main strains: the Dravidian, which represents the earliest known population of India; the Mongoloid, or Chinese; and the West Central Asian, of which the Aryan is the earliest and best-known branch. Of these the Mongoloid is not an important branch, for, though dominant in Burma, it does not penetrate into India further than Bengal. The early Dravidians appear to have been a backward race, living under a tribal system of government, with no elevated ideas of religion. They were dark in colour, hardy and vigorous, and in modern times pure specimens of the race respond readily to civilized influences. But when history first casts its light upon the scene, the fair-skinned Aryans were supreme. They had marched upon the plains of

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India from the north-west, and subjugated the Dravidians by driving them into the Himalayas to the north and to the highlands and hills of the south. To judge from their Sanskrit literature, the Aryans were an active, industrious and highly intelligent people. From the earliest times they exhibited, like the Greeks, a marked tendency to speculative thought, which is clearly shown in their religious writings.


Geography, however, has played an even greater part in moulding the habits, character and history of the Indian people. India proper is a territory of irregular diamond shape, about the size of Europe without Russia. The two southern sides of the diamond are bounded by the sea, the northern by the rampart of the Himalayas, the north-western by the highlands of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Burma, separated by great rivers and impassable forest-clad ranges of hills running north and south was never part of India, until the exigencies of administration compelled the British to bring it under the same government. The diamond of India falls into two natural divisions. The northern half consists of the great alluvial plains, watered by the Ganges to the east, and the Indus and its affluents to the west, and stretching level, rich and highly cultivated, in a vast crescent, about 300 miles wide. These plains contain to-day and always have contained a majority of the population of India. The southern half consists of a great highland known as the Deccan, roughly of a triangular shape, with its apex to the south. The population tends to congregate most thickly on the coast, and along the banks of a few rivers, for the rest of the country is hilly and often difficult to cultivate, and much of it is jungle to this day.

The whole of this vast territory is subject to the dominion of climate to a degree incomprehensible to the stay-at-home European. The sun is a tyrant imposing the strictest laws on the habits of the people. In the hot season mankind has to flee before it, to lie prostrate and idle in the midday shade. The heat it generates saps appetite and energy and lays hands upon the sleep of an exhausted

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people. Even in winter the sun is strong enough, except in the extreme north, to drive away invigorating frost. It never abdicates, save to the rains which in their moist intensity are more enervating than the torrid dryness of the summer heat. The soil is rich and gives an easy and abundant return to the labour bestowed upon it, but even here the sun steps in to assert its rule. Where water cannot be brought from the great perennial streams or wells, the chief crops are dependent on the annual monsoon rains. Unless they arrive to time, the sun devours every stalk and blade, and then his toll is heavy indeed, for just because the normal return is high, and the population it sustains great, crop failure means privation to millions. To the villager the years of famine are still the landmarks of history. But the tale of the sun's exactions is not yet complete. Wherever standing water is to be found it breeds myriads of insects and microbes, adding a new scourge to a long suffering people, and to years of famine must be added years of devastating pestilence and plague.

Geography, however, has not only endowed India with an overpowering climate. For so large an area India combines an exceptional ease of internal communication with an extraordinary isolation from the outside world. Travel has always been easy from one end of India to another. There are no impassable or even difficult rivers or hills. The country is seamed with roads and tracks for man and beast. Food is everywhere plentiful, and Nature affords the warmth which travellers in more rigorous climates have to seek indoors. But except for the passage through Afghanistan, India till recent times has been isolated from her neighbours. In days when bold excursions across the ocean were impracticable, coasting voyages led to no other civilized land. The desert and the barren highlands of Baluchistan closed the route along the coast from the west. The Himalayas and the forested hills of Burma were so impenetrable a barrier to the north and east that the Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsiang, who came to visit the Buddhist monasteries of India about 550 A.D., travelled over the Pamirs so as actually to reach





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India from the west. Afghanistan was the sole road to India till Europe mastered the seas.

As a result of this geographical isolation the contact of India with other countries has been exceptionally small. For not only was there but one overland road to it, but that road led to a land which has always been the most barbarous and unsettled in the world. The territory comprised in Turkestan, and the southern steppes, in Khorasan and north-east Persia, and in Afghanistan has been called the nursery of the nations. So in a sense it is. It is not that vast populations have there been brought to birth; it is rather that, while the country is healthy and invigorating, the food supply is normally insufficient for its rapidly increasing peoples. These, therefore, have perpetually to migrate elsewhere, either in driplets, or when united under some masterful leader as a devastating and conquering horde. They have radiated east, south and west to China, to India, to Persia and Syria, and across Russia to Europe. Thus the country has always been in a ferment. It has produced no stable society, no civilization of its own. Till the Russian bear crushed its spirit in his own inhuman way, it has been a perpetual spring of hardy barbarous fighters flowing down to land richer than their own. Thus India's contact with the outside world has for the most part been contact with totally uncivilized barbarians, hard fighters and hard livers, with the virtues of their kind, but capable of giving India instruction in nothing but the sword.

We have now the main forces which have moulded the broad lines of Indian history. At its commencement we find an intelligent and comparatively civilized white race settled in India, more thickly in the north than in the south, and ruling over a subject race of dark complexion and inferior attainments. The country in which they live is rich, but has an overpowering and enervating climate, and is subject to terrific visitations of famine and disease. It is also extraordinarily isolated. As a result India must be classed among the countries in which have been developed an original

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civilization. Like Egypt, Greece, Rome and England, not being a thoroughfare of the world and thus comparatively immune from invasion from outside, at any rate from the east and south, it has possessed that stability in local conditions required by a plant of so slow a growth.

The nature of that civilization has been pre-eminently speculative, peaceful and humane. Religion has always exercised a dominant influence upon it. The climatic hindrance to physical activity encouraged the natural speculation of the Aryans, while the iron rule of the great forces of Nature, and their wholesale destruction of human life, gave to their religious ideas a resigned and fatalist aspect. What is the use of foresight and experiment where famine or pestilence might snatch away the fruits of enterprise? Is it not better to plod steadily along in the well-trodden paths of custom, obedient to the will of heaven, striving after individual perfection, in order that at death man might escape a renewal of this tormented mortal life?

The nature of such a religion, the fertility of the soil, and the difficulty of adjusting the relations between an upper and a lower stratum divided by colour, profoundly affected the social side of Indian civilization. India's two chief creations in this field have been the village community and the caste system. The village community was a highly complex organism, admirably adapted to the circumstances of Indian rural life. It provided within itself a complete and adequate machinery for the conduct by the village elders of local affairs, including justice, as well as for cultivation of the communal estate. It had a hierarchy of blacksmiths, watchmen, medicine men, and other workers, in addition to the village accountant and head man. It produced a level of skill in the arts and handicrafts which has always been justly famous. The immense majority of the inhabitants of India, probably over ninety per cent, have always lived in these villages. They are scattered all over the country, a few miles distant one from the other. Their inhabitants number from a few hundreds up to two or three

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thousand. Even to-day towns containing more than five thousand inhabitants are astonishingly rare.

The caste system is mainly the outcome of the efforts of the Aryans and their fellows to preserve the purity of their blood and religious traditions. In course of ages, living side by side, the subject Dravidians had to be incorporated in the Aryan polity. But the Aryans attempted to preserve their predominance by insisting that the right to practise the higher occupations and to impart the truths of religion, could be transmitted only by heredity, and they punished with social ostracism any who dared to pollute the purity of their blood by marrying outside their caste. The Dravidians in their turn copied the custom of the Aryans, and formed themselves into lower castes for the inferior trades. Caste has always been connected with religion, for upon its laws depends the priestly supremacy of the Brahmin class.

In India political institutions have never developed beyond the rudimentary stage. Politics is the science of change, and though there has been much steady development in the realms of thought and custom, there has seldom been need in India for abrupt change. The village community provided for most of the ordinary requirements of a peaceful agricultural society. The need for some higher authority to maintain law and order, to put down bandits, and to settle disputes involving more than one village, was vaguely recognized. But in a country where enterprise was uncommon, even among rogues, and where invasion from outside was infrequent, hereditary princes and nobles sufficed, long after they had been proved wanting in Europe. These potentates too though, as usual, they looked to the privileges rather than to the duties of their station, were seldom cruel or rapacious. The climate, like their social and religious ideas, tended to make them embrace the attractions of ceremonial display rather than conquest and an extended rule. They fought vigorously among themselves, but their quarrels did little to disturb the even current of village life, and their exactions were not a

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sufficient hardship as compared with Nature's, to compel a fatalist and unenterprising people to contrive a better political system for themselves.

In consequence India has always been at the mercy of a strong conqueror. The local princes have had neither unity nor real strength. The people have been unwarlike, and have regarded high politics as beyond their ken. Their business has been to work in the fields, to take their share in the life of the village and to fulfil their duties to their family, their caste, and their gods. Indeed, the history of India is unintelligible until one realizes how tide after tide of conquest has rolled over the country from the north-west, and yet how little change it has made until our time. Invader after invader has swept into India plundering and slaughtering, dynasty after dynasty has arisen to appropriate and enjoy that share of the crops which immemorial custom has set aside for the ruler; but for the mass of the people things have gone on unchanged. Conquests and palace revolutions have been surface ripples. The deep waters of Indian life, its customs, its religious ideas, its mode of life, have remained unstirred.

III

THE history of India begins with the sacred writings of the Aryans—hymns, rules for ritual and ceremonial, and philosophical speculations. A thousand years B.C. we find the following guide to conduct: "Speak the truth. Practise virtue. Do not be indifferent to the attainment of greatness. Do not neglect your duties to the gods or to your parents. Give alms with a willing heart. Give wisely. Give with modesty. Give with fear." From this time, too, dates this philosophy: "The good, the pleasant, these are different things. They who accept the good alone are wise. They who prefer the pleasant miss life's real aim." "To the man without under-

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standing, thoughtless, and deceived by wealth, the future life is not revealed. He who thinks this world alone exists, and the future is not, must yield himself to death time after time." "True knowledge cannot be gained by reasoning. It is subtler than an atom and beyond the ken of reason." "The wise man who has realized truth, gives up both joy and sorrow." "The real self is neither born nor dies. It is unborn, eternal, everlasting." There was a more popular religion for the multitude embodied in two great Homeric epics chronicling the exploits of early mythical heroes, the Mahabarata inculcating the virtues of chivalry and courage, the Ramayana domestic virtue and affection.

The first historical event that can be chronologically fixed is the life of Buddha, who lived about 550 B.C. Buddha was a religious reformer, who founded one of the greatest religions of the world and exercised a profound influence on Hindu thought. He led a revolt against the growing tyranny of caste and the increasing insistence on ceremonial by the priestly Brahmin class. He was a mystic, believing that life was a misfortune and that man was doomed to a recurring series of lives until he proved himself worthy of annihilation. This consummation was to be attained, not by ceremonies and prayers, but by works, by right thinking, right actions, self knowledge and meditation.

In 326 B.C. the slow philosophic current of Indian life was rudely disturbed by the invasion of Alexander the Great. Alexander did not penetrate very far into India; he reached the neighbourhood of the modern Lahore, only to evacuate the country for good the next year. Yet he produced far-reaching effects. Out of the confusion he caused arose the first great Indian Empire founded by Chandra Gupta, with its capital at Pataliputra, which is now Patna, the capital of the new province of Bihar. This Empire included Afghanistan and all India save the extreme south. The administration was autocratic, but it was sufficiently good to enable Chandra Gupta to hand it down unimpaired to his famous grandson Asoka (272 B.C.).

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With Asoka the Indian genius reasserts itself, and the political interest gives way once more to the philosophical. A convert to Buddhism, he directed his great abilities to the propagation of truth rather than to the business of administration. Asoka defined clearly his typically Indian idea of the position of a ruler. "The object of all my exertion is simply to acquit my debt to living beings, so that I may make some of them happy in this world, and that hereafter they may attain heaven." "Whatsoever exertions I have made, all are made with a view to the life hereafter, so that every one may be freed from peril, which peril is sin." His greatest edict was the Law of Piety, which declared that every man was bound to cultivate the virtues of self control, purity of mind, gratitude and fidelity, and to abstain from the vices of rage, cruelty, anger, pride and jealousy. He was also constantly to practise self-examination and be strictly truthful. These and similar injunctions were inscribed on pillars and rocks throughout India, so that all might know the truth. Asoka also built a number of monasteries to house itinerant monks whose duty it was to preach the truths of the Buddhist religion. The remains of these monasteries, as well as Asoka's inscriptions, are still to be seen in all parts.

Asoka, however, was also an administrator. The country was divided into four chief satrapies. It had an efficient standing army, said by Pliny to have numbered six hundred thousand infantry, which was managed by six boards, for transport, commissariat, elephants and so forth. Pataliputra, a city of four hundred thousand people, was governed by a municipal council of thirty, one of whose functions was to make a register of births and deaths. There was a complete hierarchy of magistrates, as well as a body of censors, to promote the observance of the Law of Piety. India was said to be peaceful, prosperous and well governed in his day.

But the empire of Asoka depended upon the personality of the sovereign, and under his successor it rapidly fell to pieces. For the next six hundred years the political history

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of India is confused. Dynasties rose and fell, and there were fresh intrusions from the north-west. But the life of the country does not seem to have been troubled. A Chinese pilgrim, Fa-Hien, who visited India during the period, describes the people as being prosperous and well-behaved. Their taxes were light, punishments were mild, and the government good.

This period was brought to an end about 450 A.D., by the invasion of the white Huns. As before, the disturbance seems to have produced a political reaction, and the Hindu Emperor Harsha wielded power as autocratic and extensive as Asoka himself.

The six hundred years which followed the entry of the white Huns were the heyday of India's civilization. During them there were no invasions and India was left to develop on her own lines. The result was Hinduism, India's most characteristic achievement. By the reign of Harsha the social distinction between the Dravidians and their Aryan conquerors had disappeared, and Dravidian ideas and customs were making their influence felt on the earlier Aryan civilization. Hinduism, the name given to the religion professed by more than two-thirds of the inhabitants of India, is a compound of the earlier Aryan traditions, of the ideas of Buddha, and of the anthropomorphic polytheism of the Dravidian people. But Hinduism is much more than a religion. It is, in many ways, a substitute for government, as we understand it. It is a code of law. It governs minutely the daily conduct of life. It is a system of philosophy for the educated and of ceremonial observance for all.

But while India was evolving Hinduism, she made practically no advance in the political field. The traditions of caste allotted the task of government to one hereditary class, the Kshatriya, as they allotted the duty of preserving and transmitting the truths of religion to another, the Brahmin. Government was not a matter for everybody to play with. Accordingly it was during this period that the Rajputs, a number of hereditary ruling clans, arose and divided the

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country between them. They were incessantly fighting among themselves, but none among them managed to create an Empire. In spite of their bickerings, India was prosperous. Commerce flourished, industry was active, poets and pundits travelled from coast to coast; the normal life of the people went on almost undisturbed. No ruler was hardy enough to interfere with the sacred Brahmin preserve. For the rest, it was the eternal order of things that rulers should fight among themselves. The people and the clergy looked on much as they did in England in the days of feudal strife.

IV

ABOUT 1200 A.D., however, a new era arrived. The invasions from the north-west began once more, and they began in a quite unprecedented form. Hitherto they had been conducted by military conquerors like Alexander, and his feeble imitators, who entered India for the sake of plunder and dominion, or by loosely organized tribes of fierce fighting men who deserted the hills to settle in the plains. Hindu India, like Europe in the early centuries, had almost always been unable to resist these invasions by force, but had taken her revenge later by absorbing her conquerors rapidly into her religious and social system.

The new invaders, however, came not only as conquerors in search of plunder or empire, but as the crusaders of a militant religion. They were the disciples of a prophet, the people of a book in which was written the word of God. Hinduism, while it influenced profoundly their customs and their ideas, was unable to detach them from their allegiance to Islam. To this day the Mohammedans, Indian in their habits and ways, are sharply differentiated from the rest of the population by their religious ideas. Numbering 66,000,000 as against 217,000,000 Hindus they form "an absolutely separate community—distinct by marriage, food

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and custom, and claiming in many cases to belong to a different race from the Hindus." In consequence their rule established was far more permanent than that of preceding invaders, and had far graver effects.

Mohammedan pressure began as early as 700 A.D. with a short-lived Arab conquest of Sind. Three hundred years later, Mahmud of Ghazni—an Afghan town between Kabul and Kandahar—made seventeen expeditions to the plains to plunder and destroy, between 1001-1028 A.D. But the real Mohammedan conquest of India did not begin till 1206, when Mohammed, a Turkoman successor of Mahmud on the throne of Ghazni, succeeded in making himself the paramount power from Kabul to the Bay of Bengal, and established his capital at Delhi. Before the century was out Mohammedan rulers were to be found practically over the whole of India, the greater part of the Deccan falling into their hands between 1295 and 1320 A.D.

Most of the Mohammedan rulers of India were originally Afghan and Turkoman adventurers, who collected an army of northern freebooters about them, overturned the unmilitary Hindu princes, and governed in their place. Many of them acknowledged the vague suzerainty of Delhi, but most in fact, if not in theory, were independent sovereigns. Their rule was something quite different from what India had seen before. To the fierce intolerance of their religion they added the barbarous cruelty and destructiveness traditional in their land of origin. Their objects were conquest, plunder, and dominion. They acknowledged no responsibility for the welfare of their subjects—mostly infidel Hindus—they ruled for their own pleasure, and in the name of Islam, though religion did not deter them for a moment from seizing the domains of their fellow-Mohammedans if they got the chance. The spirit in which they entered the country is shown clearly in the history of Timûr the Lame. Timûr entered India in 1398 and, "slaughtering the inhabitants of every place he passed, and firing the towns, he

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advanced upon Delhi. The Indian army was defeated and Mahmud (the Delhi Emperor), fled to Gujerat. Delhi surrendered and Timûr was publicly proclaimed Emperor of India. An awful massacre and a sack and conflagration of the city, which lasted for days, followed. The march was then continued to Meerut where there was a great massacre." Thence Timûr turned back and left India to look after his conquests to the north, "leaving anarchy and famine and pestilence behind him." The Mohammedan rulers, it is true, gradually lost their Central Asian barbarity in Indian surroundings, but their government, for religious reasons, remained harsh and unsympathetic, and India, in their day, was turbulent as it had never been before. Thus between 1206 and 1526 there were thirty-four kings of Delhi, whose average reign was only nine and a half years, and of whom twelve were deposed, assassinated, or killed in battle.

The outstanding result of the Mohammedan conquest has been that from that time onward Hindu civilization has been stagnant. It remained almost entirely unaffected by Mohammedan ideas, but, with minor exceptions, on which it would take too long to dwell, the period of its highest development and growth came to an end with Ramaniya, the last Hindu reformer, in the twelfth century. In India, as elsewhere, Mohammedan rule in Turkoman hands has been like a blight over the land. The Mohammedans have been active and vigorous, and have exhibited many of the robust virtues which the Hindus have lacked, but, with one exception, their idea of government has been limited to personal autocracy, while belief in progress or the value of a liberal civilization has been barred by a literal acceptance of the injunctions of the Koran.

That exception was the Mogul dynasty, whose history must be examined in more detail, because its overthrow heralded the British occupation. The Mogul Empire was founded in 1526 in the good old style by Babar, a picturesque and poetical ruffian of genius descended from both Genghiz

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Khan and Timûr the Lame. After a stormy early life, in which he lost one kingdom in Ferghana and founded another at Kabul, he saw that the strife of the Mohammedan rulers in the plains of India gave him his opportunity of carving out a kingdom for himself. In his memoirs, a book crammed with picturesque adventures, occur the following passages: "On Friday, September 1, 1525, I set out on my march towards Hindustan. Great and small, good and bad, servants and no servants, my force numbered twelve thousand persons." "I placed my foot in the stirrup of resolution and my hand on the reins of confidence in God, and marched against Sultan Ibrahim . . . in whose possession the throne of Delhi and the dominions of Hindustan at that time were; whose army in the field was said to amount to ten hundred thousand men." Babar was completely victorious and established himself firmly as Emperor of northern India.

The liberal genius discernible in the memoirs of Babar found expression in some of his descendants. Akbar, his grandson (1556-1605), one of the greatest men who ever lived, entirely reversed the methods of his Mohammedan predecessors. He recognized that the weakness of the earlier emperors of Delhi had sprung from three causes—the liability to invasion from the north-west, rebellious military governors, and Hindu disaffection caused by oppression. Accordingly he created a standing army sufficient to protect his frontiers and overawe his subordinates, he entrusted the work of administration to civilian, not military, officials, regularly paid, and he abolished all discriminations against the Hindus. He had a high conception of the functions of a ruler, and based his policy on two principles—that it was his business to govern in the interest of the people, and that there should be equal toleration for Mohammedans and Hindus alike. He organized his administration in three departments, military, judicial and revenue. When he was on campaign he did not seize his supplies but paid for everything he took. Inland tolls were abolished, famine was

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provided against, irrigation works were undertaken. He introduced an entirely new system of dealing with land revenue, which is continued substantially unchanged by the British to this day. He introduced many needed reforms. He prohibited "suttee"—the burning of widows. Slavery was resolutely suppressed. Child marriages were made illegal. The remarriage of widows was declared lawful. Animal sacrifices and trial by ordeal were forbidden.

Akbar was the one Mohammedan prince who attempted to revive the vitality of Indian civilization, and he set to work to do so by breaking down the old barriers between Mohammedans and Hindus. He abolished the tax on non-Mohammedans, he married his sons to Hindu princesses, and he employed Hindu officials throughout his service. He encouraged poets, architects, and philosophers to flock to his court, and the edifices built by himself and by his grandson, Shah-jahan, rank with the finest monuments raised by man. He loved to listen to philosophical and religious disputes in his palace in Agra fort, and encouraged the utmost freedom in the expression of opinions. His religious ideas were tolerant and profound. "I will," he said, "cut no man off from his own mode of intercourse with his maker." They were clearly influenced by Hindu thought, and are represented by the following verses inscribed by his minister, Abu-l-Fazl, on a temple in Kashmir, "O God, in every temple they seek thee, in every language they praise thee. Each religion says that it holds thee. But it is thee that I seek from temple to temple, for heresy and orthodoxy stand not behind the screen of thy truth. Heresy to the heretic, orthodoxy to the orthodox, but only the dust of the rose petal remains to the seller of the perfume."

But the rule of Akbar like that of Asoka and all great Indian princes centred in the person of the emperor. There was no informed electorate as in the West to-day. There was no hereditary ruling class as in Great Britain before the Reform Bill. The whole machinery of government derived its motion from the emperor alone. With Aurangzeb

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(1658-1707) the last of the great Moguls passed away, and he, so far from carrying on the work of Akbar, destroyed it. He centralized government in his own person even more completely than Akbar had done, and, being a bigoted Mohammedan, he revived the old discriminations against the Hindus. He had not even the saving grace of being a patron of art, which he thought with Mohammed was sacrilegious. One day he met a funeral procession, and on asking who was dead, was told Music, which he had forbidden at court. "Good," he replied, "then let her be buried deep."

By the end of his reign Aurangzeb had undermined the Mogul Empire. His bigotry had roused the Hindus to revolt, and his constant wars against rebels had imposed an unbearable burden on the people. His revenue from land alone was £43,000,000, or more than twice the sum raised by the British to-day. After his death India sank into indescribable confusion. A medley of minor powers struggled for existence or predominance. Religious differences lent acrimony to the strife. The invasions from the north-west, long unknown, began once more. Nadir Shah, a Turkoman ruler of Persia and Afghanistan, and Ahmed Shah, an Afghan king, invaded India in 1739-1741 and 1761, though they established no permanent rule. Probably never was there so much widespread destruction and suffering in India before.

What would have happened if India had been left to herself it is impossible to say. Aurangzeb had no successor capable of restoring discipline to the armies, and order to the finances, and within fifty years the Mogul Empire was but a name. The Hindus were everywhere in the ascendant, the Marathas to the south, the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Rajputs in the territory between. The Mohammedans were in a minority, their vigour had been undermined, and unless they had obtained new blood from the north-west, their political supremacy would probably have to come to an end. But before the issue could be decided an entirely new

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power appeared upon the scene, which was strong enough to impose upon India its own solution of her problems. In 1765 Clive had accepted from the titular Mogul emperor the direct administration of the revenues of Bengal, and a first-class European nation thus became an important territorial power in India. What were the causes which led to its appearance?

V

DESPITE the geographical isolation of India, there has always been a considerable trade between India and Europe in jewels, the precious metals, embroidered stuffs, spices and essences of all kinds. In early times these articles were borne in coasting vessels from southern India to the head of the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, to be carried overland to Constantinople or the Mediterranean. Pliny says that in his time some of the vessels plying in this trade were capable of carrying as many as three thousand amphorae.* The rise of the Mohammedan power in Arabia gravely interfered with this traffic, which was gradually diverted to the north, progressing laboriously on the backs of camels and donkeys across Afghanistan and northern Persia, or even round the north of the Caspian and Black Sea to Constantinople. At this time, says Finlay, the historian of the Byzantine Empire, "the commerce of Europe centred at Constantinople . . . more completely than it has ever done since in any one city." But the rise of those Turkoman powers, whose devastating entry into India has been recorded, had the effect of closing the ancient trade route between India and Europe. For a time the crusades restrained the flood of Turkish conquest, but in 1453 it broke through the half-hearted resistance and, capturing Constantinople, finally closed the ancient traverse to the east.

The rise of the Turks alarmed the conscience at the same time that it damaged the pockets of Europe. As long before

* About 110 tons,

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the capture of Constantinople as 1418 Prince Henry of Portugal, the Navigator, resolved to devote the rest of his life to discovering the means of reaching India by sea. His objects were threefold: to take the Mohammedans in rear, to spread Christianity among the infidels, and to restore the fortunes of Portugal by reopening the ancient trade with the East. Prince Henry died in 1460, but in the meantime he had contrived a type of vessel fit to withstand the storms of the Atlantic, and before the end of the century his labours had borne fruit in the discovery of the sea route, both to India and America. By this time the Turkish danger had died away and the religious motive had given way to the commercial. The trade proved extremely lucrative, and Spaniards and Portuguese were soon in active rivalry for the lion's share. This led to fierce disputes, for, according to the ideas of the time, the right to trade was a monopoly of the first discoverer and was no more an international privilege than is colonization to-day. The matter was referred at the end of the century to the arbitration of the Pope, the international authority of the day, who settled it wisely enough by allotting Africa and India as private trading ground to the Portuguese, and America to the Spaniards.

Half a century later, the northern nations of Europe, and notably the English and the Dutch, awoke to the value of trade with the newly discovered portions of the earth. The prosperity of the Tudor days, and the new ideas disseminated by the Renaissance, stimulated a spirit of adventure which found congenial expression in plundering Spanish galleons on the high seas. The Reformation gave the English an excellent excuse for ignoring the title conferred by the Papal bull, and it was not long before their intrusions into what the Spaniards regarded as their private property aroused the wrath of the Spanish King. Two events brought the quarrel to a head. Queen Elizabeth recognized the independence of the Dutch Republic in 1578, and in 1580 Philip II of Spain annexed Portugal and all her foreign possessions and trading rights in the east. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588

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not only preserved the freedom of England and gave her command of the sea for the first time, but also opened the road to the Far East. The Spaniards still professed to regard trade with the Indies as part of their sovereignty. They treated the Indian seas as territorial waters, and attempted to prevent the creation of any ports upon the Indian shores but their own. But, with their sea power shattered, they could not sustain their claim in practice and, before the seventeenth century was very old, it had tacitly lapsed.

By this time the whole trade between India and Europe had been transferred from the overland route to the sea. It was immensely lucrative. A single ship to the Clove Islands in 1606 made a profit of 236 per cent, and goods costing £356,000 in India were sold in England in 1622 for £1,914,000. But if the Spanish claims had been indignantly repudiated, the era of free trade ideas had not begun, and the fiercest competition set in between the various trading companies. One and all claimed monopoly of the trade with the area served by their factories and ports. The nature of the struggle was very different from what we understand by commercial competition to-day, and rival companies thought little of seizing one another's factories and ports when strong enough to do so. "The extent," says Sir Alfred Lyall, "to which unofficial war was practised from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century by the roving nations of Europe is hardly perhaps appreciated in this age of international law and ubiquitous diplomacy." The governments did not regard themselves as directly interested in trade, and the company charters practically amounted to licences for private war. Thus an early treaty between France and Spain provided that westward of the Canaries *tout serait à la force*.

Early in the seventeenth century the Spaniards concentrated their attention on the gold and silver mines of Peru and their other American possessions, and the enterprise of the Portuguese began to fail under Spanish rule. In consequence the English and the Dutch were left as the chief rivals for the trade with the East Indies. But towards the

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end of the century a complete change in the situation was brought about by the appearance of a new competitor, France. Hitherto the relations of England with India had affected her trade alone. They now began to affect her national existence. For the appearance of the French was not prompted merely by the desire to share in the profits of the East Indian trade. It was part of the scheme conceived first by Richelieu and later adopted by Louis XIV for establishing a world-wide dominion. To achieve their object Louis and his ministers recognized perfectly well the necessity not only of extending their possessions abroad, but of fostering their overseas trade, which was one of the main sources of their revenue. Leibnitz in 1672 presented to Louis a document in which he counselled him to seize Egypt as the best method of obtaining control of the invaluable Eastern trade, "for the king only requires to acquire command of the sea, and to possess a large foreign trade, in order to become the arbiter of the affairs of Europe."

The struggle with France began in 1690. The first stage, which ended in 1713, was caused mainly by events in Europe, the espousal by Louis of the Stuart cause after the revolution of 1688, and his attempt to establish a French predominance in Europe by uniting the crowns of France and Spain. It did not directly concern India but it had one important effect there, inasmuch as the Dutch were so weakened with their struggles against the French in Europe that they were never able to recover their position in the East.

The second and more important stage opened in 1741. Though the war began over the succession to the Austrian throne, in reality it was the outbreak of a struggle long inevitable between France and Great Britain for predominance in India, in America, and on the high seas. In this contest, which did not end till 1763, the British were entirely victorious, partly because their command of the sea deprived the French of reinforcements and supplies in India and America, and partly because the French resources were

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exhausted by their endless dynastic wars upon the Continent of Europe.

The defeat of the French by sea had decisive results in India. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century a complete change had come over the Indian situation. In early days the right to trade had generally been obtained by a "firman" from the Mogul emperor, and any attempt on the part of a European trading company to annex territory would certainly have invited disaster. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the government of the Moguls had crumbled into ruin. Even as long before as 1687, during the last stormy years of Aurangzeb, the Directors of the East India Company, distracted by the growing lawlessness of the country, had resolved to assume independent jurisdiction within their own settlements and ports and to enlist militia to defend them from attack.

Fifty years later both French and English trading companies had come to regard their ports and coast settlements as territorial possessions. By the time that war broke out in Europe rivalry between them had become exceedingly acute, and Dupleix, the Governor of the French company, determined to avail himself of the outbreak of hostilities to win a final victory for his company and his nation, by turning the British, bag and baggage, out of India. For this purpose he began to intrigue with the Indian princes, who were fighting to carve dominions for themselves out of the moribund Mogul Empire, promising his help in return for assistance against the British. The British followed his example, and a struggle ensued in which the British and French companies in India, assisted spasmodically by troops from home, and in alliance first with one native prince and then with another, fought for predominance. As has been said, superiority by sea in European waters ensured the success of the British. In the course of the struggle, and after the atrocity of the Black Hole of Calcutta, England had become the paramount power in Bengal. And when it was over, the French, disgusted with colonial adventure, and already under the influence of

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Rousseau and Voltaire, abandoned altogether their ambitions in the East. In 1770 the French East Indian Company went bankrupt. Thus by 1763 the British, in control of a considerable territorial domain and possessed of the only strong and efficient army in the country, were left alone in India.

The history of the gradual extension of the British dominion over India from that point is a familiar story. For many years it was the resolute determination both of the Company and the British Government to resist extending their domain. Clive himself in 1765 said that India was within the grasp of England if she chose to take it. "It is scarcely hyperbole," he wrote, "to say that to-morrow the whole Mogul Empire is in our power. The inhabitants of the country have no attachment to any obligation; their forces are neither disciplined, commanded, nor paid as ours are. Can it be doubted that a large army of Europeans would efficiently preserve us as sovereigns, not only holding in awe the attempts of any country prince, but rendering us so truly formidable that no French or Dutch or other enemy will presume to molest us?" Despite this entirely accurate estimate of the situation, Clive declared it to be his resolute intention "absolutely to bind our possessions and conquests to Bengal."

But events were too strong. Disorder on the frontier, attacks by upstart leaders, foreign intrigues against the British by native princes, notably with France during the war of American independence and in the time of Napoleon, drove the British, step by step, to extend their influence and their domain. They attempted to rule Indian territory through dependent Nawabs, with the only result that to the disorder of Indian government was added the evil of dual control. They attempted to limit expansion by erecting barrier states, but their obligation to their allies compelled them to intervene to protect them, which they could only do effectively by assuming direct charge of their affairs. But all to no avail. India was a medley of fighting

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chiefs and captains. Brigandage was an endemic plague. How grave was the disorder may be seen from the fact that at the time there were 2,000,000 roving mercenaries in the country, mostly Afghans and other tribesmen, ready to sell their services to those who could pay, or if there was no bidder, to help themselves. In the interests of India, as in their own, the British had no option but to advance.

VI

BEFORE, however, examining the nature of British rule in India, we must note one aspect of the long struggle between the European powers for the Indian trade, which had a far-reaching effect on our subsequent policy in India.

The original motives which inspired Portuguese and Spanish expansion were three, commercial, religious, and dynastic. The early explorers and the kings who backed them wished to profit by trade, to fight for Christendom, and to acquire dominion. With the English it was different. They did not go forth to preach Christianity by the sword, or to win dominion for their king; the predominant motive for their connexion with the East from the days of Elizabeth till the reign of George II, was the desire to share in the profitable Indian trade.

This difference cannot be explained by saying that the English have the souls of shopkeepers. The cause of it is more profound. Even as early as the days of Elizabeth the English had begun to profit by their fortunate geographical position. After the Norman conquest they had never to resist any serious foreign invasion, and they were able to concentrate their undistracted attention on the creation of a stable system of government at home. By 1500, the lawlessness of the great feudal nobles, and the personal ambition of the king for tyranny at home, or expeditions in search of glory abroad, had been gradually

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curbed. The prosperity of the Tudor age and the Reformation had also quickened the sense of independence in the people. In consequence, the opening of the road to India was regarded as an opportunity for private enterprise rather than for royal conquest, and public policy was governed by the interests of the dominant classes—the nobility and the traders, and not by the ambitions of the king.

The peoples inhabiting the Continent of Europe were not so fortunately situated. They had no natural barriers like the Channel against external aggression, and, in fact, internal peace was continually upset by intrusions from outside. Strong kings, possessed of military force, were the best guarantees against these attacks, but strong kings were also able to resist the infant efforts of the people to take charge of public policy for themselves. In consequence, the policy of all the great countries of Europe, until the French Revolution, was dictated solely by the monarch and the advisers whom he chose.

The contrast between results of the dynastic policy of the continental powers and the popular policy of England is very striking. Apart altogether from such internal advantages as greater personal liberty and greater security for life and property, the English escaped altogether the exhaustion which overtook the peoples of Europe after the endless dynastic wars of the seventeenth century. England's policy, being moulded in the popular interest, was steady and continuous, not vacillating with the whims or deaths of monarchs. It looked steadfastly to real advantages, like safety for trade and country and command of the sea, instead of to the illusory glories and rewards of conquest. It regarded the Indies and the New World as fields for trade or colonization, not as territory to be annexed in order that the royal dignity might grow, and the royal revenues might be enlarged by the monopoly of gold and silver mines, and by heavy tolls on the operations of colonists and traders.

But if her democratic system of government was the chief cause of Great Britain's triumph in her struggle with the

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absolutist powers of Europe, it produced even greater effects on India. As we have seen, local anarchy impelled the East India Company to acquire a territorial domain. No sooner was this done than public opinion in England drove the British Government to take charge. For centuries the popular cry had been that the duty of the government was to consider the interests of the governed, and the national conscience soon found it impossible to reconcile these maxims at home, with the evils and exactions of the system of company rule in India. The liberal and humanitarian feelings aroused by the Wesley revival, and the exaggerations current at the time of the Warren Hastings trial, increased misgivings and forced the British Government, step by step, to assume direct responsibility for the administration of the Company's possessions in India. Though the Company did not finally disappear till after the Mutiny of 1857, the British Government had taken charge of its dominions long before.

This did not simply mean that India was endowed with a government unlike any that she had experienced before. It meant also that the impulse to expansion was multiplied a hundred fold. If it was important for the Company that trade should not be destroyed by anarchy, it was infinitely more a necessity to the Indians themselves that the 2,000,000 mercenaries should be subjected to discipline and control, that an end should be put to the internecine strife of hereditary princes and rulers, that the war of Mohammedan and Hindu for predominance should be stopped, and that their frontiers should be protected from the devastation of Afghan hordes, or the depredation of other powers. Directly the British Government assumed responsibility for India, it had to consider the interests of its new subjects as well as of its own traders. It has been the welfare of India far more than the needs of India which has forced the expansion of the British domain. It has been no less the welfare of India which has driven the Government to establish in recent years an ever-growing measure of control over that

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third of India, which has never been conquered and formally annexed, and which is still governed by independent native chiefs. British India could not progress if, side by side with its civilized administration, there were appalling examples of autocratic tyranny and misrule. Its traders and agriculturists could not be allowed to starve because reactionary rulers forbade railways or telegraphs, roads or canals to cross their territory. Peace and good government could not be endangered because native princes wished to try their hand at conquest or their skill in diplomatic negotiation with foreign powers.

Thus it was the necessity of protecting their own lives and trade, and the struggle with France, which first compelled the British to occupy territory in India. It was responsibility for the welfare of their new subjects which drove them to establish a government which could maintain peace, law and order throughout the length and breadth of India, and protect it against attack from without.

The position of the British in India, indeed, cannot be understood until it is realized that in internal policy they represent India and not England. To speak of British rule is strictly a misnomer. It is nearer the truth to say that the government is conducted chiefly by Englishmen, representing in fact, if not in democratic theory, the people of India. It is literally the Government of India. More than this, since the British assumed responsibility for the government of India, not only has their policy in India been an essentially Indian policy, but Indian interests have profoundly influenced British policy. England has become a first-class Asiatic power because her government represents India. Her policy in the East is mainly directed to protect the safety of her Indian subjects. The British Cabinet watches anxiously to-day the slow march of Russia towards the Persian Gulf, not only because the appearance of a Russian base in those waters would mean additional burdens and complications at home, but because it would threaten the safety of Indian shores, and impose a burden for naval

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defence upon the shoulders of India's peoples from which they are at present free. From 1765 down to the present day, in framing British policy in the East, the interests of Great Britain and the interests of India have been inextricably conjoined.

VII

WHEN they assumed responsibility for the government of India, the British, in accordance with the principles of government they had devised at home, confined themselves entirely to politics. They left religious and social customs alone, save where they were patently barbarous, as in the case of widow-burning. Their business was to construct a stable system of administration which would do justice impartially between individuals, and promote the material and intellectual welfare of the people. This was precisely the sphere in which India was most backward. Government in India had never passed the stage of the hereditary autocrat, and while India had produced many great rulers, it had never devised a system for perpetuating the benefits of their administration. The British supplied exactly what Indian government lacked, continuity in sound and progressive administration. Their government has been autocratic. It could not fail to be, for it is not possible to create in a day the conditions which have made democratic government stable and continuous at home, namely, such a degree of outstanding knowledge and public spirit in a popular electorate, that it can work successfully a representative system of government. The word autocratic, colourless in its derivation, has acquired an unpleasant meaning from association with its ordinary results. This reputation does not attach to the British autocracy in India. Brought up in the traditions of British public life, and freed from that strongest of temptations to stray from the path of political rectitude, connexion with local families, cliques,

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traditions, and religions, the British have conducted an administration more impartial, and more dispassionate than any Oriental country has ever seen.

They have also been vigorous to a degree unknown in India before. Resident there only in the prime of life, they lose but little of that instinct for efficiency and improvement which is, perhaps, the dominant trait of the Anglo-Saxon race. In consequence they have not been content simply to maintain law and order and to do justice among their subjects. They have thrown themselves heart and soul into the task of developing the country, and of elevating its people. When they entered India, government in the East as in the West was a comparatively simple undertaking. To-day, owing to the innumerable functions which it is expected to discharge in the spheres of transportation, communication, public health and social welfare, it is extremely complex. Every extension of government activity in the West has had its counterpart in the East. The functions of government in India are as multitudinous as they are in England. The whole of this vast machine has been the product of the initiative of the British. There is scarcely an institution or an enterprise commenced since their arrival in the country which has not been originated by them.

The achievements of the British in building railways or roads or canals, their enthusiasm for improved methods of agriculture or manufacture, their practical efficiency in administration, their impartial justice on the bench—all these things are remarkable—but they are in no sense exceptional. They can be paralleled elsewhere. What is unique is the astounding moral ascendancy of the English. A handful of Europeans, numbering but a few thousands, absolutely dominate by their presence a country containing 315,000,000 souls. To a stranger the position of the Government official is almost terrifying. It is not so much his legal powers as the moral influence he wields that is so tremendous. If there is a dispute between villagers, it is the Collector who

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must decide, or, failing him, any *Sabib*, rather than a possibly interested native arbitrator; for the *Sabib* may be stupid, but he will certainly be just. If a new road is to be made, or a nuisance removed, or an improvement built, it is the Englishman who must make the start and show the way. If it is a case of service on a municipal board, or district council, it is generally the invitation of the official, not the responsibilities or even the privileges of membership, which induces the local notables to serve. When any project is mooted, assent depends upon the answer to the universal question, "What does the Government think?"

This is not because the British have been greedy of power, or have kept initiative jealously in their hands, or have overawed the land with an obtrusive army. In part it is because in India there has been no tradition of public spirit, since princes and emperors have always been suspicious of enterprise among their subjects; in part it is due to an enervating climate; in part it is due to the absorption of the people in their own affairs and their indifference to politics and change. But mainly it is because the British have possessed vigour, knowledge, public spirit, and an impartial enthusiasm for the practical business of government, which have raised them far beyond the level of all but a very few of their Indian competitors.

As a result the British are indispensable to India. There is no other class in India to-day capable of administering the vast governmental machine. If by a miracle every Englishman were to disappear from India to-morrow, things would simply come to a standstill. The situation would be analogous to that caused recently in England by the stoppage of supplies of coal, which gave heat and energy to the national life.

But the British are also indispensable because India is still divided within itself. To the outside eye India may seem one country. In reality it is as divided as Europe. According to the census there are in India forty-three races. There are twenty-one languages in every-day use. Forty-five

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million people speak Bengali. No other language in the world can claim as many people who understand it. To the educated classes English is the only *lingua franca*, and it is always used on occasions when representatives of all India are gathered together. Even notices of lodgings to let in the sacred city of Benares are printed in English for the benefit of the poorer pilgrims. There are two chief religions, bitterly hostile to one another. There are five others, each with more than 1,000,000 adherents. There are 2,378 main castes and tribes, each of which is debarred from marriage beyond its own ranks. The area of the Indian Empire is as great as Europe without Russia, and one-third of it is under the rule of hereditary princes, sovereign in the purely internal concerns of their States, proud of their martial traditions, and intensely jealous of their dignity and powers. Out of the total population, only one man in ten and one woman in a hundred and forty-four can read and write. If the British were to leave, not only would the machinery of government decay; the discord of race, language and religion would instantly revive the old conditions of riot, revolution and war.

It is only by travelling in India that one can realize the tremendous responsibility which rests upon the shoulders of the British race. The peace and happiness of 315,000,000 souls depends upon them to-day as much as the safety and happiness of a child depends upon its parents. It is very much as if a race of men had appeared in Europe in the year 1500 from the Antipodes, had obliterated national boundaries, enforced religious toleration, disbanded the contending armies, put an end to war, and within a century had equipped the country with a modern system of scientific industry and communication, and endowed it with a government as benevolent and complete as any that exists in Europe to-day, but embracing the whole continent, and yet deriving its authority not from its subjects but from New Zealand.

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VIII

TO insist, however, that the British are necessary to good government in India is to explain but one-half of the present situation. If the people of India, intelligent and constructive in other respects, have hitherto been lacking in political aptitude, in great measure this has been because they have laboured under two great disabilities. The first has been their climate. The second has been their entire isolation from other civilizations than their own. The coming of the European from across the seas has diminished the first and removed the second of these disabilities.

Western medicine and organization have discovered how to mitigate to some extent the effects of the climate. They have done much to prevent the ravages of famine, malaria and even plague, and they have found remedies for previously incurable disease. For the rich they have invented better clothing and food, more efficient means of cooling houses, and the revivifying hill station. Intercourse with the British has opened Indian eyes to a thousand ideas of which they had no conception before. No direct attack has been made upon the strongholds of religious belief or social custom, but still the effect is immense. Scientific criticism and exact knowledge are steadily destroying prejudice and superstition, and are remodelling the methods of agriculture and industry and the habits they produce. Western literature is awakening minds long dormant to ideas of liberty and progress. The example of the English has aroused the ambition to emulate them in the direct self-regarding honesty of their ways. Caste is altering its character and gradually breaking down. The seclusion of women—a Hindu as well as a Mohammedan practice—is becoming less universal among the upper classes, though it is extending as a mark of social respectability among the lower.

It is evident that this first contact of India with the civilized outside world, after the long repression of the Moham-

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medan era, must have incalculable effects. And the pace at which the change is proceeding is being enormously increased by the methods adopted by British and Indians alike to educate the people in the thought and learning of the West. In 1909 there were 168,000 educational institutions, containing nearly 6,000,000 scholars. In the same year 12,000 students matriculated at the Indian universities. In 1911 there were no less than 1,700 Indian students in England, receiving an education infinitely more potent in its effects upon their minds than is Oxford or Cambridge on the average British boy. The general passion for Western education, indeed, is the most striking proof of the rise of a new India; for education means change, the abandonment of early beliefs, the firm conviction that man is the master of his own fate in the world, and not the powerless slave of inexorable laws—the very antithesis of the inertia and fatalism of previous days. Only a few weeks ago a leading Indian review said that the “peoples of the Orient are descending from their cold Himalayan heights of philosophic indifference, and will no longer permit it to be said by a triumphant West that

‘The East bowed low before the blast
In patient, deep disdain,
She let the legions thunder past
Then plunged in thought again.’”

It was inevitable that this movement should manifest itself in the political sphere. An Indian writer has recently acknowledged that “Orientals have learnt the deep significance of a peculiarly Western dictum that ‘Man is a political animal.’” Especially since the Japanese war and the revolutions in Persia and Turkey, Indians have put forward a growing claim “to be allowed a larger share in shaping the policy of the Government.”

Their entry into the arena in which the British have held unchallenged sway is bound to have momentous consequences. Their claim is not like that of an uneducated mass of barbarians, as some people appear to think. Previous

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pages may have given the impression that Indians were all of one level, and that the problem of the British in India might be compared to the problem of ruling the negro tribes in Africa. Nothing could be more fallacious. India is full of highly educated, thoughtful, and competent people. It has great ruling families comparable to those represented in the House of Lords. It has numberless country gentlemen exactly like the country gentlemen of England. It has professional men of the highest qualifications and standing, lawyers, judges, doctors, many of them trained in England. It has a huge hierarchy of public officials holding all but a few hundred of the topmost positions. It has a growing financial and commercial class. The potential influence of these men is prodigious. It has not been exercised in the past, because they have been traditionally indifferent to politics. They are rapidly ceasing to be indifferent, and their demand to be allowed to share in the control of public policy is not one that can possibly be ignored.

What has been England's answer? True to her own principles of government she has looked at the question as it affected the interests of India. And from that point of view there could be only one reply. Political unrest has had its bad side. Narrow extremists, quick to shuffle on to others the blame for their own defects, have preached sedition and anarchy, with results familiar to all. But in the main it has been entirely healthy. It has represented a deliberate striving after self-reliance and responsibility. If Indians are to free themselves from the reproach that they are wanting in public spirit, that they are unable to shoulder responsibility, that they are incapable of dealing fairly with their fellows in politics, they can vindicate themselves only by being allowed to prove in practice that the reproach is no longer true.

As long ago as 1882 the experiment was made of creating municipalities and district boards, composed almost exclusively of Indians, under a British official chairman, entrusted with the construction of roads, bridges, sanita-

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tion, street cleaning, and empowered to make by-laws, levy rates, and so forth. In 1910 there were nearly 800 of these municipal councils, chiefly elected by the local ratepayers. There was also a very large number of district boards, also mainly elected by various local interests. In 1909 this process, which had been continuously developed in the meanwhile, was carried an immense step forward, by the enlargement of the Provincial and Imperial legislative councils. The Provincial councils contain a considerable majority of unofficial members, chiefly elected by municipalities and district boards. They have ample powers of discussion and all the local legislation of the great provinces has to receive their sanction. The Imperial legislative council—the body which makes laws for the whole of India, and discusses every aspect of public policy save foreign affairs and defence, was enlarged to 68, of which 30 members are non-officials, chiefly elected by the Provincial councils. There is therefore in India to-day a system of representation influencing the action of Government at every stage. No one can attend the debates at the Imperial legislative councils without being impressed with the high level of knowledge and debating power, and the sense of public responsibility, displayed by the Indian representatives.

Not only have Indians been given a direct voice in the control of public affairs. They have been admitted into the *arcana* of government. One of the seats in the Viceroy's council—the Indian cabinet—is allotted to an Indian, who thus becomes the head of one of the great departments of State. Two seats on the India Council, which shares with the Secretary of State and the British cabinet the ultimate responsibility for India, are held by natives of India.

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IX

WE can now understand something of the problem of India. We have seen that in the past we were driven to India by the simple necessities of existence. Civilized life depends on the division of labour and the exchange of its products. It is man's inalienable right to trade with his neighbours. Having gone to India to trade, we were driven step by step into establishing a territorial dominion there, partly because Indians at the time were incapable of maintaining law and order for themselves, partly because the protection of our national liberties involved us in a desperate struggle for predominance with France. Once we made ourselves responsible for government in India, the interests of our subjects compelled us to assume charge of the whole country.

The future no man can forecast; but the two principles which have governed our policy in the past will still govern it in the years that lie ahead. On the one side are the interests of the Empire. The commerce of Great Britain with India to-day is worth more than £80,000,000 a year. Even Australia does business with her worth £3,000,000 a year. On this trade depend not merely the profits of merchants, but the employment of many thousands of workpeople. On it also depend the national revenues from customs duties, income tax, and so on. Disorder in India would mean ruin at home. Commerce links us indissolubly with India to-day, and will continue to link us in the future. Strategy does so no less. We can never willingly acquiesce in the establishment of any foreign rule in India. We can never willingly see a regenerated India become an independent power. We should no more welcome Indian Dreadnoughts in Indian waters, controlled by an independent Indian Government, than we should welcome the battleships of Russia or Japan. That is one cardinal feature of the future policy of Britain in India. Whatever the status of India may be,

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INDIA AND THE EMPIRE

whether she remains a dependency, or whether she attains the full stature of a self-governing Dominion, she must for all time remain within the Empire. To humanity at large, no less than to the Empire, it would be a calamity that India should become a fresh centre of international friction, and a fresh fountain of armaments.

On the other side are the interests of India. To a surprising extent they correspond with those of England. India also needs internal peace and order. India also requires commerce if her people are to rise in the scale of civilization. India also must remain part of the Empire if she is to be secure against foreign aggression and to avoid the crushing burden of armaments which enmity with the Empire would entail. But India also demands progress in the political sphere, and progress means a change in the character of British rule. Here is the supreme problem. Nobody doubts that India ought to progress towards self-government; but nobody knows how the process is to be carried out, or what the ultimate end will be.

The ideal goal is clear. It is that some day or other India should acquire the status of a self-governing Dominion, independent in the control of her own internal affairs, a loyal and willing partner with the other units of the Empire in their common concerns. Whether she will ever be able to attain complete self-government will depend entirely upon the capacity of her people to progress in knowledge and self-control. How slow the process must be only those who know India can understand. A famous despatch of the Government of India has described Indian society as "essentially a congeries of widely-separated classes, races and communities, with divergencies of interests and hereditary sentiment, which for ages have precluded common active and local unanimity," and a leading Indian—the Aga Khan—has recently declared that "generations must pass before India is a nation." When, in addition to disunion, one sees the still appalling ignorance and apathy of the agriculturists, the want of initiative, and the reluc-

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tance to assume responsibility among the country gentry—together three-fourths of the people—and when one remembers that the present Government is no longer the simple, old-fashioned one, but the complex, all-pervading system introduced from the West, it is obvious that it will be long before India can govern herself on democratic lines.

But if this mitigates the difficulty during the intermediate stage, it does not remove it; for progress, if slow, will be steady. How is power and the responsibility for internal affairs to be transferred by degrees from the British to the Indians without causing an irreparable split between the two? It has proved a difficult task with the Dominions, and, before we learnt the road, America had broken away. With India it will be immeasurably more difficult; for it is a country peopled by a race different in blood, different in colour, different in every habit and custom of life from ourselves, and with whom understanding and sympathy is difficult to attain. Yet at bottom the conditions are the same. The Dominions remain within the Empire solely because they wish to do so. If in the future India also remains within the Empire it will not be because we are strong or because we govern justly and well, but because we retain her respect and goodwill. We cannot look to any substantial British community in India to help to keep her loyal to the Empire. India is not a white man's country. It is composed and always will be composed of Indians, with a tiny sprinkling of outsiders occupied either in trade, or as soldiers, or in government service. Nor can we look to the sword. There are 75,000 British troops in India, and a native army twice that size. Amply adequate to deal with riot or fanatical rebellion to-day, such a force, or any force that we could pour into India would be powerless to resist a determined movement in an educated India. It is not so much that our troops could be overpowered, but that our government would be blocked at every turn and our position made untenable. If India, progressing as she hopes to progress, and as the British with their schools, their missionaries, their repre-

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sentative institutions, are encouraging her to progress, remains within the Empire, it will be solely because her people wish to do so.

If we look, therefore, to the future the problem is not so much to perfect military organization, or to maintain a just and enlightened administration—though these are essential—as to retain the good will and respect of the people of India. To imagine that to-day India is hostile to British rule is a profound mistake. Indians not only recognize that they cannot do without the British, but they look on the Government of India as a government of their own and not as an alien rule. The individual English official may not be popular, because he is not understood and because colour prejudice is blind, but he is regarded as being as good an Indian in his policy as the native born. So long as that relation is maintained, the problem of the future is not insoluble. Only one thing can make a rupture inevitable—if the British in India or elsewhere should allow their policy to be swayed from the paths of equity and justice by pride of colour or race. The belief that we treat them as inferior or inherently incapable of development, not on their true merits, but because of their blood or the pigment of their skins, will unite all Indians, Mohammedans with Hindu, high caste and low caste, north and south, in revolt against our rule, as nothing else will do. If such danger exists it is to be feared rather from the Englishmen living in the other parts of the world than from those who know India.

To talk about colonial self-government in India is, no doubt, to look far ahead. It does not fall within the field of practical politics. But it is well that those outside India, who are ultimately responsible for its government, yet who only occasionally have time to glance at its affairs, should see where things are moving. For whether the pace be fast or slow, that is the goal towards which events in India, propelled by Indian and British alike, are travelling. To dam the tide would raise a flood which would overwhelm not only

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our rule but India herself in a torrent of desolation. To roll it back would be to burden ourselves for all time with the responsibility for the daily welfare of three hundred million souls.

But, if the task before the British is difficult, it is also well worth the undertaking, for on its achievement great things depend. Fate has entrusted the British with the duty of instructing well-nigh one half of the people of Asia in the civilization of the West. If they succeed, they will be the agents through whom one-sixth of mankind will not only enjoy good government and material prosperity, but will be fitted to take their stand as self-dependent citizens of the world. If they succeed, they will have discovered how to compose that world-old feud between East and West, between coloured and white, which threatens once more to engulf mankind in war. If they succeed, they will lay broad and deep the foundation of an Empire which will then have proved its claim to be foremost among the political fabrics of the day for its freedom and its self-respect.

There is a school of opinion which laments the Westernization of the East. If to bring justice to the oppressed, liberty to the slave, enlightenment to the ignorant, the opportunity of self-development to all, is a vain thing, then let us lament, for we must then believe that truth does not exist and that mankind must drift eternally, the sport of every impulse to passion or to folly. Fortunately there are few to confess to the cowardice of that despairing view. But there are others who would have us relinquish our work in India—they have been called appropriately the "Perish India" school. It is a school which is dead in England, but which still has its adherents in the Dominions. Let us hope that a true understanding of what the British have done in India and what they have still to do, will destroy it overseas as it has destroyed it at home. For their task is worthy of a great nation. If it is accomplished, it will surpass the exploits of the great heroes of the world, and it will rank the name of Britain beside the names of Greece and Rome.

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THE naval defence of the Empire, and in particular the part which Canada is to play in it, are now before all men's minds. In the following pages the question is dealt with from three separate points of view. First the problem is stated as it concerns the Empire generally. Secondly the varying views of the political parties in Canada are examined by a resident in Canada unconnected with party politics; and thirdly a Western Canadian sketches the opinions of the dwellers on the plains with regard to this great problem, so remote from them, and yet so charged with moment for the future of their country.

I. THE PROBLEM AS IT APPEARS FROM LONDON

ON July 22, 1912, the First Lord of the Admiralty placed before the House of Commons a general survey of the naval defence of the British Empire. No man, who has studied his speech, will be inclined to disagree with Mr Balfour in his statement that it brings before us in almost menacing guise the increasing difficulties of the European situation and the ever-darkening clouds threatening the Empire from the European side. In an article on Imperial Defence in *THE ROUND TABLE* of May, 1911, it was stated that the British Empire was rapidly approaching a crisis in its fate. A year has passed and all that has happened since then has served to confirm that view. At this critical moment, when, as has been foreshadowed in the momentous speeches recently delivered by Mr Borden in London, the

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relations between Great Britain and the Dominions may be entering on a new phase, it may be well to summarize the opinions then expressed.

Two great changes have taken place in the last fifty years, almost it may be said, in the last twenty or even ten years, which raise the question of the whole future of the British Empire and the English-speaking races within it. Both arise mainly from the unparalleled development of the world in wealth and population. The first is the sudden re-appearance of great external danger in Europe, from which Great Britain has been free since the Napoleonic era; the second is the change which the growth of the Dominions is inevitably bringing with it in the mutual relations between them and the United Kingdom.

Till the end of the nineteenth century the British fleet was practically supreme on every sea. No other nation had either sufficient resources or sufficient cause to challenge its supremacy; Europe was absorbed in its internal struggles; the citizens of the United States turned their eyes inwards to the development of their great country, and not outwards to the world; the colonial expansion of France and Germany had only begun; the era of world-wide commerce and the great development of the new world was in its infancy. Even Bismarck deliberately damped down the first attempt of Germany at creating an empire overseas. So secure was Great Britain that her own shores were left almost undefended while her fleets guarded her world-wide possessions in the Mediterranean and China seas, and the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

In the last few years the face of the world has changed. The application of science to industry, the immense developments in the ease and rapidity of transportation and the great production of gold have led to an enormous increase in wealth, not only in the new world, but in Europe itself. and Great Britain, instead of being the only wealthy nation, is now one among many. This increase in wealth has been quite as rapid in Germany as anywhere else in the world, and

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a nation the very existence of which is due to the successful application of force now finds itself for the first time not only with the means of creating a mighty navy, as well as an unequalled army, but with a good excuse for so doing in the great growth of its oversea possessions and oversea trade. But, whatever the motives for the growth of the German Navy, its effects are not open to doubt. In six years, as Mr Churchill has pointed out, Germany will possess a fleet far stronger than the British fleet is at this moment. Already, if her policy is to cripple the effectiveness of the British fleet, she has been largely successful. The British flag has been withdrawn almost wholly from the oceans of the world and the British navy is now concentrated in the North Sea. Nor, whatever may be the demands upon it from any distant part of the Empire, can it move from that sea without laying Great Britain open to invasion. But it is not only Germany which is creating a Navy. For the first time in European history Austria and Italy are becoming strong naval powers; in Russia a large fleet is projected; the United States are increasing their Navy; so is Japan; the Argentine, Chili and Brazil all have fleets which may at least endanger communications and trade in time of war.

The British Isles are small in area. Their population of 45,000,000 is not capable of indefinite growth; their resources are already exploited to the full. They are faced by Germany with her 69,000,000; Russia with her 150,000,000; the United States with their 100,000,000; as well as by other great powers. Whatever the efforts of the British people—and they will spend their last drop of blood and their last penny in the defence of the Empire—it is unlikely that the British fleet, unaided, can ever regain its position as mistress of the seas, or, indeed, that the British people alone, can defend indefinitely against every danger all parts of the vast Empire they have won. They will not shrink from the effort, but year by year this burden grows heavier and more exacting.

Fortunately the Empire has grown with the rest of the world, and Canada, Australia, South Africa and New

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Zealand are already large and wealthy communities. In a generation Canada may equal the British Isles in population, and finally she must far surpass them. Canning's phrase may become true in a different sense, and the new world may again redress the balance of the old. But, encouraging as is this aspect of the future, the growth of the Dominions has brought with it problems which will before very long demand solution. The old system of defence and foreign policy is breaking down; it is not yet replaced by a new one. Until the last few years the defence and foreign policy of the British Empire have been treated as a single organic whole; they have been conducted under the sole responsibility of the British Government. It was only dimly recognized that the Dominions would very shortly demand some share in the determination of policy, and would reject as inconsistent with their national pride the development of a system under which they would pay tribute to a navy in no respect subject to their control. Only last year Mr Asquith stated categorically in the Imperial Conference that the authority of the British Government in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace or the declaration of war could not be shared. The pressure of circumstances is already bringing him to modify this conclusion. It is inevitable indeed that, if the Dominions do not share in the foreign policy of the Empire, they will set up independent policies of their own. In the present amorphous condition of the Empire they are already doing so. They are already negotiating treaties, and their statesmen have already declared their intention of determining their own policy. "Under present circumstances," said Sir Wilfrid Laurier in November, 1910, in the Canadian House of Commons, "it is not advisable for Canada to mix in the armaments of the Empire. But we should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own purpose, and leaving to the Canadian Parliament, to the Canadian Government, and to the Canadian people, to take

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part in those wars in which to-day they have no voice only if they think fit to do so."

Australia, too, as a writer in the present number of *THE ROUND TABLE* points out, is beginning to realize that defence depends upon policy as much as upon armaments,* and to question the system under which Australian policy is determined by a Government in which Australians are unrepresented. There is no small danger that each of the five nations of the Empire may set up an independent foreign policy and an independent defensive system for itself. The inevitable results were stated in *THE ROUND TABLE* a year ago. Instead of one Government responsible for the safety of the Empire there would then be five. Each of these governments would be free to pursue its own policy, and each would have military or naval strength to back it. Each therefore might involve itself in war. What then would be the position of the others? Meanwhile, presumably, Great Britain is to remain responsible for maintaining intact the Imperial system as a whole. Can she do so if her government does not know what resources in men, ships and money can be depended upon from the rest of the Empire, or if the Dominions frame policies which may nullify or render impossible the international agreements which she may consider necessary for the safety of the Empire? The principle of complete local separation, admirably as it works for internal politics, cannot be applied to foreign affairs. We have only to ask ourselves whether, supposing the Empire had never lost the United States, the foreign policy of Washington could still be determined by the British Government, to see that the present system cannot indefinitely continue. There is no instance in history of a number of nations who have remained permanently united in defence and foreign policy solely by the bonds of goodwill. How much did goodwill accomplish for the thirteen Confederate States of America, before the Constitution was framed? Or how much did goodwill do even

* Page 721.

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for the separate states and provinces of Canada, Australia, and South Africa before they broke the deadlock by merging their separate entities in a wider federation. Similarly the nations of the Empire must either agree to co-operate for foreign policy and defence, or they must dissolve the Empire, and each assume responsibility for its own policy and its own defence. There is no third alternative.

In what manner complete unity will finally be achieved, and what will be its form it is unnecessary here to consider. Truly effective unity means the control of foreign policy and defence by one Government fully representative of all the self-governing communities of the Empire. For so great a change the minds of men are not yet prepared either in the United Kingdom or in the Dominions. But let it not be supposed that the day is far off when the Dominions will have to choose whether or not they will share in the responsibilities of Empire, and when Great Britain will have to choose whether or not she will share her control of foreign policy. That day has already come, and, though at this juncture it will to-day be possible to take a short step only in the direction of unity, it will be a momentous one, since it involves consequences the end of which no man can see.

Before 1909 the problem of Imperial Defence had not been recognized as acute. Satisfied that the United Kingdom was well able to secure by her own efforts the safety of the Empire, the Dominions had been content either to do nothing at all or to contribute a relatively small sum to the British navy. But in that year the serious nature of the German competition became apparent. The Dominions hastened to offer their help, and an Imperial Defence Conference was held in London. At this Conference a far-reaching change was made in the defensive system of the Empire. It was decided that Australia and Canada should create local navies of their own, instead of contributing to a single navy under the authority of the British Government. These navies were, to all intents and purposes, quite independent of Admiralty control, and even in time of war, as

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was made apparent later, they were only to be placed under Admiralty orders, if the Canadian and Australian Parliaments so determined. As a result of these decisions Australia has commenced the creation of a local navy and has framed an elaborate policy for the naval defence of her shores. In Canada Sir Wilfrid Laurier started on the same lines. But in that country, as is shown in the second part of this article, opinion is still somewhat divided as to the proper method of Canada's contribution to defence. It is indeed not to be supposed that the policy of the two Dominions should be identical, for their conditions are radically different. Canada's shores are not in danger, and she is subject to no internal pressure. She does not, therefore, attach the same vital importance, as does Australia, to the constant presence of her Dreadnoughts near her coast. She wishes to do something substantial and effective and is prepared to listen to and weigh the views of the experts as to where her ships should be stationed, whether on her Pacific or Atlantic coasts or as the Canadian squadron of the Imperial Battle Fleet. On the other hand, there is no likelihood that the Canadian people will simply hand over their fleet without further consideration to the British Admiralty. They will rightly demand some share of responsibility, and, as is shown later, they can secure it in one of two ways, either by the control of their own navy wholly independently of the Imperial fleet, or by joint control by Great Britain and Canada over a united fleet. The Canadian ministers in England are attempting, it appears, to take a first step towards the realization of this latter end.

Australia's position is different. Her eyes are turned not to the North Sea, but to the China Sea and the Sea of Japan. She is, as an Australian contributor* graphically puts it, "an advance guard of the West flung far out into the East," "a lonely outpost of European civilization in a region which is profoundly alien." Australian opinion, and very possibly sound strategy as well, is likely always to demand that the Australian fleet should remain in Australian waters.

* Pages 720-721.

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Australia's isolation calls forth from the writer above quoted a plea for an Australian foreign policy, independent of that of the British Government. But if that policy is independent it may also be contradictory. At the same time in a later part of his article the writer fully characterizes the lack of organization in the Empire as the fundamental defect of its constitution, and refers to the possibility that "the act of an irresponsible government in New Zealand or Newfoundland may plunge the whole Empire into war." But how is this lack of organization in the Empire to be cured by its having two or more separate foreign policies? Is the British Government, though having no part in Australia's policy, to accept all the consequences of it, and share the responsibility for any trouble which may ensue? Or, if not, in what sense would Australia still remain a part of the British Empire? And is it suggested that Australia, even if she had, as the writer recommends, arrangements with Canada, South Africa and India, would carry more weight in an eastern conflict than a united British Empire? We draw indeed from Australia's isolation precisely the contrary moral. That moral is not that she should pursue a separatist policy, but that she should demand a voice in deciding the policy of the Empire, and in influencing that policy in a direction which accords with Australian interests.

The time, then, is ripe for both Canada and Australia to demand some share in directing the policy of the Empire. Yet both countries must be patient. Any change which can now be made, must be small, any step which can be taken, must be tentative. The gulf between the present constitution of the Empire and a truly representative one is profound and can only gradually be bridged.

The idea has been mooted that, as a first step, such Dominions as wish should send a representative, who should be one of their Cabinet Ministers, to sit as a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence. There is much to be said for the suggestion. The Committee of Imperial Defence has, as Mr Asquith recently explained, a peculiarly elastic con-

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stitution. It is not an executive body, nor does it determine policy. It is simply advisory. Technically it consists of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such persons as he may summon to sit on it. In practice its members appear to be the half-dozen leading members of the Cabinet—e.g. the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and so on—and the naval and military experts whom they call to assist them. The full Committee meets only occasionally; its general work is entrusted to special expert sub-committees, which are practically in constant session considering various questions of Imperial Defence, and acting as a co-ordinating link between the great Departments.

The Committee is still in an experimental stage; its relations with the General Staffs of the Admiralty and the War Office are ill-defined. But the very fact that it is still in embryo makes it capable of further growth. One may, indeed, perhaps hazard a guess as to the lines on which that growth will proceed.

In vague outline we already see the future division of the British Cabinet into a domestic and Imperial Cabinet. Those ministers who deal with defence and foreign affairs are invariably members of the Committee of Defence. The final decision on any matter of policy arising out of the questions discussed by the Committee is, no doubt, taken by the Cabinet as a whole, but it is doubtful if the latter would often demur to a decision arrived at by their colleagues when sitting as members of the Defence Committee. Though the Committee might retain in form its purely advisory function, this tendency would be strengthened by the presence of Dominion Ministers. A further result would probably be that the experts who now attend as members on an equality with Ministers, would then attend solely as advisers. The decision of the Committee would, in consequence, be a decision of Ministers.

We may look, therefore, to the Committee taking the

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form of a Council of Ministers from the united nations of the Empire, advised by their experts in defence and foreign affairs. These experts would consist of the ruling authorities of the Navy and Army and the chiefs of the General Staffs, which would naturally be co-ordinated with the Defence Committee. The Committee would, therefore, be the apex of the pyramid from which would branch out the General Staffs and the defence services themselves. Finally, any decision of the Committee would be reported to the British Cabinet, with whom, at any rate until the constitution of the Empire is further developed, the ultimate decision must still rest. The creation of such a joint Committee would be a great step in advance. But it would be far from solving the constitutional problems involved in the defence of the Empire. It is doubtful, for instance, in what relation the naval and military experts and authorities in the Dominions would stand to the Committee. But that is a small matter compared to the status of the Committee itself. It is clear that while the representatives of the Dominions might have an opportunity to express the views of their governments on all matters of importance, the final responsibility must still rest with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues, if for no other reason, because foreign affairs and defence demand above all instant decision, secrecy, and unity of purpose. It might often not be practicable to wait for the assent of every Dominion government, and so long as the different governments are not merged in one single government for defence that condition must remain. Furthermore, the control of naval and military forces is an executive matter, capable of exercise only by an executive government, and the Committee is not an executive but an advisory body. It would be there to offer advice to the British Government. But while, therefore, the Committee would not be a true Cabinet of Empire, it would be a great step beyond anything in existence at present, and it would rest with the Dominions to come forward and demand a greater responsibility. Meanwhile,

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we should have reaped this great advantage, that all the governments of the Dominions would be kept informed as to the policy of the Empire and would be able to make their voices heard, while the world would recognize in the action of the British Government the decision of a united Empire.

It remains then for Mr Borden's Government to take the first step. Mr Borden's recent speeches have been remarkable for their grasp of the realities of the constitutional problem, and have created a profound impression in the United Kingdom. It is clear that he appreciates the necessity not only in the interests of Canada, but in those of the United Kingdom and the Empire at large for finding some solution of the problem of Imperial Defence which shall combine autonomy with unity. He recognizes that any present solution can only be a partial one; he recognizes, too, that even a partial solution must involve Canada in new responsibilities from which as a great nation she cannot escape; and on Canada's behalf he accepts those responsibilities. It may well be that Mr Borden's declarations will mark the commencement of a new era in the Empire's history.

II. PARTY OPINION IN CANADA

BEFORE these lines appear in print, it may have been settled, at any rate for the time being, what Canada is going to do in the matter of Naval Defence. In the following pages it is not proposed to attempt to weigh the merits and demerits of each of the various courses which have been suggested, nor to advocate one or the other of them, but rather to give some account of the various currents of opinion on the subject, and perhaps to offer some tentative explanation how they have been formed.

To begin with, it must be remembered that it is only a few years since the question of naval defence has entered at

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all into the "practical politics" of Canada. Before that only some scattered enthusiasts were interested in it. They worked hard in various ways for the conversion of their countrymen, and their labours are now bearing fruit. But the movement for taking part in the Naval defence of the Empire was not until recently a living issue for the nation at large. On this account there has, perhaps, been some advantage from the national point of view in the postponement of action which has been caused by recent changes in Canadian politics. Time has been given for discussion and ventilation of the question. It has become one of the issues of the day. The newspapers refer to it constantly. The public has become familiar with it. Its importance is coming to be realized; and whether people approve or disapprove of whatever action may now be taken by the present Government, they will, at any rate, not regard the whole matter with apathy, as they might have done if action had been taken two years ago.

There is one thing to be remembered in this connexion. Since public interest in the question is only of recent growth it follows that opinions have been, and to some extent are still, in a state of flux. Change and development of view are much more rapid about a question which most people are really considering for the first time, than they are about the stereotyped issues of politics. It is by no means safe to assume that a politician or a public writer in Canada thinks to-day about naval defence as he thought two years ago. Even now public opinion can hardly be said to have fixed itself on entirely definite lines. Some of the most ardent advocates of a "forward" Naval policy admit that they have developed their views greatly during the last few years. They attribute this to study and consideration of the question. It is reasonable to suppose that the same process may also produce development in the views of others who have begun later.

Another point to be borne in mind is this. Almost as soon as naval defence turned into a question of "practical

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politics," it became entangled with party differences. The party in power—the Liberal party—had to produce a policy. When they did so it was the natural thing for the Opposition to fall into an attitude of criticism. It is not suggested that there was no reasonable ground for this attitude. On the contrary, as will be pointed out, there are some real differences in the point of view from which the two parties approach the question. It is true that the differences exist rather in the point of view than in the practical conclusions arrived at. But where a party system exists, it is the points of difference that tend to be emphasized in any political question, and not the points of agreement. Defence, like foreign policy, is a matter which in every country patriots must desire to see kept out of the party arena, and there is no reason to despair of this being done ultimately in Canada. But up to the present, the views expressed in Parliament and on the platform, have often been coloured by party feeling and urged in the terms of party argument. It is to be hoped that this is a temporary condition; but, for the time being allowance must be made for it in considering the public utterances of statesmen on either side.

In Canada we have two great parties in politics, which bear the time-honoured names of Liberal and Conservative. The differences of opinion and tradition which separate them in domestic affairs need not be discussed here. As regards matters of Imperial policy it may fairly be said that the Conservative tradition leans rather towards emphasizing the connexion with the Mother Country; the Liberal tradition towards emphasizing the autonomy of Canada. It must not be supposed that the Conservatives are indifferent to the latter, or the Liberals to the former principle. On broad lines both parties are equally determined to maintain the status of Canada as an autonomous community and its status as an integral part of the Empire. But the Liberals are perhaps inclined to be more meticulous than the Conservatives about any question which touches, or may be supposed to touch, the question of autonomy; and the

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Conservatives to be more meticulous than the Liberals about any question which affects the ties binding Canada to the rest of the Empire. A reason for this may be found in the composition of the parties. The nucleus of the Conservative party—though it is strong elsewhere—lies in Ontario, among men of British descent, with an hereditary British tradition. This tradition carries with it a feeling of sentimental attachment to the Mother Country, which though it is really, if analysed, quite distinct from loyalty to the Imperial ideal, tends in practice to reinforce and strengthen that ideal; just as personal or family affection between members of a partnership may strengthen the feeling of loyalty among partners, though that loyalty may, and does, exist without family ties. On the other hand, the main strength of the Liberal party has for many years lain in the province of Quebec; and that portion of Canada is, for obvious reasons, particularly attached to, and jealous of, the autonomous status of the Dominion. There are many Liberals who have as strong a sentimental attachment to the Mother Country as any Conservative; and there are many Conservatives who are as jealous about Canadian autonomy as any Liberal. But in each party it is the dominant element which gives the tone. Hence it happens that, in matters of external policy, there is a tendency in one party to visualize more clearly the duties of Canada towards the Empire, and in the other to visualize more clearly the rights of Canada as against the Empire. This difference in the point of view became apparent on the question of naval defence, as it has done before, and no doubt will do again, on other Imperial questions.

Besides the two great parties in Canada there is the faction of the Nationalists, which must be considered separately. It is important only in the Province of Quebec, and its avowed object is to protect the interests and express the views of the French-speaking and Roman Catholic inhabitants of Canada. Its representation in Parliament is insignificant, and the extent of its voting strength in the

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country is doubtful, and probably fluctuates considerably from time to time. But it gains importance from the talents of its leaders, from the large measure of support which has been given to it by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and from the balance which it is sometimes in a position to hold in the Quebec elections. On the Naval question, as on other questions, it may be taken as voicing the extreme French view, and the line which it has followed in the matter will be referred to later.

The history of naval defence as a part of the "practical politics" of Canada begins with the famous resolution of March, 1909. This resolution was founded on a motion originally brought forward by Mr G. E. Foster, was re-drafted by the leaders of the Government and the Opposition in consultation, and was passed unanimously by the Dominion House of Commons in the following form:

That this House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence. The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire and the peace of the world. The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and the honour of the Empire.

It was, perhaps, too much to hope that the agreement between the parties should continue for long. The Liberal Government, which was then in power, had to give its own

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interpretation to the resolution of the House, and it did this by introducing a Naval Service Bill, which passed its first reading in the beginning of 1910. The resolution had been unanimous; but the Bill soon became the subject of a fierce and prolonged controversy. It was attacked on two sides. It has been said, in general terms, that it was attacked by the Conservatives on the ground that it did not go far enough, and by the Nationalists on the ground that it went too far. That is the way in which the matter is put by Liberal spokesmen, who are naturally disposed to make capital out of the alliance contracted against them by opponents so ill agreed among themselves. The statement is fair enough as a platform argument, but, taken by itself, it does not give a full or exact idea of the position.

It will be remembered that Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Bill provided for the creation of a "Canadian Navy," and that in supporting it he laid great stress on that fact that this Navy was to be absolutely under the control of the Canadian Government in time of peace, and that even in time of war it would only take part in hostilities should the Canadian Government decide that it wished to share in them. In that case, and in that case only, would the Canadian Navy be put at the disposal of the British Admiralty. In emphasizing this feature of his proposals, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was led into enunciating his now well-known doctrine about Canada's right to retain neutrality in the case of Great Britain going to war. This doctrine is clearly inadmissible. It is impossible to argue that Canada, while remaining a part of the British Empire, can claim the status of a neutral in a war in which the Imperial Government is engaged. She must either accept her status as a part of the belligerent state, or must announce her secession from it. There is no doubt that under the present constitution of the Empire, if the British Government goes to war, all the Dominions are at war also, in the sense that they are parts of the belligerent state, and would be regarded as such by any international tribunal, unless they proclaimed

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their secession. There is equally no doubt that, under the present constitution of the Empire, Canada is not bound to assist the Imperial Government in time of war to the extent of a single soldier or a single dollar. Therefore, while Canada cannot obtain the status of a neutral in a British war, she can, if she wishes, refuse to take any active part in such a war. Imaginary cases can be constructed in which the Canadian Government, though it had decided to take no part in a war, might be compelled to take an active part, e.g. in the case of British or hostile ships of war seeking supplies or repairs. Cases can also be constructed in which Canada would never come into contact with the operations of war unless she chose to do so. But inaction is not the same as neutrality. While, too, under present circumstances Canada's action or inaction depends on the decision of the Canadian Parliament and the Canadian people, in any war in which Great Britain were hard pressed the Canadian people would be quick to repudiate the idea of inaction, which they would rightly see would be tantamount to secession.

But the objections of the Conservative party were not confined only to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's doctrine of neutrality. The policy put forward by the Liberal Government was also attacked on the ground that it was inadequate. Here the criticisms tended to run on divergent lines. Some were inclined to disparage the present value of a Canadian Navy, and to demand that an immediate contribution of money and ships, or both, should be made to the Imperial fleet. Others, while accepting the principle of the Naval Service Bill, declared that the proposed armament was insufficient or unsuitable. Others, again, were insistent that the Canadian contingent must be put at all times under the direct orders of the Admiralty, and declared that otherwise it would be useless. The truth probably was that views on the subject were in process of formation. But, on the whole, there seemed to be a consensus of opinion among the Conservative Opposition that the proposals of

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the Government were not sufficient, and that Canada must both do more, and do it more quickly, if she intended to take her fair share in the naval defence of the Empire. The Nationalists, on the other hand, attacked the Bill as being unnecessary as well as useless, as imposing new burdens on Canada, and as tending to militarism.

Much water has flowed beneath the bridges since the Naval Service Bill was first introduced, and the views of the Conservative party, if they are not yet entirely unanimous, have tended to solidify and take definite shape on some of the most important points. In the first place, it may be said that the opinion in favour of a Canadian Navy, or at any rate a distinctively Canadian wing of the Navy, has gained strength and established itself as against the opinion which favoured a mere contribution of money or ships (except as a purely temporary measure). The resolution of 1909 pointed to this view, and the Naval Service Bill, of course, embodied it in an extreme form. Several ways are conceivable of giving effect to it, and many different suggestions have been put forward as to the manner in which the Canadian Squadron should co-operate in the general scheme of Imperial defence, as to its relations with the British Admiralty, as to interchange of personnel, and so forth. These matters, important as they are, are rather matters of detail than of principle. The two governments will have to determine them together, and in doing so no doubt will be guided to a great extent by expert advice. But in whatever form the details are finally settled, it seems clear that the popular sentiment in Canada demands that the permanent Canadian contribution to naval defence shall take the form of a Canadian naval contingent. In this matter the Liberals may claim that their view has prevailed, for a distinctively Canadian Navy was an essential feature of their scheme. It would not be correct to say that the Conservative party has ever advocated the method of direct contribution. In fact they stopped themselves from doing so by the terms of the

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resolution of March, 1909. But the party view on the subject was, in the earlier stages at any rate, neither absolutely unanimous nor altogether definite. Now, however, it does not look as if any serious difference of opinion was likely to remain between the parties on this point.

On a second aspect of the question the Conservative policy has taken a rather different trend from that of the Liberals. That is on the question of control. The Liberal solution of this question was expressed in Sir Wilfrid Laurier's declaration, already referred to, that the Canadian Navy must remain absolutely under the control of the Canadian Government, that it must take its orders from them, and acknowledge no other authority except when the Canadian Government should choose to "lend it out," so to speak, to the British Admiralty. This declaration was intended, no doubt, to satisfy Canada's proper claims as a self-governing Dominion. These claims would certainly not be satisfied if a squadron, equipped and maintained by the Government of Canada, were left, as a normal thing, under the orders of a department of the Government of the United Kingdom, to be used at the sole discretion of that department. But there were obvious objections to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's solution of the difficulty; and the Conservative party, perhaps, realized these objections more acutely, because it had used them as weapons of controversy. Accordingly some different method of safeguarding Canadian autonomy was looked for. It was found by insisting not on a division of command, but on a union of councils. The Liberal policy was to preserve the autonomy of Canada by keeping the British and Canadian fleets separate, each under the orders of its own Admiralty. The Conservative policy, according to recent declarations, is to preserve autonomy by uniting the fleets and at the same time uniting the Admiralties. It is too early yet to say how the practical difficulties which, under the present Constitution of the Empire, undoubtedly lie in the way of such a solution, can be overcome. Should they be overcome successfully a long step will have been taken to-

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wards the solution of the whole problem of Imperial Defence. The great objection to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's solution was that, while it gave Canada an apparent rather than a real autonomy in the disposition of her fleet, it tended at the same time to hamper efficiency in naval action, which is the reason for which fleets exist. In theory the Canadian fleet might be at the absolute disposal of the Canadian Government; but in practice it is certain that if Great Britain became involved in a serious naval war, any Canadian fleet which existed would become a part of the combatant forces. The sentiment of the Canadian people, to say nothing of the instinct of self-preservation, would be too strong for any Government which tried to hold aloof. That being so, the right of choice nominally reserved to Canada under Sir Wilfrid Laurier's plan, would in practice be worth nothing. At the same time, the fact that the British Admiralty, which would direct the operations of a naval war, would have no technical right to give orders to the Canadian Squadron, could not fail to detract from the strength of the joint forces, through the moral as well as the physical effect of a divided command.

The solution now apparently proposed by Mr Borden's Government is not open to either of these two objections. If Canada is given a real voice in the Councils which determine peace and war for the British Empire, her autonomy is not only preserved, but extended beyond its present limits. At the same time the illusory safeguard, but real evil, of a divided command, can be dispensed with. Everything, of course, turns on the question whether a practical means can be devised of giving Canada effective and satisfactory representation in the Imperial Councils. If this can be done, it is safe to say the Conservative party in Canada will follow its leader and welcome his solution of a difficult problem. The attitude of the Liberal party is more doubtful. Some years ago, at an Imperial Conference, Sir Wilfrid Laurier disclaimed any desire on the part of the Canadian Government for a voice in Imperial foreign policy, on the ground that

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representation involved responsibility, and that the Canadian Government wished to preserve its freedom of action. But, as pointed out above, such freedom can only be apparent and not real. It is as if one partner in a business should say that he did not wish to be consulted about any of the firm's relations with third parties, on the ground that these relations might involve litigation, and that he wished to keep a free hand to take part or not as he chose. In practice, of course, the effect would be that he would always be affected by the results of litigation unless he chose to dissolve partnership, and that by holding aloof he would merely deprive himself of the opportunity to guide matters in the way he desired.

But the views of Sir Wilfrid Laurier on this matter in 1907 are not necessarily the final views of the Liberal party, or even of Sir Wilfrid Laurier; and possibly, as the Liberals seem likely to convert the Conservatives on the point of a Canadian Navy, the Conservatives may convert the Liberals on the point of the method by which Canadian autonomy is to be preserved.

To sum up the situation as between the two parties, it may be said that both are practically agreed that Canada must do something immediate, substantial and effective in the way of making provision for Naval Defence, and that in doing it Canada's position as a self-governing Dominion must not be impaired. Both parties are likely to agree on the principle of a Canadian navy or naval contingent, though possibly the reasons on which they will base their adherence to this principle are not altogether the same in both cases. With regard to the question of autonomy the Liberals at present are inclined to advocate that this should be secured by the maintenance of two entirely separate controls. The Conservatives prefer the solution of a joint control, if any means can be found of giving effect to this. On the Conservative side there is also a feeling in favour of making an immediate contribution to the Imperial Fleet, preferably in the form of ships. This is suggested, not as a precedent for

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future action, but as a temporary measure, on the ground that under present conditions Canada ought to do something at once, that the creation of a Canadian Navy will take time, and that while it is being proceeded with something should be done *ad interim*.

There remains the Nationalist party. Though this party is hardly represented in Parliament its views on the subject of Naval Defence have interest and importance in so far as they may be supposed to be a guide to the feeling of the French population. The Nationalists, as has been said, stand for the extreme French view, the bulk of the French Canadians, as a rule, voting either Liberal or Conservative. But in both of the two great parties they are mixed with and modified by other elements. It is worth while, therefore, to glance at the attitude of the third party, which represents French sentiment and clerical influence in its purest form.

When the question of Naval Defence first arose the Nationalist leaders, and those connected with them, began by taking up an attitude of hostility to the whole movement. They denounced the Naval Service Bill root and branch, and its iniquity was one of their chief topics, if not the chief, in their campaign against Sir Wilfrid Laurier in Quebec. Their denunciations undoubtedly appealed to the French-speaking agricultural population of the Province. That population is by temperament intensely conservative, intensely thrifty, and intensely jealous of its privileges. In consequence the new policy was distasteful to it on three separate grounds. It was distasteful simply because it was new, and because the idea of building a fleet and becoming a Naval Power had never before been presented to French Canadians. It was distasteful because it opened the prospect of taxation for military and naval purposes, and marked the first attempt on the part of Canada to shoulder the burden which presses so heavily on the nations of the old world. It was distasteful because it was unjustly suspected to be an off-shoot of that kind of Imperialism which, in the mind

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of the French Canadian, is vaguely identified with a tendency to obliterate Provincial distinctions and Provincial privileges, and to "Anglicize" the organization of the whole Empire.

There was another ground for opposition which must be mentioned, though it must not be misunderstood. The French have always been the most warlike of all the civilized nations; but, at the same time, when they are not moved by some enthusiasm there exists among them a strong love of peace, engendered partly perhaps by their thrift and their hatred of disturbance. This is particularly marked in the French agricultural classes, and is found in the habitants of Quebec no less than in the peasants of France itself. In Quebec there is an active feeling against militarism, which does not exist, or exists less strongly, elsewhere in Canada. It is supported by the influence of the priests and of the women—both of them great factors in the life of the French-Canadian village communities. There is a traditional dread of conscription in these communities, derived, presumably, from the traditions, or the reports, of the old world. The feeling of anti-militarism was aroused by the Naval Service Bill, which was looked upon and represented as an attempt to entangle Canada in the dangers and burdens of war from which the habitants had come to regard themselves as permanently free.

In spite of this, the attack of the Nationalists on Sir Wilfrid Laurier's strongholds in Quebec last autumn was only partially successful. The feeling against Naval Defence probably grew weaker as the election campaign proceeded. The idea was familiarized and some misapprehensions, at any rate, were removed. Mr Bourassa, the Nationalist leader, abstained, whether purposely or not, from committing himself against Naval Defence on any terms. The line he took was that as Canada had no share in governing the Empire, she had no obligation to assist in maintaining it. This, of course, leaves a line of retreat open to him if Mr Borden's policy is adopted. So far he has not availed himself of it. But both

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he and his friends are bound, sooner or later, to look facts in the face; and unless they take the line of "peace at any price"—which is hardly likely to commend itself permanently to the temperament of the French Canadians—they will have to recognize that Canada, in ceasing to be a small isolated community and becoming a great and growing nation, has incurred the risks and burdens which fall on other nations also; and that ultimately the only question is whether these shall be borne alone or in association with the kindred nations of the Empire.

III. THE VIEW OF THE PLAINS

THE attitude of the Atlantic and Pacific provinces to the Empire is fairly well known: their dependence upon the British fleet for security will, sooner or later, force every thoughtful man into active advocacy for closer union. Quebec's position has been discussed from every point of view; Ontario's antipathy to the United States has been traced to the undying memories of loyalist sufferings and to the fears of the manufacturing and financial interests. Opinions in the east and the far west are taking definite shape. But what about the plains?

There the uncertainty is partly due to the rapidly changing character of the settlement. Are the American settlers favourable or adverse to Imperialism? Have the British settlers flung off the ties of the motherland? What views are held by the central Europeans? Are the native-born indifferent?

While not a little light comes from such inquiries, it seems plain that old-world opinions and sentiments count for little in the new land. The American element is at least one-third European (principally Scandinavian and German), one-third returning Canadians and Britishers and not quite one-third native-born, or "Yankee." The two-thirds have generally adopted American forms of speech, American ways of

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thinking and acting, and, because of intimate knowledge, they like the American better than they once did. Yet the sentimental ties binding them to the Republic are not deep-seated; they have changed their allegiance once and do not entertain excessive feelings of repugnance to a second change.

The British settler may flaunt his Radicalism, deride the aristocracy, and decry militarism, but the John Bull in him is aroused when he scents real danger. An ardent Free Trader, he attacks the tariff, abuses eastern manufacturers, and welcomes reciprocity until he begins to suspect that political absorption is skulking behind freer trade, and then he votes emphatically against reciprocity and declares himself an Imperialist.

The Canadian is more of a party man. He is inclined to stick close to his party, and to take his opinions from his party leaders. Traditionally the Liberals are not pronounced Imperialists, but Sir Wilfrid Laurier's naval policy and, earlier, Mr Fielding's preferential trade policy pledged them to a more cordial attitude to the Empire. The Conservatives, as the champions of the "National Policy," came to regard themselves as the custodians of the "Old Flag" and all it denotes. The lukewarmness of the Conservatives to Sir Wilfrid's naval projects drove the Liberals into an ardent Imperialism, and in time the ultra-Imperialism of Toronto will swing the entire Conservative party back to its old moorings.

The sentiments and opinions of the past, however, do not thrive in the West. There is an old saying that a man drops his morals and religion when he crosses the Rockies. While no one accepts it as true, many feel that it points to a noticeable change of attitude in a man who has crossed the Lakes and settled in the West. The true Westerner is a Radical. The conditions of life are so novel and so different that he soon feels like a plant torn up by the roots and placed in different soil and under changed skies. He finds that the farming methods of his father in the East—methods which sought to conserve fertility, remove excess of water and

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were indifferent to hail and frost—must be completely disregarded. For the West is lavish with its fertility, parsimonious with its moisture, and in constant fear of hail and frost. If he is a mechanic, he finds that the season is short, the pace killing, and the quality of the workmanship indifferent. If he turns to business, he finds that the number of employers is small, the number of petty tradesmen fairly large, and that the policy of small profits and quick returns will not work; for the market is limited, the purchasers reap a harvest but once a year, and the long hauls and enormous freights demand a policy of large profits and slow returns. The conditions of life force the Westerner into Radical ways of thinking and acting.

The Westerner, moreover, soon becomes fascinated with the vastness, richness, and wonderful opportunities of his country, and unconsciously becomes somewhat contemptuous of the microscopic ways of the East. He recalls that each of the four western provinces is as large as Germany, and Germany has 60,000,000 of people. Why may not each province in time become a Germany? He reads that Saskatchewan in one year produced over 90,000,000 bushels of wheat, and that not one-seventh of the arable land of that province was in crop, while that same year the total wheat yield of the United States was about 880,000,000 bushels. One province may thus even hope to rival the great Commonwealth. He hears imaginative politicians talking of the transference of the centre of power to the plains, and even of the centre of Empire shifting to the West, and he finds it pleasant and easy to accept.

The conditions of his life are making a new man of the Westerner, and are re-making him with startling rapidity. He did not come to the new land filled with hate against the injustice and cruelty of political tyrants, nor was he driven forth by the fires of religious persecution; the grinding and remorseless pressure of economic conditions forced him to seek a more hopeful and more comfortable life in the land of opportunity.

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For wealth and comfort he came, and in terms of these he is inclined to measure all things, and his political attitude will be very largely determined by these two things. To-day Imperialism does not seem to him to be vitally connected with either, but before long he will see the force of reasons such as the following.

Every wide-awake Westerner will tell you that the prosperity of the West depends upon three things—men, money and markets—an ever increasing tide of immigration, an ever expanding stream of capital to care for the settler, and a reliable and rising market to take his products. An ever increasing stream of men and money and ever expanding markets, these sum up the Westerner's hopes. Of course behind all is the wealth of the land. This is not a hope, not a doubtful quantity; it is an absolute certainty, and the Westerner knows it. Whenever he is assailed by doubt, he turns his eyes to the Western States of the Union, and all his doubts vanish.

The Westerner's greatest enemy is war. To-day he may not believe this; to-morrow he will. The supply of men to fill his towns, to till his lands, to build his railways, will dry up if a great European war breaks out, and more particularly a war in which Britain is involved. The heavy immigration from the British Isles to Canada would almost disappear. It is true that from the United States immigrants would still come, but even if that source were to yield more than ever before, the total volume of the stream would shrink to one-half. The demand for farm hands, the demand for town accommodation, the demand for commodities would be reduced fifty per cent, and this reduction would bring prices tumbling down with a terrifying clatter. The pessimists would repeat their "I told you so," and the optimists would take fright and attribute the decline to more serious causes than the temporary check in immigration.

War would affect the supply of money more than the supply of men. Money is more fluid and more sensitive than men. Britain's need of money would dry up the stream at its

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source. To-day the Westerner is borrowing with a recklessness that savours of insanity, so the staid Easterner thinks. He needs money for his public enterprises—his railways, his canals, his docks and his steamship lines—for his public works, provincial, civic and municipal. Public ownership is his idol and he lavishes all he can borrow or beg upon it. To one place and one place only he looks for funds—to London. The financial interests of the United States seem to prefer industrial enterprises; the British, public loans. Then there is the British investor who visits the West, buys town lots, large tracts of land, timber, or mineral limits. A European war would divert his interest. Suddenly the Westerner would find himself deprived of four-fifths of his supply of capital. He can easily picture the effect of this.

But the Western Mark Tapley may reply that he has his wheat left; that real estate, general business, transportation systems may become seriously embarrassed, but the farmer has his wheat, and in war times the price of wheat soars.

The price of wheat soars, when a war cuts off a portion of the world's supply. Thus, if war were to seal up the Russian, the Egyptian, the Indian or the French ports, the price of wheat would rise. A British war, which would interfere with the supply from these countries, would interfere as much, if not more, with the supply from Canada, for Britain's enemy would assail her wheat ships with exceptional vigour. What would be the effect on Canada? The price of wheat in the Liverpool market would rise, but would not the risks due to war and the increased cost of transportation absorb the difference in price? To these must be added the paralysing effects of uncertainty. But the western farmer is already confronted with a sufficient number of causes of anxiety; drought, hail and frost require no assistance in making the farmer uneasy.

How can the Westerner take a bond of fate and make assurance doubly sure? By making war an impossibility.

Men who take short views are right in saying that the Westerner is more interested in box cars than in battleships.

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But his interest in box cars may lead him to battleships. He follows his wheat with anxious eyes until it reaches the consumer. To-day he clamours for box cars, public elevators, just grading and rapid transportation, because he wants his grain to reach the consumer with the utmost rapidity and in the best condition. If that wheat is in danger on the high seas, the Westerner will call as loudly for a fleet as he ever shouted for box cars and elevators.

The Eastern manufacturer parades his Imperialism until some one suggests an increased preference on British goods, and then we suddenly discover that his Imperialism is skin deep. The reason is clear. The Eastern manufacturer produces for the home market. The Westerner produces for a world market; his wheat and his cattle go abroad. The Westerner is more vitally interested in Imperialism than all the ardent Imperialists of the Manufacturers' Association. What is "made in Canada" is mainly consumed in Canada, but what is grown in Western Canada is mainly consumed in Europe.

The Westerner is not an Imperialist by sentiment. Business not sentiment governs him. The best compliment that he can pay to an enterprise is that "it is good business." Even in religious work he demands observance of business principles. In his devotion to business he doubtless overlooks many things of very great importance, but in the main he is right. What he wants is efficiency. He does not wish everything to be reduced to dollars and cents, but he wants things to be done in an effective manner. The successful man is the man who "makes good."

When the Westerner begins to call for protection on the high seas, he wants protection, not its semblance. He is not craving for a fight. He is not enamoured of a large navy; the pomp and circumstance of war do not appeal to him. He would much prefer to secure peace through trustworthy alliances, through diplomacy, through any means that are justified by honour rather than by war. But, if war is necessary, he does not want to play with

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it; he is too much in earnest. In this respect he will more nearly approach the men of the old land who realize that defeat means death. If then, peace can be assured only by Canada's active participation in the burden of the naval defence of the Empire, the Westerner will not be satisfied with make-believe policies and trifling measures; he will either go into the thing with serious intent or leave it alone.

The form of that participation is not a matter of vital importance to him. His experience has led him to pay little regard to the way, but much to the end. "Get there" is his injunction. He may be shortsighted in paying so little attention to form, but he feels that he has not time enough to waste over discussion of ways. In the rough and tumble of life that man accomplishes the most who presses onward without wasting time considering niceties of expression and action. Respect for local autonomy appeals to him, but not enough to stay his hand if he finds that the thing he wants can be secured only by disregarding local autonomy. Precedent is an excellent thing, except when it gets in the way of getting things done.

If this interpretation of the Westerner's ways of looking at things is fairly correct, then we shall find that as soon as he begins to realize the need of guarding the highway of the seas, he will demand a vigorous policy of national defence. He will not quibble about ways and means, but will insist most emphatically upon efficiency, upon doing something worth while. He will not be terrified by the magnitude of the project, but will rather be fascinated by its far-reaching consequences. Nor will he sit down and carefully consider every penny of income and outgo before making the venture. He will launch forth on a grand project with a big faith that "everything will somehow turn out all right, provided that nothing is spared to make things go."

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN AUSTRALIA

I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

THE labour movement in Australia has now become the dominant factor in the political life of the community; in the Commonwealth Parliament and in two of the State Parliaments (New South Wales and Western Australia)* the Labour party is now in power, while in the other four States it forms the direct Opposition. Hence the evolution of the labour policy, its character and aims, and the causes leading up to the present position are of peculiar interest.

The turning point in the evolution of the labour movement came in 1891, on the failure of the maritime strike, the real object of which was to settle the relative authority and powers of employers and of trade unionists. As the strike spread from trade to trade, industry of every description was paralysed. Public sympathy was divided, but, upon the whole, the people sided with the employers. The workers were completely defeated, and the disorders and embarrassments which the strike occasioned strongly affected public opinion. In the meantime the colonies had entered into a system of lavish borrowing and expenditure, and the period of depression that followed, culminating in the financial crisis of 1893, was accompanied by a wave of social discontent. The failure of the strike made the workers distrust trade-union methods, and their leaders saw the need of adopting new tactics. Friendly and unfriendly advisers from all classes of the community pointed out the

* In South Australia the Labour Government was defeated at the General Election, held in February, 1912.

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evils of industrial conflicts and urged the adoption of constitutional methods. The workers were told to send their own representatives to Parliament to right their wrongs. They took the advice, and a unified and consolidated political Labour party in the Parliament of each colony was the result.

The effect of the maritime strike was thus to cause labour to become a new force and a new party in political life. The movement grew rapidly in each colony, and in each, as opportunity offered, candidates from the new party were put into the field, with a considerable measure of success. Political labour leagues were established, conferences held, and platforms drafted. The first general elections to be held after the establishment of this new régime were in 1891, when 29 members were returned on the party's platform in New South Wales.

For some years the Labour party in the State Parliaments supported that party which accorded the greatest measure of favour to the labour platform, and with increasing numbers was soon able to maintain the balance of power; in this way the domination of the Labour Party in party alliances is frequently manifest in the course of legislation. Though there were special distinctive features in some of the States, the general development of the Labour party throughout Australia has not varied greatly. The farmers appear disposed to distrust the trade union organization and the socialistic land theories of the Labour party, and the growth of the movement has accordingly been more vigorous in communities where mining and pastoral interests are proportionately strong, such as Queensland and Western Australia, than in agricultural States such as Victoria and Tasmania.

This fact is indicated in the following statement which shows the general numerical progress of the party in each State legislature since 1891, and in the Federal legislature since the year 1901, when the first Commonwealth Parliament came into being.

DEVELOPMENT OF MOVEMENT

Year.	C'mon. wealth.	N.S. Wales.	Vic- toria.	Queens- land.	S. Aus- tralia.	W. Aus- tralia.*	Tas- mania.	Total.
UPPER HOUSE.								
1891	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3
1901	8	5	—	—	3	2	—	18
1912	23	9	3	2	6	6	1	50
LOWER HOUSE.								
1891	—	29	4	3	—	—	—	36
1901	16	21	11	20	12	7	—	87
1912	41	46	19	25	16	34	13	194

Taking into consideration the total number of Members, the above figures show that in the Upper House in 1891 slightly over $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the members were Labour men; this had increased in 1901 to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and in 1912 to over 20 per cent. In the Lower House the corresponding percentages are 8 in 1891, 18 in 1901, and nearly 47 in 1912. The large Labour element in the Commonwealth Senate is chiefly due to the fact that that Chamber is the only one of the Upper Houses in which the franchise has been placed upon a popular basis.

II. LABOUR POLICY IN THE STATE PARLIAMENTS

IT is true that the majority of the voters who support the Labour party do not look beyond one or two measures specified on the platform which they desire to see passed into law; yet each such law suggests another, with still more attractive possibilities. And so, though there appears to be no finality to the labour programme or to the demands of the trade unionists, the present trend of labour policy in the States can be gauged to some extent by an examination of the latest proposals of labour leaders. These

* The figures given do not include a number of what may be called advanced democrats. It should be borne in mind that reductions in the number of seats were made in all the State Lower Houses except Queensland and Western Australia during the period under review.

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are embodied at periodic conferences of the various labour leagues for each State (as well as for the Federal Labour party), in what are known as (a) a "fighting platform" which indicates the practical proposals for which public opinion is considered ripe; (b) a "general platform" which contains other proposals of a propagandist nature; (c) an "objective" which is intended to express the ultimate aims and objects of the party. As an illustrative example reference may be made to the fighting platform adopted by the New South Wales Political Labour League in January, 1912. The six planks of that platform are entitled: (1) Constitutional reform. (2) Effective Land Settlement. (3) Nationalization of Health. (4) Equitable industrial laws. (5) Educational, and (6) State iron industry.

As regards Constitutional reform every State labour platform favours the abolition of the Legislative Councils. Though the party has not espoused any Constitutional theory hostile to bicameral legislatures, it is considered that the so-called Upper Houses have regularly opposed the popular reforms demanded by the Labour party, and they are regarded as inimical to democratic legislation. Economy, as well as expediency, is said to demand a single House. The same argument is advanced to advocate another proposal popular with the party, namely to abolish the importation of State Governors, leaving the Governor-General of the Commonwealth the only Imperial official. The initiative and referendum are advocated by the party in all the States; by these terms it is understood that the people shall have the power not only to initiate new legislation independently of Parliament, but also to veto any legislation of which they disapprove.

The main features of the labour policy with regard to land tenure and settlement are the compulsory resumption of private holdings and the cessation of alienation. The Labour party thus hope gradually to make private ownership the exception, and aspire eventually to the complete nationalization of land, which to a member of the party need seem no

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far-off and hopeless dream when it is realized that of the original public domain of the whole Commonwealth only a fraction over 5 per cent has been alienated, while very nearly 50 per cent is still unoccupied under any form of tenure. Upon these matters of land policy the farmers and the agricultural community generally join issue with the Labour party. Several laws have been enacted in the various States providing for village settlements and co-operative communities, but these measures have not generally proved successful—in some cases probably through inefficient administration—and though favoured by the Labour party as political projects, they have not been supported as economic enterprises.

The State control and administration of charitable institutions, such as hospitals and asylums, is generally advocated by the Labour party in all the States. The New South Wales platform provides for (a) free and decentralized medical, surgical, and nursing services; (b) State maintenance of hospitals; (c) Special care of maternity and protection of child life; and (d) supervision of unhealthy and dangerous occupations.

As regards industrial legislation, one of the chief directions in which the influence of the Labour party has made itself felt has been in supporting the institution of wages boards and courts of conciliation and arbitration. In this direction the State legislatures have been converted into a species of laboratory for economic experiments. The wages board form of industrial legislation began in Victoria under the ægis of the Liberal party in 1896, and has been followed by Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania, while New South Wales and Western Australia adopted compulsory arbitration from the beginning. The object of the wages board system was primarily to mitigate or abolish sweating. It was quickly extended to the fixing of a minimum wage in certain industries. In practice it works out that the minimum which the boards fix is ordinarily the maximum which the employer will give, so that in effect minimum and maximum

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become identical. The arbitration court system attacks the problem at the other end, and aims primarily at preventing strikes; this has, however, worked out in practice to be the wages board solution of enforcing by law certain definite minimum conditions of employment in each trade. Probably no other measures discussed by the Australian legislatures have awakened more general interest, or have had more influence in determining political parties and cabinet crises than industrial legislation of the class referred to.

Though these forms of industrial legislation have, without doubt, done much to mitigate "sweating" conditions of labour, and have in many cases materially improved the economic condition of the worker, many supporters of the Labour party argue that these measures can in themselves never be permanently efficacious to secure to the worker a reasonable standard of comfort consistent with the welfare of the community, or to gain for the worker a fair share of the profits of his industry. The wage-earner is beginning to find that, though his wages have risen, his expenditure, and especially that part of it which represents the cost of necessities, has gone up at even a greater rate (owing partly to the increased labour cost, partly to causes operating to produce the world-wide movement in this direction, and partly to other local economic and social causes). It is on these grounds that many of the Labour leaders plead that, until the State regulates the whole system of wealth production and exchange, all attempts at wage regulation are mere delusions. The Australian Socialist is driven by the logic of his own proposition towards the goal of nationalization and the establishment of a co-operative Commonwealth.

The Labour Party has advanced ideas on the subject of education and it hopes to bring them into operation by evolutionary stages. The New South Wales platform provides for primary, secondary, technical, and university education to be free and secular, and all educational requisites to be furnished by the State. In the view of the Labour

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Party it should be the business of the State to discover for what life's work each pupil is best fitted, and to train each one accordingly. To quote the Queensland *Worker*:

Cramming will be stopped. The time now spent in brain-paralysing accumulation of futile "facts" will be devoted to serviceable studies and to the training of eye and hand. . . . Many, displaying exceptional gifts, will be sent abroad to benefit by whatever foreign lands can teach; others will be drafted into the universities for special studies; all will receive the individual attention and the close cultivation to which their capacities entitle them.

The establishment of State ironworks is specially included in the New South Wales platform in view of the fact that the only blast furnaces in the Commonwealth are situated at Lithgow in this State. Although a bounty is paid by the Commonwealth Government on all iron produced (from Australian ore) at these works, their development has been slow, owing largely to repeated industrial troubles. In other States the Labour platform goes many steps further and includes under the heading of Collective Organization of Industry, not only the establishment of State farms, mines, factories, and shops, but also the marketing and distribution of produce by the State.

The majority of the planks in the New South Wales platform which has been referred to are common to all the State Labour parties' platforms, while the remainder are common to two or more of the States. The preceding paragraphs will serve, therefore, to give some general idea of the main features of the Labour party's policy in the State Parliaments, and we may now pass on to consider the aspirations of that party in the Federal Parliament.

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III. LABOUR POLICY IN THE COMMON-WEALTH PARLIAMENT

THE evolution of the Labour policy in the Commonwealth Parliament has been favoured by the comparative freedom of its supporters from local precedents, traditions, and inter-State jealousies, and the consequent sympathy of the Party with the national idea of federation. Trade-union congresses and the early proposals made for the federation of labour organizations bore fruit indirectly, inasmuch as they accustomed the labour leaders to think from a national point of view at the time when the older parties were grouped in single states on party lines. With the advent of federation, the Conservative parties of New South Wales and Victoria were ranged in opposition in the National legislature, and entirely new questions, which parties organized on local lines were not prepared to meet, appeared on the political horizon. Amidst these conflicting interests, so perplexing to the older parties, the course of labour ran comparatively smoothly. Several years prior to this—after their first experience in the New South Wales Parliament—the party had agreed to subordinate the tariff to strictly labour issues. Moreover their policy as to State control of industries was consistent with the idea of a protectionist tariff, especially with Protection as a National, rather than a local State policy. The party was already organized on an inter-state basis, so that questions of personal leadership had been settled. Furthermore, it was gradually realized that the chief reforms advocated by the party could be more effectively secured through a National Government than through the local legislatures.

The most recent Commonwealth Labour platform was formulated at the labour conference held in Hobart in January last. The results of this conference will furnish the political texts for the Labour party for the next two years, and in view of the fact that the party is now charged

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with the responsibility of office in the Federal Government, and further that, no matter what the result of the next General Elections may be, the party must be the controlling factor in the Senate, the Hobart Conference is viewed by the delegates as the most important labour gathering yet held in Australia. Turning to the amended platform we find that its eleven planks are as follows: 1. Maintenance of white Australia; 2. Graduated tax on unimproved land values; 3. Effective federation; 4. The new protection; 5. Nationalization of monopolies; 6. Arbitration Act amendment; 7. Navigation laws; 8. Commonwealth freight and passenger steamers; 9. Restriction of public borrowing; 10. General insurance department; and 11. Commonwealth sugar refining. In the official report of the conference it is specially mentioned that the following planks of the previous platform had been made law: 1. White Australia; 2. Old-age and invalid pensions; 3. Graduated tax on unimproved land values; 4. Citizen defence force, with compulsory military training and Australian-owned and controlled navy; 5. Commonwealth bank; and 6. Electoral reform. With the exception of four planks relating respectively to the new protection, nationalization of monopolies, Arbitration Act amendment, and navigation laws (replaced as Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the new platform), these comprise the whole of the legislative policy put forward by the party in their previous platform of 1908. And it should be observed that the realization of the first two exceptions mentioned was dependent upon the approval of the proposed laws at the Referenda last year,* while bills relating to the last two have been introduced but not yet passed. It is obvious, therefore, that at any rate as regards legislative action a good deal has been accomplished, and in fact it is now asserted that in view of the failure to obtain enlarged constitutional powers at the Referenda last year, the party has, so far as useful legislation is concerned and more particularly as regards industrial matters, come to a

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 3, pp. 329-343, also No. 4, pp. 500-508.

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"dead end." Hence it is not altogether surprising, even in view of the large majority against the proposed amendments in April, 1911, that the Conference unanimously decided that another appeal must be made to the people and that the same powers should be sought by referenda to be submitted at the next general elections. This resolution is now embodied in the third plank of the new platform under the title of "effective federation." The form of the questions will be decided by the caucus, and it is probable that they will be split into five or six instead of being lumped together as on the last occasion.

Though the amended platform will not strictly come into operation until after the next general elections, since the present Labour members have not signed it, it will be of interest to examine briefly the various planks in the light of past events, and of certain statements issued as a result of the caucus meetings, which, at the time of writing, were being held.

The "White Australia" policy is to be interpreted literally, and means the reservation of the whole Commonwealth territory for the exclusive occupancy of people of European stock. At present the most important practical phase of the question is the development of the tropical territories with white labour, and in view of the taking over by the Commonwealth from South Australia of the Northern Territory at the commencement of 1911, the Commonwealth Labour Government is now brought face to face with this problem. The Labour party is beginning to realize that, in view of the growing demand which modern nations make on the material resources of the world, it will be difficult for any nation to lock up perpetually large tracts of productive country. For defence purposes, too, it is recognized that the settlement of the Northern Territory is a matter of urgency. The Commonwealth Government has recently formulated a land policy on the leasehold system for the settlement and development of the territory; in the meantime an Administrator and other officers have been appointed; exploration parties, including men of high

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scientific attainments, have been sent out, and the capacities of the country are being tested in various directions. A Government-owned steamer is to be provided for the use of settlers on the Daly River, and a Bill is to be introduced next session providing for a settlers' bank. The idea is that a man will be able to go to the Territory, work for wages for a few months, then go to the bank and be started on a leasehold block with cattle, a house, and implements. Whether the progress of science and invention, as applied to tropical industries, and a more rapid physiological adaptation to climatic conditions than is now anticipated, will enable the ideal to be realized, yet remains to be proved. In the meantime the "White Australia" policy will remain a leading question.

The beginning of the extension of the existing railway as far as the Katherine River (about sixty miles) is intended this year, but no general scheme of railway construction will be adopted until a committee of three experts, to be appointed shortly, have gone over the ground and furnished recommendations.

In regard to the building up of an agricultural population, the attitude of the Labour party in the Commonwealth legislature has been one of *laissez faire*. The professed reason for this policy, while containing a certain amount of truth and justification, is largely a false pretence. The Party allege that it is useless, and even dangerous, to invite people to come to the country under present conditions, that there is now no land available, that the only suitable areas, within reasonable distances of railway lines or any areas in remoter portions on which a settler could hope to make a living or bring up a family, except under conditions of unendurable hardship, are alienated in freehold, and their ownership concentrated into large holdings. Hence the third Labour Government imposed in 1910 a progressive land tax, with an exemption, except in the case of absentee holders, of £5,000 unimproved value. As a result of the first year's operation of this tax it is now claimed that it is achieving

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its main purpose, that of breaking up big estates. The assessments for the second year's tax show a falling off of about 10 per cent, which is stated to be largely due to the effect of the first year's tax in breaking up estates.

The third plank in the new platform, entitled "Effective federation," provides for the resubmission, by referendum, of the proposal submitted in 1911, and has already been alluded to. This was probably the most important matter which demanded the attention of the Conference, since not only has the Commonwealth Government under the existing Constitution no power to nationalize any industry, but also practically the whole realization and development of the Labour policy is dependent upon whether the party can succeed in obtaining the sanction of the people to the enlarged powers sought. Thus we find that in the absence of such powers it will be impossible for the Labour party to realize any of the fourth, fifth, eighth, or eleventh planks of the new platform.

What is known as the "new protection" is the subject of the fourth plank and is a proposal which originated with the Labour party at an early stage in Federal politics. The object of this system is stated to be to guarantee the Australian market to Australian manufacturers, on the understanding that they would pay fair and reasonable wages, and that they would not enter into combines and trusts, nor overcharge the consumers for their goods. The principles of this system were embodied in the Excise Tariff (Agricultural Machinery) Act, 1906, which imposed an excise duty on a scheduled list of agricultural implements manufactured in Australia, and then proceeded to declare that the duty should not be payable on goods manufactured under the prescribed conditions as to remuneration of labour and other matters. This Act, after nearly two years of dislocated industry and expensive litigation, was declared unconstitutional on the grounds (a) that it was an attempt to regulate the internal trade and industry of the States, (b) that it discriminated between States and parts of States,

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and (c) that it contained provisions dealing with matters other than the imposition of taxation. Though the policy of the party in respect of this matter is indefinite, it was stated by the Prime Minister at the Hobart Conference that, if the constitutional amendments are carried, the system will be brought into effect.

The fifth plank, relating to nationalization of monopolies, may be considered in connexion with the eighth and eleventh planks relating respectively to Commonwealth freight and passage steamers and to a Commonwealth sugar refinery. Though various proposals for the nationalization of industries have been made, and two or three of these expressed in the form of resolutions in one or other of the Federal Houses of Parliament, no definite scheme for such a step has ever been officially brought forward by the Labour Government. The objective of the party in this direction may be gauged from the propaganda put forward in the manifesto issued in March, 1910, prior to the last General Election. In that document it was stated that the nationalization of monopolies demanded the urgent attention of the people; that the capitalistic system was developing on the same lines as in America, and that nothing short of nationalization would prevent the exploitation of the people. The sugar monopoly, tobacco combine, coastal shipping, and the coal vend were specially mentioned. In addition to the planks relating to Commonwealth steamers and to a Commonwealth sugar refinery, two other resolutions dealing with the subject of nationalization were passed by the Conference in January last, viz.: (1) That publicly owned ironworks are an urgent necessity, and (2) that the sale of alcoholic liquors in the Federal territory (i.e. in the Northern Territory and in the Federal Capital Territory) be nationalized.

As regards the Arbitration Act amendment (plank 6), the only resolution passed by the Conference specifically relating to this matter was to the effect that the Act should be amended so as to prohibit members of the legal profession

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from appearing before the court for either party. It was stated that a recent case, in which a union composed mainly of pastoral workers was concerned, cost no less than £26,000 in lawyers' fees for both parties. The question of amending the Act has, however, two other important bearings—first in regard to "effective federation," since the power of the Commonwealth to make laws in regard to conciliation and arbitration is at present limited to disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State; and secondly in regard to the matter of "preference to unionists."

This question of preference to unionists is one which has been an important feature of the Labour policy. Its justification is that it encourages the formation of unions for the purpose of bringing about industrial peace, as it is considered that the existence of men outside such organizations makes the securing of peace by a Court more difficult. Further, in the view of many, the man who pays for the cost of conducting a case before the Court has a right to receive the benefits of the award in preference to the individual who does not pay for it. The history of the question is as follows:

In the first Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act power was given to the Court to direct that preference of employment or service should be given to members of registered unions, but this power was hedged round with safeguards which exercised a restraining influence on any tyranny of union control. The first Labour Government came into power in April, 1904, but being defeated in a proposal to give unconditional preference to unionists, resigned in the following August.

In 1909 the second Labour Ministry introduced an amending bill by which it was proposed to tie the hands of the judge, by making it mandatory that preference should be given to unionists; it was pointed out, however, that such a provision would be unconstitutional, and a new clause was therefore inserted partly restoring the discretionary power to be exercised "whenever, in the opinion

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of the Court, it was necessary for the prevention or settlement^{of} of the industrial dispute, or for the maintenance of industrial peace, or for the welfare of society." An interesting development of the Labour policy of preference to unionists occurred in September, 1911, when the Minister for Home Affairs issued directions that preference should be given to unionists in connexion with Federal public works. This will apply, of course, to such works as the building of the Federal capital, the construction of the trans-continental railway, and public works for the purpose of military and naval defence.

In connexion with this question of preference to unionists the Trades Mark Act passed by the Coalition Ministry of 1905 and inspired by the Labour party is interesting. This Act did not merely co-ordinate and amend the various State Acts on the subject, but also sought to give preference to unionists by introducing the "union label" for all goods wholly manufactured by members of trade unions. If followed up, as the Labour Councils apparently intended it should be, by all members of trade unions refusing to deal at any shops except those which kept union-label goods, the effect of this provision would probably have been to lead employers into compelling their men to join unions, or accept dismissal. After a period of two years, during which the "union label" clause was a source of trouble and contention, a test case was brought to decide the constitutionality of the clause, which was declared invalid, not only because the label was not a trade mark in the proper sense, but because the clause was an attempt to regulate the internal trade of the States.

The subject-matter of plank number 7 (navigation laws) has now been before Parliament for nine years. It has been considered by a Royal Commission, carried to London and discussed by the Imperial Conference, and sifted through many processes in Australia. Last year it went through the Senate and in response to eager requests from the seamen's union it was taken to its second reading stage in the House

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of Representatives. The caucus has now agreed that it is time that it was passed and it will be taken early in the forthcoming session, of which it will form one of the principal features. Labour members hold that any such calamity as the "Titanic" disaster could not have happened in Australian waters under the provisions of the Bill. Various resolutions relating to the Bill were passed at the Hobart Conference, and it is understood that its provisions are to be made more stringent in view of the recent disaster in the Atlantic.

Restriction of public borrowing is one of the main features of the Federal Labour Government's financial policy, and in accordance with that principle all expenditure, including the cost of the Australian fleet unit amounting to upwards of £4,000,000, is being paid for out of revenue (with the exception of certain items which are being paid for out of an advance from the Notes Trust Fund referred to below).

The Australian Notes Act, 1910, providing for the issue of paper money by the Commonwealth, was claimed by the Labour party to be the first step towards the inauguration of a Commonwealth Bank. Mr Fisher had promised such an issue in March, 1909, and had told his hearers that it would add £100,000 to the revenue at the expense of the banks. Under the Act there is no limitation as to the amount which may be issued, but the Treasurer has to hold in gold not less than 25 per cent of the total issue. The Bank Note Tax Act was simply the corollary of the Notes Act; it levied a tax of 10 per cent on all bank notes in circulation after a stated time, and thus practically prohibited their issue.

The general principles of a scheme for the establishment of a National Bank were adopted at the Inter-state Labour Conference of 1908. No sound business reason appears to have been advanced for the establishment of such a bank, the Commonwealth being already amply provided with banking facilities, prudently managed; its advocates apparently content themselves with declaring that the project is a step in furtherance of the policy of the nationalization

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of all means of distribution, exchange and production of wealth. The Act providing for the establishment of the Bank was passed in December last, and a Governor has recently been appointed at a salary of £4,000 per annum. The bank is to be incorporated as the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and is to have the general powers of an incorporated bank, but it may not issue bank notes. The capital will be £1,000,000, raised by the issue of debentures, and the expenses of establishment will be provided out of the consolidated revenue fund, and subsequently repaid. The Governor is now engaged in organizing work. Arrangements are being made for officers of the Postmaster-General's Department to act as savings bank officials, and it is understood that operations will commence in Victoria at an early date. One of the objects of establishing the Commonwealth bank is stated to be to facilitate the transfer of the State debts by affording suitable administrative machinery for the consolidation of the stock; no definite policy in regard to this matter has, however, been formulated by the Labour party. In December last an Act was passed providing for the issue of Commonwealth inscribed stock in any case where authority to borrow is granted by any Act, and in the same month another Act was passed authorizing the advance from the Australian Notes Trust fund of a sum of nearly £2,500,000, to be applied towards the construction of the trans-continental railway and to other purposes.

In regard to the tenth plank (general insurance department) no declaration as to the policy to be pursued by the Federal Government has been disclosed. The plank relates to a general insurance department with non-political control, and though the need for such a department is by no means obvious, it is probable that the Labour party, if successful at the next general elections, will introduce a measure to provide for such a department. This plank does not refer in any way to what is known as social insurance, and a resolution favouring a system of compulsory and contributory insurance against sickness, accident, mother-

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hood, and old age only found three supporters when put to the vote at the Hobart Conference.

In addition to the matters indicated in the platform, a number of resolutions dealing with other matters were passed by the Hobart Conference. The delegates declared against elective ministries, and a proposal for preferential voting at Federal elections was lost on the voices. Nationalization of inventions was negatived, but government rewards for inventions of public utilities were generally recommended. Various proposals for a Federal executive of the political labour leagues were lost; the organization was left as before the Conference, except that, with the object of avoiding some of the ridiculous proposals on the Conference Agenda Papers, it was directed that only such items as have been passed by State conferences, State executives, or the Federal Labour party are to be put before inter-State conferences. The Conference affirmed the principles of (a) international arbitration as opposed to war, and (b) universal decrease of armaments, and resolved that the abolition of the several State Upper Houses was desirable. Another resolution directs that the portfolios in the Federal ministry be re-allotted by exhaustive ballot after each general election. Should the party return to power next year, ministers must therefore resign and submit themselves for re-election at the hands of the caucus.

Some of the matters in regard to which resolutions were passed by the Conference are small enough to be embodied in amending legislation during the forthcoming session without submission to the public as issues of a general election. In addition to the Navigation Bill the Government will probably introduce measures dealing with electoral redistribution (consequent on the results of last year's census), banking law, Northern Territory constitution and public service, bankruptcy law, copyright, and amendment of the compulsory training provisions of the Defence Act, and of the Public Service and Land Tax Acts. The Prime Minister has also announced his intention to introduce a bill provi-

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ding for a maternity allowance (probably of £5) to the mothers of all children born and registered in Australia. Should negotiations with Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa produce the desired results, it is probable that bills providing for reciprocal trade with these Dominions will be introduced. It is stated that the bills for the proposed laws for the alteration of the constitution will be held back till late in the session.

The realization of the Hobart platform will mainly depend upon the results of the next general elections and upon the fate of the proposals which are to be submitted by the referendum at the same time. What these results will be it appears at the present stage impossible to forecast. One thing is certain, that the opponents of the Labour party have not a set of proposals so well defined, so clear cut, as those which appear in the Labour platform given above. It seems impossible to bring the non-Labour bodies into line one with another. Those who attempt to do so make the mistake of ignoring the fact that the lines of party cleavage are not clearly drawn only between the Labour and non-Labour parties. Though nominally only two, there are in reality three parties, each with distinct aims and each animated by a different spirit. These three are Labour, Liberal, and Conservative. The failure of the two coalitions between Liberal and Conservative, which have been formed since federation, and the inefficacy of the attempts of party leaders to arrange the differences between the non-Labour leagues at present are due to the underlying diversity of aim and spirit in the two non-Labour parties. The great need of the present moment, from the anti-labour standpoint, is a constructive Liberal policy, similar to that with which the first Liberal Ministry faced the first Federal Parliament.

The full significance of the Labour policy can hardly be gathered from its formal statement on the party's fighting platform, which is intended to indicate the practical proposals for which public opinion is considered ripe. The ob-

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jective and the general platform must be studied to get an adequate idea of the propagandist side of the movement. The first part of the federal objective declares for: The cultivation of an Australian sentiment, based upon the maintenance of racial purity, and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community. The second runs: The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies, and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State and Municipality. It cannot be doubted that in general the platform has won the party popular support. Containing definite proposals, it counts more with the masses than the doctrinaire proposals and hazy policies of the older parties, and though there is little social idealism among the rank and file of the party, the working men generally are Socialistic in their beliefs, most of them as yet unconsciously so. The rank and file of the party hardly look beyond their own day and generation—nor do they theorize about the functions of government. They support the party in order to obtain more favourable wages and hours of labour and other economic reforms. On the other hand, Labour leaders are fully conscious of their Socialistic purpose. They are perfectly candid in stating it to their supporters, but as they are practical politicians, and have experienced the responsibility of office, they are so much the more conservative in their policy put forward in their "fighting platform." They are endeavouring, gradually and without unduly disturbing existing conditions, to abolish private employment, and thereby to solve the economic problem of securing to the worker a fair share of the profits of his industry. Unfortunately there are not sufficient data available to determine to what extent, if any, the worker has benefited by the efforts of the Labour party. Few of those prominent in the Labour movement are communists; most of them are sceptical as to the possibility of establishing economic equality, and none of them look forward to making a grand division

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of the country's wealth among all citizens. But they have faith that the Government can in some way eventually succeed in securing to every man a larger share of the results of his labour. It is towards this end that the policy of the Labour party is directed.

UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE COALITION

THE four main measures of the present session are those dealing with Home Rule, Welsh Disestablishment, Franchise Reform, and the right of Trade Unions to use their funds for political purposes. The full majority of the Liberal, Irish and Labour parties over the Unionists is 114.* The Home Rule Bill passed its second reading on the 9th of May by a majority of 101, the Welsh Disestablishment Bill on the 16th of May by 81, the Franchise Reform Bill on the 12th of July by 72, and the Trades Union Bill on the 6th of August by 100. In the case of the Home Rule Bill seven days had been spent in Committee and a little more than one clause out of forty-eight (and four schedules) had actually been concluded when Parliament adjourned on the 7th of August. In the case of the others the Committee stage had not yet begun when the House rose. Even allowing for the fact that the ordinary financial business of the year is well forward, the burden of work awaiting the Legislature when it reassembles early in October is beyond all precedent.

There is no advantage in attempting to follow the fortunes of these measures in the present number of THE ROUND TABLE. This can be done profitably only when they have run their full course of Parliamentary discussion, and have assumed their final shapes. When this will be no man can foretell. The estimates of political soothsayers vary between Christmas and Midsummer. So far there are no clear indications how the country regards any one of the

* Since this was written the Unionists have won two seats.

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Bills. There have been no unforeseen developments. Public opinion for and against appears as yet to have followed party lines, and is very much what might have been expected. The only surprise is the absence of any sign of intense feeling except in the case of the Ulster Protestants.

There can be no doubt that the legislative programme of the government is not the subject which has the strongest hold upon men's minds. Labour unrest, the operation of the Insurance Act, and the naval competition between the British and the German Empires all claim much greater attention. For the moment the plain, hard business of government yields more excitement to the ordinary spectator than the making of laws. And what is, perhaps, even more unusual in this country, certain promises of reform, like the Radical land policy, which are as yet only dimly foreshadowed on the screen of the future, seem to excite more popular notice than those others which have already assumed a definite and practical shape and are claiming all the time and attention of Parliament for the better part of a twelvemonth to come.

There are two theories of the present situation—the one that the government will break because it has undertaken too much; the other that it will succeed because, having invited criticism at so many points, the attack will be concentrated on none. It is urged in favour of the second alternative that the Opposition, as at present constituted, will inevitably lose its sense of proportion, and by a distracted clamour on a great variety of topics, instead of convincing the country, will only confuse it. It must be recognized that a minister with nerve who can carry the Cabinet and his party with him is in a vastly stronger position to-day than was Mr Gladstone, when he piloted his Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons in the prolonged session of 1893-4. In the hands of a master the closure has now become a most formidable weapon, not merely for putting an end to fruitless prolixity, but for smothering unanswerable criticism and for evading unpopular issues. In the old days there was a pro-

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digious waste of time, as soon as Mr Biggar and Mr Parnell had perfected the art of obstruction, but from the point of view of any sagacious Opposition leader the old rules had a much higher value than that of mere delay. For then, if the Opposition got hold of a good point, they stuck to it. When it was defeated in one form they brought it up in another. By reiteration in speeches and leading articles the objection, if it were a good objection, sank into the mind of the country. The government majorities shrunk by surprising accidents and mysterious abstentions. The Whips took alarm. Frequently concessions were the result, occasionally defeats; or else the minister trudged forward, depressed by the long faces of his colleagues and disquieted by the murmurs of the back benches. But now all this is changed. An amendment is moved and defeated; then we pass on to the next. A new mood rapidly obliterates the preceding impression. You can pass your finger through a flame unhurt, though you cannot hold it there. For the purpose of getting Bills forced through the House of Commons the new way—the shorter ordeal by fire—is certainly an advantage. But, on the other hand, it is only by iteration and reiteration that the people can be made to understand; and if popular government is to be a reality and not merely a name it is essential that the people *should* understand what is being attempted on their behalf. At the present time this objection to the new system is felt more acutely by the Unionists because they happen to be in opposition. But it would be a greater objection still from the Liberal point of view under similar circumstances, since the Liberal relies even more than his opponents upon the support of popular feeling for withstanding dangerous legislation.

But whether the final result of the present large programme of legislation will be to destroy the government or to confuse its adversaries, it is clear that Mr Asquith is confronted with difficulties of no ordinary character. His Cabinet is not in itself a coalition, for it is composed entirely of members of the Liberal party; but as it is absolutely

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dependent for its existence upon the confidence and good-humour of the Irish and the Labour parties—both of which are jealous of their independence and neither of which has any representation in the Ministry—it is maintained in power by a coalition of rank and file, and it is in this sense that we have come to speak of it as a coalition government. All coalitions are “kittle cattle,” and a coalition government of this peculiar character is clearly weaker in some respects than one which contained members of all the parties concerned in keeping it in office. But, notwithstanding, up to the present, it has defied all efforts on the part of the Opposition to break up the alliance. Indeed, during the two and a half years for which the Coalition has existed, the period when it was weakest was that immediately following the general election of January, 1910, when it was in its infancy. The “as-you-were” election of December, 1910, had a bracing effect upon its constitution. The Parliament Bill united practically all its members, and put no strain upon the principles of any section. To stick together was a matter of life or death, and it was also easy, until such time as the powers of the House of Lords had been curtailed by statute. But a year has now passed since the Parliament Bill became law, and although the habit of co-operation which was acquired by the Coalition during the struggle over this measure is undoubtedly of much value, it is not capable of standing any great strain of conflicting principles.

No Liberal would contend that at the present time Home Rule, or Welsh Disestablishment, or Franchise Reform, is supported by the same unwavering unanimity, or by the same eager and earnest conviction, as was the Parliament Bill. None of the three, of course, is an object of actual disapproval; in principle probably all are approved by the Coalition; but when it comes to putting the principles into practice there are doubts and even murmurings. What is also abundantly clear is, that enthusiasm is confined in each case to a comparatively small section, and in each case to a different section of the Coalition. Moreover, there has recently

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been a re-appearance of our old friend—the “unauthorized programme”—whose coming is usually the herald of staleness, and sometimes of dissension, in the Cabinet. A campaign for the taxation of the capital value of land has been announced, while for some time past there has been a movement on foot for the reversal of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy, with the double object of promoting a good understanding with Germany and of enabling us to oppose what is conceived to be the aggressive and illiberal policy of Russia in Persia. These manifestations of independence, of impatience, and of discontent with the official attitude, may possibly mean very little, but they cannot be disregarded. Years in the lives of governments count as decades in the human span, and this government is all but an octogenarian. For it has been nearly seven years in office, and therefore by political reckoning is in its extreme old age, where every symptom must be taken into consideration by the family doctor.

Other causes of difference within the Coalition are found in naval policy and the labour troubles. In both these instances the Radical wing of the party is dissatisfied with the action or inaction of the government. In both the sympathies of the Irish and the Labour men are with the dissentients rather than with Ministers. To some extent the personality of the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but to a much greater extent the violence of a natural reaction after ten years of Unionist government, had temporarily obliterated the old, but by no means fanciful, distinction between Liberals and Radicals. At the General Election of 1906 the country voted furiously Radical. Men had grown weary of a “Rump” which refused to budge from office even in the face of the most unmistakable hints that it had outstayed its welcome. The sincere and deep feeling which was evoked by the anxieties of the South African war had disappeared for the most part, leaving behind it a tawdry sentimentality and an empty jargon of taunts and exclamations. The virtue even of Patriotism was gravely suspect, while Imperialism and Militarism—a

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sorely bedraggled pair—were hooted off the stage, whenever they put in an appearance. For the time being the old Liberals were merged in the Radicals, and this state of things lasted, roughly speaking, until the beginning of 1909, when the naval preparations of Germany were explained in ministerial utterances of undisguised gravity. To the bulk of the Liberal party it seemed clear that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's overtures for a mutual check on armaments had been rejected, and that the earnest which he had given of his sincerity in a reduced programme of British shipbuilding had been answered only by an increased programme of German shipbuilding. But the advanced Radicals were not willing to accept this explanation. They charged the government with deliberately provoking a panic, and with a mis-statement of essential facts, and they blamed the course of our foreign policy, which by removing old-standing subjects of dissension with France and Russia, had thereby exasperated the sensibilities of Germany. This rift in the Ministerial lute has never been entirely closed, even in the excitement of the campaign against the House of Lords. It was widened by the declaration of policy made by Mr Churchill, when he went to the Admiralty in the autumn of last year. It has been widened still further by his subsequent utterances, and by the opposite interpretations which Liberals and Radicals, according to their temperaments, have placed upon the facts of the situation.

The effect of office in turning Radical visionaries into Men-of-the-World and Whigs is a proverb. To some extent this has been counteracted up to now by the remarkable wisdom and dexterity of Mr Asquith's management, under which the Cabinet, by one and the same process, has been constantly refreshed with ideals and secured against the unpleasant consequences of rebellion. For no sooner has a young man of promise shown himself above the horizon of debate than he has forthwith been absorbed into the Ministry. But this is only possible for so long as differences do not cut too deep. When they do, the young man of pro-

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mise will not only ease his conscience, but will also serve his ambition better by going into a "cave." And there is a very real difference of view and principles between Mr Massingham and the "moral influence" party on the one hand, and Mr Churchill and the "physical basis" party on the other. The brilliancy of Mr Massingham's writings is equalled by their sincerity, and he undoubtedly speaks for a considerable section of those who have hitherto supported the government in the House of Commons,* and probably for an even larger section of the party in the country. But it cannot for a moment be doubted that on this subject Mr Churchill so far has expressed the views of the great majority of his own party. He has won the confidence, not merely of the quiet men who are by nature inclined to leave decisions to their leaders, not merely of the alarmists, and the timid folk, and the professional partisans, but of a large body of sturdy and independent Nonconformists, like Sir Joseph Compton-Rickett, who, though their sympathies are all on the side of peace, have not forgotten the Cromwellian tradition, and disbelieve in the possibility of any peace which is not based upon a full security. It may be conjectured on the one side that Mr Massingham's sentiments are shared by the Irish and the Labour men, even if they are not openly demonstrated, and on the other side that Mr Churchill's are in the main approved by the Unionists. But there can be no doubt which of the two expresses the present mood of the nation, and it is not Mr Massingham.

The other cause of difference arises out of Labour unrest. When the Parliament of 1906 first met, some people were inclined to think that the majority of the Labour representatives would soon lose their identity and become absorbed in the Liberal ranks. Many of the Labour members owed their seats to Liberal votes, and in some instances Liberal members in like manner owed their seats to Labour

* The 40 or so of malcontents who go into the lobby on Radical amendments cannot be taken as a full measure of the disagreement.

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votes. The Labour party was not a band of red-capped revolutionaries preaching fines and confiscations. In speech, manners and outlook, they were very similar to their allies. The prevailing spirit was the spirit so characteristic of the British middle classes—a zeal for the redress of grievances, real or imaginary, in a common-sense way. It must also be noted that as the Liberals had a large majority of the whole House, there was not much profit to be gained by any irritating display of independence on the part of either section of their allies. But when the first general election of 1910 made the support of the Labour party a vital consideration to the government, any tendencies there may previously have been towards fusion were immediately arrested. There is nothing which fosters the spirit of independence so effectively as the discovery that others are dependent upon ourselves. And there is nothing which preserves independence so well as the knowledge that it has a high market value. After the election of January, 1910, the delicate balance of political parties alone, without any other change in the circumstances, must inevitably have tended to crystallize the Labour members into an entirely separate organization.

But there have been other changes in the circumstances. There have been important internal changes affecting the spirit and methods of the Labour movement, and tending in the direction of socialism. There have been even more important changes arising out of the many strikes which have occurred during the past eighteen months. It is hardly conceivable that any government which is prepared to act as a government, no matter how sympathetic its attitude may be, can avoid a certain loss of popularity with the Labour party during a period of industrial conflict. For the first business of all governments alike is to maintain law and order, and they can only escape from this responsibility by suicide.

The restiveness of the Labour party in the House of Commons first came to a head during the railway strike in August of last year. The announcement of the government

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that they intended to protect the food supply of the community by using the army if necessary to maintain an adequate railway service was bitterly resented. In the more recent coal strike the government incurred reproach because its legislation to end the struggle did not go so far as the men desired. In the still more recent dock strike it has added to its unpopularity by a refusal to interfere at all. If the results of these various conflicts had been increasingly favourable to the men the attitude of the government might have been forgotten in the victorious progress. But there has been no victorious progress. The issue of the strikes has been decreasingly favourable to the men. During the shipping strike in June of last year the men carried all before them, partly because the employers were unprepared, but chiefly because the balance of right and justice was clearly on the side of Labour. But in the railway strike in the following August the concessions wrung from the companies were only of a moderate character, and were granted, as we now know, because the government put pressure on the directors to end the dispute in view of the anxiety of the foreign outlook. The strike of London tailors last May was a complete and ludicrous failure; the dock strike has been a complete and tragic one.

Public opinion, reacting from the exaggerations of newspapers and platforms, has recovered from the very violent attack of nerves which afflicted it at the beginning of the coal strike, and has swung round to the opposite extreme of confidence and carelessness. Public opinion, nourishing itself upon headlines and sensational reports of street-corner oratory, upon the threats, boasts, and blasphemy of a few agitators who have made a great mistake and know it, seems to be in danger of forgetting the essential fact, that thousands of quiet workmen—as kindly of heart as the most virtuous and orderly inhabitant of South Kensington—do not watch their children and their wives starve and sicken through ten long weeks of a London summer, unless, in their opinion, there is something more at stake than a small rise in

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wages and a few modifications in the terms of employment. But public opinion, with eyes and ears only for the vanity and violence of one or two intriguing mountebanks, thinks it understands the whole case and is outraged at any idea of government interference. Even charity (in England rarely a laggard) is less free-handed than usual, and gives, not, indeed, grudgingly, but doubtingly; haunted by the fear that more harm will come of it than good. Labour beginning with high hopes and a brilliant victory finds itself thoroughly beaten at the end of the campaign. The judgment of those who instigated the recent strikes has been bad for a year past and has grown steadily worse. We are told that the Labour members in the House of Commons have been well aware of this, but that they have used their powers of dissuasion in vain. They have been powerless to hold in their men and to prevail against a new generation of ambitious and inexperienced rivals. They are blamed, nevertheless, by everybody—by these very rivals, by the men, by the Liberal party, and by the country. And all this does not tend to draw the Labour party closer to Mr Asquith's government.

This dock strike is one of the strangest phenomena which have occurred in recent times. Its motives are wrapped in obscurity. We see little clearly except the match which lit it and the charred remains. The speeches of leaders, some of whom seem to be men of excellent sense and feeling, and the articles in Labour journals, alike leave us uninformed. It seems as if the underlying principles had not yet found any means or formula of articulate expression. An idea may be a very formidable force, and yet be only expressible at the beginning in a string of curses. The incoherent orator has not explained the matter to us any more than the dumb crowds at the dock gates. All we can be sure of is that there is something which stands very much in need of explanation. He must be a very superficial observer of events who does not see something very solemn and moving in this foiled upheaval. Is it the envy of other men's possessions, or a revolt against injustice? Is it sordid or noble, a hunger or a

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passion? Occurrences in the mean streets of East London during the past ten weeks have been apt to strike us as purposeless and squalid: are they perhaps manifestations, none the less, of the same spirit which, as we look back, appears so sublime at Valmy, but which is still an unread riddle after more than a hundred years? One fact is clear enough—between the leaders of men whose spirits are disturbed in this fashion, and a cabinet intent upon reforming the Irish Constitution, and disestablishing the Welsh Church, and amending the law as to the registration of voters, there is a great gulf fixed. To the Labour party it may perhaps appear as the gulf separating reality from unreality.

From another point of view it is interesting to consider the strength of the ties which compel the Irish and the Labour parties to common action. The Labour party is said to be hand in glove with the Irish party, and it is natural that these two sections, neither of which participates in the honours and responsibilities of office, should stand in a closer relation to one another than to their Liberal allies. But it is not clear that the Irish have much sympathy with the ideals of labour, any more than it is clear that the Labour men have much interest in the question whether the Act of Union is to be superseded or maintained, or whether Ireland is to be made into one separate community or into two. The programme of the Labour party is detested by the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland as elsewhere. It is repellent, with its doctrines of State-ownership and State-control, to the minds of peasants and agriculturists; and in Ireland there are but two large cities—Dublin and Belfast—so that public opinion is largely the farmer's view. The Irish motive for keeping well with Labour at the present time is to pass the Home Rule Bill. The Labour motive for keeping well with the Irish is to pass Labour legislation. Both are strong motives so long as their objects remain unsatisfied. But when Home Rule is achieved Irish representation at Westminster will be reduced by more than half, and it may easily be that the Irish members who remain there will have

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no sufficient inducement of a political kind to overcome their natural antipathy to the Labour programme.

For all these reasons we may conclude that the Coalition is at present passing through a very critical stage. Its chances of cohesion are less than they were a year ago, or even six months ago. Labour is exasperated for the reasons we have already given. Liberals are exasperated by the slackening of Labour support in the division lobby, and by the three-cornered contests at by-elections, where the Labour candidate has had no real chance of success, and where the effect of his standing has been to endanger or to lose the seat for the government nominee. The Irish are disquieted by these signs of division. They are disquieted also by a suspicion that the government itself is not wholly united as to its policy, that it is becoming weary of its existing embarrassments, and that its nerves are beginning to be affected by the dread of the still greater embarrassments which seem likely to arise out of the unbending hostility of Ulster. It was calculated that the effect of the Parliament Bill would be to maintain the government in power for at least two years, until the first crop of its measures had been passed under the operation of the new statute. But this confidence no longer exists, and although no one believes that Mr Asquith is riding for a fall, no one would be surprised if yet another general election were after all to be fought on the subject of Home Rule. Mr Healy and Mr O'Brien have always prophesied that this would be the case, and many people on both sides would agree with them to-day who thought otherwise only a few months ago.

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IT becomes interesting, therefore, to consider the question of an alternative government. If Mr Asquith were defeated in the House of Commons in some important division on

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Home Rule, Disestablishment, or general policy, would he resign? It appears almost certain that he would. Would the Unionist leaders in that case accept office? This can hardly be doubted, and the immediate result would be another general election. Is it probable that in this appeal to the country Lord Lansdowne and Mr Bonar Law would win the eighty seats which are necessary to give them a working majority of forty? Is there anything in the measures to which the Unionist party is pledged, or in the methods which it has pursued in recent times, or in the calibre and character of its chief men which can be relied upon by the Liberals to counteract the natural swing of the pendulum against a government which has been in office for seven years? How stands the credit of Unionists with the country as regards their measures, their methods, and their men?

The first of these is the least important. What turns the scale in the country is rarely any clear perception of what the new people are going to do, but, far more, dissatisfaction with what the old people have already done or have left undone. After seven years, even a Cabinet of archangels would find a heavy bill of dissatisfaction piled up against them.

Except in one particular, the official Unionist programme is not at all frightening to the average elector in his present mood. He is not alarmed but reassured by the promise of a still stronger Navy and a larger and more efficient Army; nor does he grudge the expense. He is all for a "firm" foreign policy and no departure from our existing friendships. So far as he understands the question he is favourable to completing the business of Irish land purchase, which he believes to have worked much good so far as it has gone, and which he also believes, rightly or wrongly, to have been hung up by the present government out of deference to Mr Dillon's desire that Ireland should not be made too contented, lest, perchance, it might lose its appetite for Home Rule. Even if he sympathizes with Liberal anathemas upon our own land system he is not repelled, unless he be a pure

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theorist, by Lord Lansdowne's promise of some scheme of state-aided land purchase for England and Scotland; for he approves of small ownership and does not discriminate over nicely as to the means proposed for arriving at it. On the whole he probably prefers Lord Lansdowne's scheme to that of the "single taxers," because he understands it better. It is simple. The State will lend a man money at a low rate of interest, and with it he will buy land at a fair price, and the "magic of property" will do the rest. The countryside will smile once more, and lusty babes will abound in it. This is easier to follow than disquisitions upon the metaphysical basis of taxation, and the benefits promised, though less effulgent than those of the Radicals, have the advantage of appearing less like a mere fairy-tale. So far there is nothing alarming if there is nothing very exciting in the Unionist programme.

But when we come to Tariff Reform it is different, and Tariff Reform, as we have been told time and again, is "the chief constructive plank in the Unionist platform." It is as difficult for a Liberal as for a Unionist to gauge accurately the fears and hopes with which this subject is regarded by ordinary men outside the walls of party committee rooms; for both sides have imported into the discussion something of a religious fervour which blinds their judgment. Nine years of discussion and pamphleteering have not succeeded in overthrowing the Liberal belief that Free Trade is one of the first principles of statesmanship. And if that party holds by the doctrines of Richard Cobden almost as Scotsmen, after three centuries of experience, hold by the doctrines of John Knox, Unionists on the other hand are inspired by Tariff Reform, as the tribes newly converted by Mohammed, with a fanatical faith in its efficacy to cure all human ills. The rash intermeddler who should venture to say that neither the one nor the other is a principle, but only an expedient, to be taken up and laid aside again, as it seems likely to serve the needs of each particular time, speaks to deaf ears.

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What would strike the impartial observer, if there be such a person, most forcibly in regard to this discussion is, that the portion of Tariff Reform which is most widely and firmly held by the Unionist party, and which is most readily listened to by the average elector, is not the doctrine of Preference, with its concomitant of the food taxes (which was Mr Chamberlain's starting-point in 1903), but that other body of doctrine which came as a kind of by-product somewhat later:—the securing of the home market against the competition of foreign manufacturers by means of protection, and the opening of new foreign markets to British goods by means of retaliation. On this it seems pretty certain that the Unionist party is not merely unanimous, but confident. By what arguments and by what interpretations of the facts they have persuaded themselves into this conclusion is for the moment beside the point. They may be all wrong, but there can be no doubt that they believe, and that they also agree. What is more, they find audiences in every part of the country ready to listen to them. Their appeal to simple minds is direct and forcible, as are all appeals made to people to protect their own industries. It needs no disquisitions upon dry economic axioms. "Why should we import goods from abroad which we can make at home? Why should we not tax the foreigner and so keep the home market to ourselves? Employment will then increase, wages will rise as an inevitable consequence." This is the argument, and it is one which it becomes increasingly difficult to answer in simple terms. And so the impartial observer would probably conclude, sadly or merrily according to the inclination of his impartiality, that the country is no longer terrified by this aspect of Tariff Reform, and that consequently it is not any obstacle to the return of the Unionists to power. He might even go further and admit that, upon the whole, for electioneering purposes, it is the most attractive item in their programme.

But this non-terrifying, and possibly seductive, aspect of

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Tariff Reform is bound up with Preference and the food taxes, and that is the best hope of the Liberal campaigner. Our impartial observer will admit at once that it is a well-founded hope. Taxes are always unpopular when people are quite clear that they themselves will have to pay them, and every one knows that he will have to pay more for his bread if you put a tax on wheat. The ordinary man is still asking the same question which occurred to him nine years ago—"Why can't you give me the advantages of Protection without the disadvantages of dearer food?" And he is not yet satisfied with the double answer which he has received. For when he is told that Preference can only be given to the Colonies if he submits to a tax on food, but that the effect of this Preference will be to lower the existing Colonial duties in favour of his own manufactures and so provide him with a large and important market, he is inclined to take the view that this is all very vague, and remote, and problematical. He hears from the other side that the Colonies will never reduce their tariffs so as to give him really fair play in their markets, and being naturally of a somewhat suspicious disposition he is inclined to believe it. And when he is told again by the leaders of the Unionist party that any rise in the price of food which he may have to suffer will be made up to him by reductions in tea, sugar, tobacco, and other articles of his consumption, his suspicions are again aroused; the calculations are too elaborate; he sniffs "hickery pokery" and is off like a startled hind. It is impossible and unnecessary to argue this matter out at length in the present article. The object here is merely to give the most general idea of the difficulties which face the Unionist party in commending this part of their programme to the British working man, who more than ever now—much more than in 1903—is easily alarmed by any prospect of a further rise in the absolute necessities of life.

It is clear to every one, whether his observation be impartial or not, that the food taxes are a handicap to the Unionist party in all industrial centres, in all urban constituencies.

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Nor is it clear, on the other hand, that this item of their programme is of any value to them in the country districts. The attitude of the agricultural interest towards this part of Tariff Reform is by far the most obscure aspect of the whole movement. Does what is called the agricultural interest regard the food taxes as the manufacturing interest regards the taxes on foreign goods—i.e. as an efficient measure of Protection under and by virtue of which it will thrive more than it does at present, make larger profits, earn higher wages and have more continuous employment? This agricultural interest consists of labourers, farmers and landlords. Are the interests of these three classes identical? Would all, or any of them, benefit by the moderate imposts which have been proposed? Have all or any of them thought the matter out and arrived at any clear idea of how and what they might hope to gain? It is almost impossible to answer these questions with confidence; but what we can say is that the approval of the food taxes by the agricultural interest—if it does approve them—is a much vaguer and more nebulous sentiment than that which has caught the concrete imagination of the artificers of the towns with respect to duties on foreign manufactures. The pull of material self-interest is much less strong.

The Liberal organizer calculates accordingly that the disfavour with which the food taxes are regarded in urban constituencies is not counterbalanced by any enthusiasm which they may excite in the rural districts. But he also calculates with even higher hopes upon a consideration of a different character. Private conversation is one of the things in this world which can never be kept secret, and those responsible for the management of the Liberal party are well aware that wherever two or three Unionists are gathered together a discussion of the food taxes casts a gloom upon the company. Their advocates are afraid of them. This article of the Tariff Reform creed may be accepted, but it is not believed in with fanaticism by the whole of the Unionist party, perhaps not even by the majority of the Unionist

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party. It is regarded as entailing "a sacrifice" (to use Mr Chamberlain's original expression), and a sacrifice is a thing which usually assumes a disagreeable shape if you look at it for too long. It is true that a great man in a great emergency may add to his power and popularity by boldly calling for a sacrifice; but such an appeal depends for its sudden success upon a set of emotions which it is hard to keep indefinitely at the boiling point. And this is the weakest spot in the Unionist armour—that apparently they dare not any longer take the bold line of demanding a sacrifice, and they find it an even harder job to commend their proposals as a simple business proposition.

Admitting that Unionists are practically unanimous about the protection of home industries, it may also be admitted that, not merely in lip-service, but from their hearts, the majority of the party are in favour of the principle of Colonial or Imperial Preference. But they shy at the only practicable means to this end. Mr Chamberlain's unrelenting maxim, "If you want to give a preference to the Colonies you must put a tax on food," haunts them in their dreams. Ingenious minds have set to work to get round this hard saying, and have suggested that British preferences upon manufactures might appeal to the imagination of the Dominions, intent upon fostering the urban side of their national life. Preferences upon income tax and death duties in respect of investments within the British Empire, the abolition of the double income tax and death duties at present payable in the case of such investments, the extension of the list of trustees' securities to include more Dominion stocks, bounties upon freights, etc., etc., have all found their advocates. But none of the advocates has found an audience. Neither at home nor oversea have any or all of these suggestions appealed to public opinion as a practicable alternative.

There is undoubtedly a section of the Unionist party which is in favour of giving up all or part of the food taxes. How large this section is, it is impossible to say. It is not

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every one who is afraid of the food taxes, or who dislikes them, who is prepared, therefore, to give them up. Calculations based upon the contrary assumption are certainly fallacious.

Some, while adhering firmly to the principle of Imperial Preference, are for dropping only the tax on wheat, not foreseeing apparently that they would then be pursued by their elated opponents, with redoubled vigour, into all the other branches of food taxation. They would then have to seek for other arguments (and would certainly not find it an easy matter to lay their hands on any better ones) to defend their proposed duties on meat, bacon, dairy produce, and such like. Unionist speakers have painfully learned since 1903 a certain number of more or less effective platform arguments in defence of the wheat tax, upon which item the Free Trade attack has been concentrated. They would have to begin learning all over again if the wheat tax disappeared. It would be an admission of defeat at one point in the line, damaging enough in itself, but still more damaging because of the certainty that it must entail defeat along the whole length of the line.

It would, therefore, appear to our impartial observer that if the Unionist party were to give up the wheat tax it would be wiser to give up food taxes altogether. But if the Unionists give up the food taxes, the Liberals will say, and the great mass of the people both at home and in the Dominions will believe, and even the majority of the Unionists themselves will also believe—whatever they may say—that they are giving up Preference as well. This would be like taking the soul out of Mr Chamberlain's movement. Tariff Reform would then become an ordinary protectionist programme, as in the United States, or France, or Germany, to be judged upon its merits. Only remotely or indirectly could it be represented as leading to any kind of development or union of the Empire.

It is worth while attempting to foresee what would happen if this policy were to prevail and the Unionist party were to

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give up food taxes and Preference, and to fall back upon the protection of home manufactures. Liberals no doubt would rejoice as patriots at the removal of what they consider to be a grave national danger, and they would rejoice as men of kindly disposition at the return of erring brothers to the fold. But they would probably rejoice even more—for politicians, after all, are human, and the bad motives are mixed curiously with the good—at the disruption and demoralization which would ensue among their opponents. That is really the crux of the position seen through Liberal spectacles. For nine years the Unionist party has struggled on, sorely embarrassed by the food taxes; but it would be utterly damned if it gave them up. For it would then have sold its ideals for a mess of pottage. It would have put aside Imperial Union merely to increase the profits of British manufacturers and the wages of British artisans.

It is always a pleasant spectacle when our enemy appears hesitating and disconcerted in the midst of the struggle; and Liberals ought therefore to be forgiven if they exult openly at the present attitude of the Opposition in regard to the Food Taxes. The Unionists are not unlike a man coming to a stream, who, with a run and a leap, lands on a stone which seemed to him, as he took-off so light-heartedly, to lie right under the opposite bank—as if a mere step would be enough to land him dryshod. But as he balances himself upon the small and slippery boulder, he realizes that he has miscalculated, and that still another leap is needed to bring him safe to shore. There is no space for a run. He looks back across the gurgling waters and understands that to return is at least as hard as to advance. He looks forwards, and then backwards with doubt and misgiving. The Liberal spectator upon shore hopes sincerely that panic will breed confusion in his adversary's mind and lure him into choosing the greater evil, whichever that may be; but in any case, the Liberal holds the cheerful view that a ducking is more than probable in any event.

This, however, our impartial observer may well question.

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It is not wise to exaggerate the influence of the popularity or unpopularity of any given article of policy in bringing a party into office, or in keeping a party out of office. It is not nearly so potent an influence as admiration for a great character, or as distrust of a prominent leader. Nor is it nearly so potent as the blunders committed, or believed to have been committed, by the government of the day. The truth is that the programmes which oppositions are usually so eager to put forward, and in which they appear to place such a child-like confidence, are rarely either very enticing or very repellent to the ordinary elector, for the reason that, being all in the future, they do not really come home to him. At the best they are but minor considerations. Home Rule was undoubtedly an unpopular item in Mr Gladstone's programme, and yet he won the election of 1892 in spite of it. Mr Gladstone believed in his creed; he was a great apostle:—Lord Salisbury's government had been six years in office and had grown stale—these were the two considerations which really mattered. The present government has been seven years in office, and it would be a very confident Liberal who would maintain that there are no signs of staleness, nor any blunders to its charge. Mr Chamberlain, too, believes in his creed and is a great apostle; but Mr Chamberlain is no longer in the fight. Liberal confidence and Unionist misgiving seem to be better founded upon the absence of the apostle than upon the harshness of the creed.

We have endeavoured to estimate in the foregoing pages how far the Unionist party is likely to be helped or hindered at the next general election by the measures which figure in its programme. The next consideration (and a still more important one) is the degree of credit which the Unionist party at present possesses with the country. Have its methods, and the course of policy which it has pursued in recent times tended to create a general confidence in its good sense, its constancy, its integrity, and its patriotism?

There is undoubtedly a feeling in the country which is

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highly favourable to a Conservative reaction, if there were a Conservative party in whom the country could confide. The difficulties of putting the Insurance Act into force are very great, and even, in spite of the fact that they have been to some extent discounted beforehand by the grotesque and impolitic exaggerations of opponents, the working of this new law is likely to cause a serious and prolonged disturbance over a very wide area. The crowd of important bills at present before Parliament, and the serio-comic land-policy, which has been announced under semi-official patronage, are frightening many people. Men are saying to themselves that perhaps too much is being attempted in the way of legislation. Perhaps they also think that, under a less officious and a more understanding government, Labour discontent would not have grown to such a head. And, as a result of all this, the country is possibly inclined to the view that it would be better to take a rest.

When the country says, "better take a rest," it usually says also, "better give the other fellows a chance." It does not appear to be saying this clearly at the present time. On the contrary, as often as it remembers that taking a rest means giving the other fellows a chance, the supposed Conservative reaction comes to a stop. The country swallows its dissatisfaction with the government, sighs and resigns itself to forgo rest, whenever it is too loudly reminded by the Opposition of their existence. Men will not kill Charles to make James king.

The skies grew lighter, and the sun seemed ready to come out and shine upon Unionist hopes at the beginning of 1908; and, upon the whole, the prospect remained tolerably favourable for another eighteen months, when the sun went in again, and everything was plunged in gloom once more. In the same way, last autumn there were signs of a Unionist revival; there do not seem to be many visible at the present moment. It is easy enough, and also probably perfectly true, to say that the Unionist party does not possess the confidence of the country, but it is impossible to give an ade-

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quate explanation of the causes of this distrust without some reference to the past.

For more than two years before Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman came into power, the Unionist party had been not merely stale—which might have been expected after a long and very arduous term of office—but also thoroughly discredited. It was discredited by its division over Tariff Reform, by its dual leadership, and by its persistence in adhering to office after it was clear that it had lost the confidence of the country. The ingenuity with which Mr Balfour succeeded in evading discussions upon the fiscal question was a dearly fought success, and far more damaging than defeat. The election of January, 1906, was the result, and the Unionists were then reduced from a proud majority to less than one fourth of the House of Commons, a disaster unparalleled in the annals of their party.

The Unionist recovery was very slow. During 1906 and 1907, in spite of the fact that a violent and speedy reaction might reasonably have been expected after the unprecedented results of the general election, there hardly seemed to be a glimmer of improvement. By the end of 1909, after four years of opposition, the Unionists had won only twelve seats; and yet the by-elections were not less frequent than usual during this period.

Moreover the Liberals had a great handicap in the House of Lords. Their most important bills had been thrown out, and others of less importance had suffered the same fate.* There is an inevitable loss of prestige to a government when it fails to carry measures on which it has spent much time and labour. Public opinion does not discriminate: the failure looms large, the causes of it are disregarded. The general verdict is, that had they been strong men, they would not have failed. And also the government had miscalculated as regards Germany. It had fallen behind in naval preparations and had to admit the

* Education Bill, Licensing Bill, Scottish Land Bill, Land Valuation Bill, etc.

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fact. It had made a mistake, possibly a generous mistake, but Unionists were justified none the less in crying, "We told you so!" Again, Tariff Reform was clearly beginning to draw, especially with working-class audiences. The results of the by-elections in 1908 and 1909, though not sensational, were steadily unfavourable to the government. This was a time of bad trade, and the supposed ill-effect of foreign competition upon wages and unemployment was eagerly discussed. Popular attention was concentrated mainly upon this aspect of Tariff Reform, and the food taxes were then less of a deterrent than had been the case at the beginning or than they became later on.

Mr Asquith succeeded to the premiership in succession to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at the beginning of 1908. From that time up to midsummer, 1909, the Liberals seemed on the whole to be losing ground with the country. Mr Lloyd George's budget was not popular at its first introduction, nor on the other hand was it violently unpopular. It was suspected and denounced at first, not because it was a revolution or a confiscation, but upon the more humdrum grounds that its proposals with regard to land valuation and land taxation were complicated and unpractical. The Opposition fastened upon this aspect, as people sometimes will, with a most unremunerative industry. Mr Lloyd George wisely gave all the time that was asked for, and gradually the Unionists talked themselves into a moral transport. But outside the Houses of Parliament this long attack upon the land clauses interested only the landlords and only wearied the country. The more the Opposition talked the more they appeared to the ordinary man to talk pure selfishness. The country gentleman—on the whole a popular and a freehanded character, more observant of the duties attaching to the possession of property than most—became gradually confounded with the urban landlord, who, in the imagination of the public, has no more bowels than the rate collector, and is less disinterested. The net result of weeks of debate was that the Opposition at the end of it all

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found themselves regarded as champions of a wealthy and privileged class to which they themselves were supposed to belong. Their persistency was judged to have been due not to patriotism, but to self-interest. They had, in fact, manœuvred themselves into a defile, and Mr Lloyd George fell upon them there, suddenly and dramatically one fine day, and threw them into a state of the wildest panic.

Mr Lloyd George was not the man to let his enemies recover themselves. The Unionists had played their game so unfortunately that they were identified with class selfishness, and he pinned them to that. No one listened to the subsequent discussions in the House of Commons. The whole attack upon the Bill was discredited with the country. Criticisms of other portions of the proposed taxation, which in different circumstances might have appealed to the popular imagination were now useless. They appeared as an afterthought, as a ruse to cover up the real reasons of the Unionist dislike. The panic increased rather than diminished in September, after Parliament adjourned. The Opposition went about the country burning their boats, blowing up golden bridges, and vowing that the hateful budget should be thrown out by the House of Lords.

Rightly or wrongly, the country judged the throwing out of the budget by the House of Lords to be unconstitutional, and the crowning triumph of Mr Lloyd George's conduct of affairs was when he induced the Constitutional party to break, or to appear to break, the Constitution. Even so the swing of the pendulum could not be altogether resisted. In the ensuing general election the Unionists gained a hundred seats and reduced the majority against them to 125—still not an insubstantial figure!

But this election ended the Liberal Government, and introduced that thing, rarely known in British politics, a Government maintained in office by a coalition of groups. The old servants kept their places, but there were now three mistresses instead of one, and the housekeeping consequently became a joint affair, in which the comfort and dignity

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of the staff were not likely to be so well-cared for as formerly.

Partly as a result of ill-luck, but more as a result of ill-judgment, the Unionist party between then and now does not seem to have gone far in re-establishing itself in credit. Unionists have drawn little profit out of the embarrassments of their opponents. They have driven no wedges into the coalition. They won no benefit for themselves or for the country out of the constitutional conference. They gained not a single seat, upon the balance, at the general election in December, 1910. Before the break-down of the conference the Liberal government had wished to deal with the reform of the House of Lords, as well as with the question of its powers; but the Irish, the Labour men, and probably the majority of the Liberal private members, were opposed to the first part of this programme. But when Parliament met at the beginning of last year Mr Asquith was able to say that the Opposition had refused to help him in clearing up the situation as a whole—powers as well as composition—and that therefore he must proceed piecemeal, beginning with the limitation of the powers, upon which proposal the whole coalition was agreed.

While the Parliament Bill was under discussion the Unionists, although undiminished in numbers, were thoroughly discouraged. They grew more discouraged as the session went on. The country would not attend to them, partly owing to the absorbing interest of the Coronation, partly because it was weary of constitutional arguments, partly because it had made up its mind that the election had settled the question, partly because it was sick of Unionist oratory, partly because there was no Unionist character which attracted admiration as a popular hero. The Unionists made a bad Parliamentary fight, not so much from want of industry as from want of inspiration. The Die-hard campaign produced the opposite effect from that which had been intended by its promoters; it evoked impatience rather than admiration. On the other hand the scene of disorder in

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the House of Commons in July (in which both Die-hards and Hedgers took part) produced not merely ridicule and indignation, but contempt. This carefully prepared impromptu carried no conviction even to the simplest minds. People will pardon, even though they may deplore, a loss of self-control if they believe it to have been sincere and unpremeditated. In such circumstances it may even produce a considerable moral effect. But in this egregious transformation the ropes and the pulleys, the scene shifters and the machinery, were much more in evidence than the sublime spectacle itself.

Nor has the subsequent action of the Unionist party done much to re-establish their credit. Their action over the Insurance Bill—first in welcoming it effusively, and afterwards in taking full electioneering advantage of the unpopularity of its virtues—has not commended them to the country, already somewhat inclined to be suspicious of their honesty. But perhaps more than anything else, the country is vaguely disturbed by the language which has been held by Mr Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson, and other less prominent men, upon the subject of Ulster. The gravity of the Ulster problem is not unrecognized, and is becoming more recognized every day. Even among Liberals there is much sympathy with Ulster. There are doubts, not on one side only, as to the wisdom and the fairness of the Government's proposals for dealing with Ulster. But the country has not yet lost faith in the traditions of popular government, and is shocked by what it considers to be an official and direct incitement to disorder before the weapons of reason and Parliamentary debate have been proved inadequate.

It would seem as if recent events in and out of Parliament had brought the country to the conclusion that *Disorder is the Enemy*. It was begun in 1902-3 by Mr. Lloyd George and the Radicals when they invented passive resistance to defeat Mr Balfour's Education Bill. But on all sides there has been disorder; and public opinion, considering things in the gross, draws no nice distinction between the Suffragettes breaking

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the windows of tradesmen, and Unionist members keeping up an indecent coil in the House of Commons; between riots in the London docks and in the shipyards of Belfast; between Mr Bonar Law at Blenheim and Mr Ben Tillett on Tower Hill. It lumps them all together as manifestations of the same disease, and as constituting the chief menace of the time. In their present mood men would naturally be inclined to turn from a Liberal government, whose blunders and provocations may seem to them to have contributed in no small measure to this result, and to place power in the hands of the party of law and order, the party which regards the custody of the Constitution as its most sacred charge. But this party of law and order is threatening, through the mouth of one of its anointed leaders, to "break all the laws." It is threatening rebellion in Ulster after the harvest. It is boasting that its organization for rebellion is in a forward state of preparation. It was threatening a few weeks ago to defeat the working of the Insurance Act by passive resistance. It was threatening not to lick stamps. It has been preaching further disorder in the House of Commons as an alternative to debate—when a Liberal member or minister seeks to address Mr Speaker his arguments are to be drowned in a storm of sibilants, in cries of "Dissolve! Dissolve! Dissolve!" so that he cannot be heard. This it is conceived will attract great attention in the country as a proof of sincerity, and will win back confidence by making it clear that the Unionist party is the party of justice. Other ingenious persons, flitting about mysteriously on tip-toe, fingers on lips, whisper to all the reeds along the river bank the dreadful secret that in the autumn a dissolution will be forced by the House of Lords, which will then throw out the Expiring Laws Continuance Act, producing thereby some such fatal confusion as occurred when poor King James the Second dropped the Great Seal into the river opposite Lambeth!

All this has thrown the country into a quandary. Has the Unionist party, which is the party of order, struck

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order out of its programme, as the same party, which is also the party of the Constitution, only three years ago broke with the Constitution? It is possible that the country judges unjustly, and is needlessly perturbed; but it is the misfortune of the followers of Mr Bonar Law that they have succeeded in producing this impression, and they appear to be singularly unfortunate in all their efforts to dispel it.

The discredit which at present seems to attach to the Unionist policy is due to a suspicion of opportunism, of recklessness, of emotionalism, and of a number of other qualities which are usually regarded as the antithesis of Conservatism. Change, too, is no longer inscribed solely upon the banners of the Liberals. If the Unionists return to power there are to be changes as vast as any which have been proposed by their adversaries. The yearning for rest on the part of mankind will not then be satisfied. Under a Unionist government we have no hope of finding ourselves in any Abraham's bosom of peace. There is a feeling at the back of public opinion that there are two conflicting currents of principle among the Opposition; that the old Unionists have learned nothing, while the new Unionists, though they have learned at a prodigious pace, have not yet thought enough; that each of these sections in turn seizes the controlling influence on policy, producing as a consequence much inconsistency; that Unionism is dangerous chiefly because it has not yet found its creed, and does not really know either how it is going to come back to power, or what it would proceed to do if it found itself there.

The last point which needs to be considered here is the question of men. Is it an obstacle to the formation of an alternative government that the Unionist party is supposed to be inferior to the Liberals in the calibre of its leaders? Great reliance is placed upon this consideration by the party now in power. Any party which is in power inclines to place reliance on this consideration until one fine

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day it wakes up to find its successors installed, and the country by no means discomposed by the appearance of the new figures upon the front bench. The Liberals placed great reliance upon this consideration until Mr Disraeli beat them in 1874. The Unionists did likewise until Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman formed his Government in 1905. The Liberal party in Canada was strong in this confidence until Mr Borden replaced Sir Wilfrid Laurier after the election of last year. The veterans disappeared, and the raw levies took their place, and "the great mundane movement" still went on, notwithstanding, very much as before. If office often destroys reputations—especially of windbags—it also discovers men. There is little reason, therefore, to suppose that the country would be inexpressibly horrified at the names of the men whom Lord Lansdowne or Mr Bonar Law would include in his Cabinet. Nor is there anything in the qualities of the individual men who are prominent in Unionist counsels which terrifies the country in advance. It is not their want of ability, or honesty, or even judgment, which disturbs the country so much as the lack of a clear, consistent policy. This want may even be due—as was the case with the Radicals and the Liberal Imperialists up to the middle of 1903—to the large number of men of force and talent, and the consequent difficulties of finding any common denominator for their views.

Upon the whole matter, therefore, our "impartial observer" might draw the conclusion that, although the absence on the Unionist side of any towering character who attracts popular affection and loyalty as did Lord Beaconsfield, Mr Gladstone, or Mr Chamberlain is undoubtedly a serious lack, still the country does not realize that there is any dearth of capable men, and therefore is not appalled by this consideration. As regards the measures proposed in the Unionist programme, he would probably conclude that although the food taxes are a serious handicap upon a straight and simple issue, yet at the same time he would admit that issues are rarely straight and simple. Even the unpopularity of the food

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taxes, he thinks, may be overlooked in a greater, or in some more immediate interest. In his opinion the most serious difficulty which faces the Unionists is, that the country has become utterly confused by their methods and does not in the least know what they stand for—whether for sober progress or for violent change, for order or for disorder, for sense or sentimentality, for conservatism or a revolution. He would say further that their surest way to power is a way they have not recently trodden—steady adherence to their own principles, and to the old traditions of representative government, which still earn a great reverence, at any rate outside the walls of Westminster. Their best hope, as things stand, would appear to him to lie in the weariness of the present government after seven years of exceptional anxiety, and also in a special danger which besets the path of all coalitions. For although coalitions may begin with honest co-operation, and reasonable give-and-take between their members, they are apt—little by little, as the objects for which they were originally formed have been accomplished and recede into the past—to find themselves driven gradually, by the conflict of new ideas, to dubious shifts, undignified surrenders, and finally to barefaced opportunism in order to maintain themselves in office. Opinions will differ naturally enough as to which stage in this progress Mr Asquith's government has reached at the present time; but Liberals, Radicals, Nationalists, and Labour men are as keenly alive to the existence of this danger as is any member of the Unionist party.

London. August 12, 1912.

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I. THE NAVAL CONFERENCE

AT the moment there is intense interest in Canada over the negotiations between the Canadian ministers in London and the Imperial authorities. Five years ago the masses of the Canadian people were reluctant even to consider any obligation to assist in the naval defence of the Empire. It is even doubtful if twelve months ago there was any ardent interest in the naval proposals of the Laurier Administration. There was rather a common conviction that the Liberal Government had outrun public opinion and would be rebuked by the constituencies. Suddenly, however, through influences and processes which we do not wholly understand, a flame of feeling swept over the country, and, whether they realize it or not, there is more danger to Conservative ministers in failure to adopt an adequate programme than in robust assumption of heavy responsibilities for sea defence.

This may be a passing phase of opinion, but of its immediate strength and intensity there can be no question. At last it is realized that Canada lags behind New Zealand and Australia and that a somewhat vociferous Imperialism has been cheering the pulpit and evading the collection. It may be that this eager temper is a direct result of the contest over Continental Reciprocity. In that contest all there is of national and Imperial feeling in Canada was aroused. We had a revelation of ourselves, of our position in the Empire, of our neglect to ease the load which other shoulders bore to assure our peace and security. With this recognition of the real situation there is an irritated impatience to remove the

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reproach and a disposition to avoid further Imperial professions until there is actual and reasonable discharge of Imperial duty.

With the conferences proceeding it is unnecessary, and perhaps would be futile, to speculate upon the issue. It may be said, however, that the Canadian Cabinet recognizes the condition of opinion in Canada and rejoices at the prospect that an adequate naval programme will receive generous support in the constituencies. If there is any failure it will not be through the indisposition of Canadian ministers to assume the whole burden that should fall upon Canada, but through the denial of an equal partnership in the Empire which they will prescribe as the vital condition of full co-operation between the Mother Country and the Dominions in the organization and maintenance of an Imperial navy.

II. THE ROYAL GOVERNOR

THERE was some apprehension in Canada over the appointment of the Duke of Connaught to the office of Governor-General. There was fear that he would not enter into the genius of Canadian democracy. There were ungracious intimations that a severe etiquette would not be tolerated, and that rigid social distinctions were not congenial to the Canadian atmosphere. There was the familiar exaltation of colonial autonomy and the suspicion that some coercion or illegitimate persuasion of Canadian opinion for Imperial ends was intended. It is true that these apprehensions found only vagrant expression, but there was undoubtedly a wide and genuine concern that incompatibility should not develop between the Governor-General and the Canadian people and that the sentiment of loyalty to the Mother Country should not be weakened by the more direct representation of the Throne in Canada. We have learned how vain were these apprehensions and

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what sagacity dictated the selection of the Duke of Connaught for the Governor-Generalship.

Never have we had less of form or ceremony at Government House, a more gracious dispensation of hospitality, or a more strict observance of every constitutional usage. The Duke's public addresses have been marked by infinite discretion, but with no trace of condescension nor any fear of misunderstanding. The great popularity which he has acquired is not the result of any manifest seeking. He has indulged in no extravagant eulogy of the country or the people. He has not turned his eyes towards "the gallery" nor set any social fashion nor sought any special recognition. He has been simple, sincere, with ample dignity and a certain reserve in speech and bearing. In short, he has impressed the country as a man of sound sense, of simple habits and of sincere devotion to duty. Naturally, therefore, the respect which he commands goes beyond the social groups down amongst the people and his whole influence is towards simplicity of living, moderation of political asperities, and stimulation of interest in refining and cultural activities.

He holds in equal degree the confidence of ministers and of leaders of the Opposition. Even the most intemperate radical journals find nothing in his utterances that excites irritation or borders even remotely on personal or official imprudence. There is nothing in the nature of aggressive Imperialism and nothing that savours of political direction or dictation. Moreover, the whole impression which he leaves upon the country is that this happy result arises not from craft or design or excessive caution, but is the natural revelation of himself and the natural function of his office. The Throne will be stronger because he has come to Canada, and Royalty, as represented by the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, will have a very wholesome significance for the Canadian people. If any apprehension remains or any problem arises over the appointment of the Duke of Connaught to Canada the difficult situation will appear when the Imperial Government comes to name his successor.

III. PROVINCIAL GENERAL ELECTIONS

DURING the last three or four months new Legislatures have been elected in four of the Canadian provinces. In British Columbia and New Brunswick the Conservative party had decisive victories. In Quebec and Saskatchewan the Liberal Governments secured overwhelming majorities. In three of these contests no outstanding issue divided the parties. In Saskatchewan, through a curious combination of circumstances and events, the election turned chiefly on low tariff and reciprocal exchange of manufactures and natural products with the United States. In British Columbia the decisive factors were the personality of Sir Richard McBride and an extensive programme of railway building. For the whole province only two Socialists succeeded against Conservative candidates. Weak both in leadership and in organization, the Liberal party was hopelessly outweighed by the remarkable personal popularity of the Provincial Premier and the general confidence of the people in the efficiency and the integrity of his Administration. The situation in the Pacific Province is without a parallel in the history of Canadian politics. As has been said, not a single Liberal sits in the Legislature, while the province sends a solid Conservative delegation to the House of Commons.

In New Brunswick, with an Assembly of forty-eight members, only two Liberals were elected. In the House of Commons, however, eight of the thirteen seats are held by adherents of the Liberal party. It is assumed that the result of the provincial contest has a certain federal significance, although only local issues were discussed from the platform. Since the Conservative party was restored to office in the Dominion Prince Edward Island has defeated a local Liberal Administration and the Conservative party has greatly strengthened itself in New Brunswick. These facts suggest

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a revival of the party in the east and perhaps an increasing allegiance to Mr Borden, who belongs to the Maritime provinces.

There was undoubted federal significance in the result in Quebec, although Sir Lomer Gouin has great personal strength and deservedly enjoys the respect and confidence of the electorate. There have been no serious scandals under his Administration, the finances have been thriftily and wisely handled, agriculture has been generously assisted, the appropriations for elementary education have been materially increased and the natural resources of the province have been guarded against the rapacity of camp followers, and conserved as enduring sources of public revenue. Apart, however, from the merits of the Gouin Administration, the election revealed the still mortal weakness of the Conservative party in Quebec. Only seventeen Conservatives as against sixty-four Liberals were elected. It is admitted that the bulk of the Nationalists gave their support to the Liberal candidates. This was done, no doubt, in protest against the refusal of the Borden Government to establish Roman Catholic schools in Keewatin when that territory was added to the province of Manitoba, against its failure to satisfy Nationalist demands for the dismissal of public officials, and against its rejection of Nationalist dictation in naval defence. On the other hand, the mass of the English-speaking electors, distrustful of the feebler leadership of the Opposition and remembering the co-operation of Bourassa and Lavergne with the Conservative party in the Legislature, and the practical alliance between Nationalists and Conservatives in the federal election, now unconsciously associated themselves with the Nationalists in support of the Gouin Administration. Moreover, Sir Lomer Gouin repudiated reciprocity as an issue in the contest and thus retained the goodwill of the commercial and manufacturing interests. Indeed, in a complex and curious situation, all was gain for the Provincial Government, and all loss for the Provincial Opposition, while incidentally it

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was demonstrated that the Liberal party continues to hold a commanding ascendancy in the French province.

The victory for the Liberal party in Saskatchewan was as decisive as in Quebec. In a house of fifty-four members not more than nine or ten seats will be held by Conservatives. Although the Legislatures have no vestige of control over tariffs, the Liberal politicians succeeded in making "low tariff and larger markets" the chief issue in the contest. There was no serious consideration of local questions; there was vehement appeal to the grain growers to resist "the eastern interests" and to subordinate all other considerations to the demand for lower customs duties and access to American markets. There is still an acute agrarian feeling in the province, and all American experience teaches that while farmers' movements seldom have length of days they have a mighty power of aggression and cohesion in their time of vigour. It seems clear also that the American settlers, who are practically hived in Saskatchewan and Alberta, have been massed into a resolute unit against the Conservative party by the rejection of the Trade Agreement with Washington and the general attitude of its leaders toward the United States in the federal general election. On both sides the press was savage and virulent. There was much of gross personal abuse and demagogic fury. There was flagrant disfranchisement of Conservatives in the preparation of the lists of voters. There was intimidation and corruption of the foreign settlers by the agents of both parties. There was fraud, bribery and coercion on a scale which has seldom been witnessed in Canada. The whole contest was vicious, ugly and discreditable, and perhaps it would not be easy to determine which set of newspapers or which group of politicians had the pre-eminence in the competitions of abuse and violence. But Mr F. W. G. Haultain, Leader of the Opposition, confined himself to temperate and logical argument, while Mr Scott, the Provincial Premier, disabled by ill-health, in the few speeches which he delivered avoided the excesses of the extremists.

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For many years Mr Haultain was Premier of the Northwest territories, and he laid the foundations of western institutions with singular wisdom and foresight. His integrity is beyond suspicion; he speaks with force, clearness and dignity. But as a politician he is much inferior to Scott; he has the judicial temperament; he lacks the fervour of the partisan. Moreover, as Haultain and the whole Opposition in the Legislature had joined with the Liberal party to bless reciprocity when the Trade Agreement with Washington was negotiated, he now spoke with diminished authority as an ally of the Federal Government and a mouthpiece of the party which had rejected the contract.

The argument of the Liberal politicians of Saskatchewan was that if the Scott Government was defeated the federal Liberal party would be tempted to abandon the agitation for low tariff and reciprocal trade with the United States, and to recognize protection as the settled policy of the country. On the other hand, it was insisted that a decisive declaration for freer trade by the chief grain growing province would compel the federal Liberal party to adhere to the issue and would prevent its ultimate domination by Eastern protectionists. During the contest the *Winnipeg Free Press*, which is the chief organ of the Liberal party in Western Canada, said:

The Saskatchewan election is vital to the Liberals because it is fought on the tariff issue. A Liberal victory will mean that the radical low tariff element of the party, which since the defeat of last September has been growing in power, will take full command of the party and challenge the Conservative party to battle on the issue of lower taxation and wider markets, with special emphasis on the desirability of access to the markets to the south.

Commenting on the result, the *Toronto Globe*, which is the leading Liberal newspaper of older Canada, says: "The fight for larger markets and against the taxation of food-stuffs is only begun. It will be the supreme issue in another general election." This is now the language of the Liberal Press throughout the whole country. The tariff will again

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be the chief issue between the parties, but whether or not with such results as appeared between 1878 and 1896 has to be determined. In every general election since Confederation in which Protection was the supreme question the Conservative party has carried the country. Now, however, we have a more populous west, undoubtedly favourable to low tariff, and with a formidable representation in Parliament. But if the west favours lower duties the east becomes more strongly protectionist. The west has a population of only 1,730,000 out of a total population of 7,204,000 and the whole Dominion a rural population of 3,924,083 as against an urban population of 3,280,441. Between 1900 and 1910 the rural population increased at the rate of 16.48 per cent as compared with an increase of 63.83 per cent in the urban population. In the industrial communities both east and west protectionist sentiment dominates, while the rural constituencies of the older provinces divide fairly between low tariff and moderate protection. Moreover, before we have another general election the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern railways will be running from ocean to ocean, the Hudson Bay Railway will be constructed, and probably the Panama Canal will be drawing a great volume of western traffic to Canadian ports on the Pacific. With adequate facilities for transportation western grievances will be greatly mitigated and the relations between east and west correspondingly improved. It is certain at least that the Conservative party will adhere staunchly to the system of protection and if the tariff is the supreme issue in the next general election it is conceivable that any losses sustained in the west will be offset by gains in Quebec if the party develops leaders in the French province, and racial and sectarian considerations can be eliminated from the contest.

Canada. July, 1912.

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I. A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY*

THE English cables which have been recently published in Australia indicate that a crisis is taking place in English thought in regard to the relations of the Empire with foreign countries. In that crisis the relations of the various parts of the Empire one with another are apparently being revised. Mr Winston Churchill is reported to have said that it would be the function of the outer Dominions to patrol the oceans surrounding them. On the other hand, suggestions have been made that the warships now building for Australia and New Zealand should be diverted from that destination and used in the home waters. The arguments in favour of the one ocean, one navy, policy have been summed up by a writer in the *Fortnightly Review*, Mr A. R. Hurd. He reiterates with some arrogance the doctrine which official opinion has always endeavoured to impress upon the Dominions, viz.: That the Empire is best defended by one fleet under one control, situated in European waters. Australian statesmen have always fought against this doctrine, careless of the prestige and authority of those who have pressed it upon them. They have insisted upon the principle of local navies for the defence of the outer Dominions. One would have thought that the battle for local

* An Australian view of the problem of Imperial Defence and of Anglo-German relations is presented in this article. The opinions of the writer on these problems, regarded from the Australian angle, will be interesting to observers in other parts of the Empire. They are referred to at length on pp. 631-634 of this number in the article entitled "Canada and the Navy." (Ed.)

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defence had been won, but the present development shows that the principle is not fully accepted, since the action of New Zealand has apparently been taken spontaneously, and not as the result of official suggestion.

There is little fear that Australia will be tempted to follow the lead of New Zealand in this instance, for in Australia the sense of nationality is far too highly developed. But it is necessary for Australians to realize fully the principles upon which the local defence policy is based, and the danger there is of any departure from it. The policy of New Zealand in itself is unfortunate : it weakens Australia's position with regard to the potential dangers; it prevents that co-operation between Australia and New Zealand which is necessary for the defence of both. In the first instance, it is a pecuniary saving to New Zealand, but as it is based upon a false principle it involves a large waste.

The arguments contained in the *Fortnightly Review* article are based on the assumption that the only point of danger within the Empire is in the North Sea. It is quite true that a navy stationed in the German Ocean would be an effectual defence of Australia from all attacks emanating from European nations or even from America. It is also true that the outer Empire depends for its integrity on the superiority of the British fleet over any possible European combination. But the assumption that the outer Empire has no dangers of its own to face beyond these is quite untrue. If it be untrue, the following statement by Professor Spenser Wilkinson, one of the greatest authorities on Imperial defence, shows that in facing such dangers Australia can expect no assistance from Great Britain. Speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on January 23, 1912, during a discussion following a paper on the New Pacific he said:

Now the question has been raised but hardly discussed as to possible conflicts for the command of the Pacific. What I want to call attention to is that in the present state of the world it is not very likely that the British Navy in the near future could seriously

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enter into such a contest in the Pacific because there is a phenomenon hardly mentioned this afternoon, and that is—Europe. The present position is that this country at any time might have to defend herself in Europe; and in any naval war which it would be prudent for us to think about, we have to keep in mind the possibility of a European war. It has been found necessary in the present state of Europe and is likely to remain necessary that the principal force of our navy should be concentrated in European waters. It is not advisable while that state of things lasts that any large force should be detached into the Pacific. At least, such a detachment might render doubtful the issue of a European war.

He says in effect that the whole of the English fleet is necessary to cope with purely European difficulties, and no part of it can be spared to defend the outer Empire. Not only is this the case, but the superiority of the British fleet in European waters would have very little effect on the strategic position of Australia with reference to her own foes.

It is quite unnecessary to recapitulate the arguments which have been used to point out to Australians the dangers to them of what is known as "the Yellow peril." All thinking men now subscribe to a policy which involves this assumption—a policy which involves great sacrifices, both personal and economic. It is not based on any theory of special hostility towards the yellow races, but on certain factors which throughout history have shown themselves to be the causes of race movements and race antagonisms, viz. the tendency towards territorial expansion of growing races, and the pressure on the means of subsistence. So convinced are we Australians of the reality of the danger, that we regard the peaceful immigration of eastern races as equally dangerous with conquest. We maintain our white Australia policy as a barrier against such a danger. Such a policy is abundantly justified, for the presence of a million Japanese or even half a million would render the problems of our polity insoluble. The meaning of Professor Wilkinson's statement is that the onus of the defence of Australia against such a danger must be borne by Australia alone. England could not help her. If Japan made the demand on England that her subjects should

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be admitted to Australia, England could not but allow the request. English statesmen seem to rely upon the alliance between Japan and England as a protection against these dangers, but such an alliance is only a paper barrier against the tremendous forces involved. Alliances do not depend on the mere engagements which they record; they depend upon the forces which underlie those engagements. Such an alliance depends upon the mutuality of interest between Britain and Japan. So far as England as a European power is concerned that mutuality may exist, though this may be doubted. But, if the present Australian policy has any validity at all, it means that there is a fundamental diversity of interest between Japan and Australia. It should be remembered that the Japanese alliance does not contain any settlement of the question of alien exclusion within the Empire or any other questions between Japan and any part of the Empire. Such questions are assumed not to exist or are left without settlement and there is nothing to prevent Japan from raising them when the appropriate time arises. Japanese policy is essentially an expansionist one. No nation wishes to conquer Japan; it would not be worth while. Japan entered into the Russian war to maintain her sphere of expansion on the mainland. For various reasons that sphere is unsuitable, and she needs more suitable areas for expansion: there can be no other object in the enormous fleet of Dreadnoughts which at an appalling sacrifice she is creating. She cannot hope to conquer America or find room for settlement there, and she has come to an understanding with Russia. Australia's position is strategically weak: it is like the advance guard of the West flung far out into the East. Her position is somewhat like that of Constantinople in the Middle Ages, but with this difference, that owing to her maritime isolation it is not to the interest of any other western nation to prevent her overthrow. The United States is the one western state that might conceivably be worse off strategically by the fall of Australia; but, on the other hand, Australia would probably soak up the advancing east

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like a sponge, and stay its progress. India certainly could hardly be held for the Empire with an aggressive power in Australia, and British possessions in the Pacific would, of course, share the fate of Australia. Australia is a lonely outpost of European civilization in a region which is profoundly alien.

It is easy, of course, to exaggerate the immediate urgency of such a danger. In all probability the treaty with Britain will protect us for several years. The Japanese are a Malay race, and the Malay, with many great qualities, has always exhibited sooner or later an inherent instability. This will probably show itself in social matters and industrial unrest. The difficulties and perils of foreign invasion are manifold for the strongest nation, and Japan is financially weak. Weapons of defence are more powerful than weapons of offence, and a very strong naval armament will be required to establish a conquest of Australia. But in our present unprepared state we cannot take advantage of these weaknesses, and we offer a strong temptation to an aggressive power. Australia must realize that she has to shoulder the burden of nationhood. She has to undertake the responsibility for her own defence under circumstances that involve universal devotion to her national ideal. The future may demand great sacrifices. It will demand our best intelligence and the concentration of all our resources. There is no reason to fear that Australians will fail to respond to such a call, but, as they develop their defence policy, they are beginning to realize that it is not on armaments alone that defence depends. Defence depends chiefly upon policy. Hitherto Australians have relied upon England alone for the conduct of policy, and willingly; for they conceived the interests of both parts of the Empire to be the same. Now that we find that the defence of Australia depends upon an entirely different set of problems from those which face England the Australian point of view is inclined to change. Can any nation depend for its defence upon a foreign policy conducted by statesmen responsible to another nation? Without

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impugning the ability and honesty of the British Foreign Office, Australians need to give the question serious attention. The problems which affect Australia are new and unknown to the traditions of the Office. England is notoriously out of sympathy with, and does not understand, our exclusion policy; she has the Mediterranean as well as the North Sea problems to absorb her whole attention. Lastly, it is impossible to divorce policy from armaments; they have a reciprocal influence, and it is just as absurd to work out the problems of foreign policy in the absence of a fleet as it is to play cricket with an imaginary cricket ball. It must be clear to every thinking Australian that the policy on which his defence depends is not at present definitely in the charge of anybody.

It should be remembered that by providing satisfactorily for the defence of our own shores we shall be assisting to protect other parts of the outer Empire as well. British interests in India or the East Indies would not be attacked if there were a large Australian fleet. The problems of defence in Canada, South Africa, Egypt, and United States, would be distinctly easier with such a fleet. The irony of the present situation is that if the ships contemplated by Admiral Henderson's report were on the water now they could not cope with the fleet of Japan. Such a fleet would be a heavy burden for Australia, but it would not be sufficient; only if those other countries bore their share would the combined fleets be ample. Defence, moreover, depends not merely upon armaments but upon the possession of strategical positions. The possession by an enemy of certain strategical points in the South Seas would render the problems of Australian defence ten times more onerous. America has recognized this principle in her Monroe doctrine. It would be absurd for Australia to try and set up a Monroe doctrine—indeed, so far as European nations are concerned, they might be welcomed to the South Seas, for they would all make common cause against the yellow peril. But it would be suicidal for Australia not to gain for herself

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the full control of the strategical points in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Not only should they be obtained for Britain, but they, with all British possessions in the South Pacific and South Indian Oceans, should be administered from and by Australia. The High Commissioner for the Pacific should be responsible to Australia. The neglect of the policy on which the defence of Australia depends by officials in Australia and England is shown by the limitation of the Australian naval station in the agreement between the British Admiralty and Canada and Australia. This station is limited practically to the waters immediately surrounding Australia. It does go down to the South Pole, but otherwise includes only the waters of the Commonwealth and the surrounding islands. When it is considered that strategical points like Timor and New Caledonia are omitted and New Zealand is tacked on to the China station, Australians are almost entitled to regard the agreement as a mockery designed by the experts of the Admiralty as a revenge for the rejection of their "one ocean" theory.

What is wanted is an Australian policy adequate to these necessities, such a policy as is indicated by the above remarks. It should be based upon co-operation with other parts of the Empire whose interests are similar to ours, alliance with other nations whose interests are similar, and foresight as to the conditions under which a struggle between Japan and Australia (if it ever took place) would be fought.

The national programme which is needed might be summarized as follows:

1. Immediate carrying out of Admiral Henderson's report as to naval construction, bases, etc.
2. Close co-operation with New Zealand in all matters which affect naval defence, including command, construction, armaments and finance.
3. Arrangements with Canada, South Africa, and the Government of India for co-operation for naval defence of mutual interests, including construction of ships by those other Dominions.

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4. Understanding with the United States as to mutual protection of interests.

5. Administration of British Colonies in the South Seas by and from Australia.

6. Purchase of New Caledonia and other South Sea islands which might be used as a base of operations against Australia. Such external policy should be linked with an internal policy, the object of which should be to promote the economic development and internal unity of Australia. The northern territory should be developed, immigration encouraged, railway gauges settled and strategic railways constructed.

Lastly, arrangements should be made for the construction of ships and armaments in Australia.

Much of this policy depends upon Australians themselves; they need to make a united strenuous effort. But they are faced with the difficulty of conducting a foreign policy through diplomatic officers responsible to another constituency. This makes the situation still more urgent, and Australians should make up their minds quickly as to the policy they need, and make a definite demand upon Great Britain that it shall be carried out.

II. AN AUSTRALIAN NOTE ON ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

AT the present time a controversy is raging in England with regard to the foreign policy of Great Britain which is full of interest to all who desire to understand the issue upon which the security of the Empire stands. Australians, for instance, are beginning to realize how their welfare depends upon the relations and adjustments of the group of Great Powers in Europe, and a discussion of some of the problems involved in this controversy must be of value.

A very strong indictment has been presented against the policy of Sir Edward Grey by Liberal dailies like the *Daily*

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Chronicle; the campaign is prosecuted with exceptional ability in the Liberal weekly, the *Nation*; and in the great reviews, which are mainly Conservative in tone, weighty and dispassionate articles have appeared in which British policy is held up to scrutiny and criticism. Lord Rosebery has also warned the public impressively as to the responsibilities involved in the present policy.

The discussion arises out of the Agadir incident and its sequelæ. It is acknowledged by all that Germany has received a diplomatic defeat—a rebuff after a somewhat triumphant career. This result was admittedly arrived at through the support afforded by Great Britain to France throughout the whole of the negotiations. Great Britain has no direct interest in the Morocco controversy, yet her support of France humiliated Germany, and has intensified the hostility of Germany towards England to a pitch which it has never yet reached, and an exceedingly dangerous situation is created. For these undesirable results the Liberal Press blame the policy conducted by Sir Edward Grey. British policy, they say, seems deliberately to aim at imposing a curb on the legitimate expansion of Germany. The material interests of the two countries do not in any way conflict, but Britain seems bent on preventing the greatness of Germany and imposing a secondary position upon her. For this purpose we have now entered upon a virtual alliance with her enemies, Russia and France, which brings us into every quarrel in Europe, and makes us in part responsible for the policy of nations whose aims and ideals are deeply at variance with our own. The old-time freedom of Great Britain from European entanglements has been lost.

To understand this indictment it is necessary to understand roughly the general character of English foreign policy, so far as it is capable of being generalized. The first object of policy is national security. Security can only be guaranteed by superiority over all competitors, but in a group of great nations dominance is difficult, so nations have understandings one with another which operate so far as the

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nature of the case admits as guarantees against attack. Alliances, however, are essentially unsatisfactory. They are merely temporary bargains—there must be give and take—and a nation may by its alliances be involved in dangerous problems from which it would otherwise be free. There is thus a tendency for a strong nation to try and dispense with alliances, and make for definite supremacy. Its strength enables it to bring other weaker nations into the orbit of its policy and thus to consolidate and strengthen its position. To provide against a supremacy which would imperil the security of other nations, these other nations feel bound to organize against it. This leads us to the doctrine of the balance of power which holds that the peace of Europe is best secured by an equilibrium of contending forces. The validity of this doctrine is unquestionable, but it may be misread. There is nothing in history to show that the most stable equilibrium is a balance between two organized groups. If there are three or more factors in the equilibrium, each strong and efficient, the situation is more stable. A concert of powers may result which facilitates the solution of all diplomatic questions. When powers begin to range themselves for all purposes with one or other of two groups, war is generally the result.

The cardinal point in the position of England is that geographically she is outside the European system. The Channel is a military barrier and curbs the European ambitions of England; on the other hand it minimizes very greatly the risk of invasion. Great Britain can, therefore, *provided certain conditions are observed*, keep herself free from European quarrels, and carry out her social and political development undisturbed. It is entirely due to this freedom that the ideas and institutions which are typical of the British nation have been able to evolve, and to sacrifice that freedom would be a disaster of the first magnitude. England's main interest in European policy is that no power should become so supremely powerful as to be able to turn the combined forces or close the trade of Europe

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against her. England's policy has been in the main, therefore, a policy of isolation or, as a reviewer recently put it, a policy of opportunism. She has been able amply to safeguard her European interests by her own strength, and has been largely able to avoid entangling alliances—alliances guaranteeing support in case of aggression or war. Her power and her disinterestedness have combined to give her a very great weight in the councils of Europe, but she has been able to avoid taking sides in the great European struggle for dominance. The position is one that carries with it corresponding burdens and responsibilities, which are the price England pays for her freedom. It involves absolute mastery of the sea. But the other nations of Europe, whose interests are mainly on land, realize that maritime supremacy does not menace them, because naval forces cannot vitally injure European nations, and generally they feel that England has an undeveloped and underpopulated Empire which she will not unnecessarily extend.

Both English parties have carried out, more or less consistently, the policy of isolation. There is, however, a distinct colour in the attitude of each. Liberalism, originating in Cobdenism, has had economy for a leading principle, and has had disarmament as an end always in view. This tradition, however, to some extent conflicts with another Liberal tradition—that of intervention in favour of oppressed and struggling nationalities, for which policy, of course, strong military resources are required. On the Conservative side the distinctive feature is a jingo or bogey element. Throughout the century the Conservative party has always had a bogey which in the interests of "the balance of power" it contended should be watched and crushed. For many years France and Russia have been the bogeys of the Conservative party, and those who did not think they should be checked and thwarted were Little Englanders. An unfortunate example of this policy has been the bolstering up of Turkey so as to thwart the expansion southward of Russia. Turkey has thus been saved to become

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the ally of the new bogey—Germany. Another extraordinary example is the suggestion seriously put forward in an English review that before the German fleet became sufficiently powerful to challenge England, England should fall on Germany and destroy it. Germany has indeed been a God-send to the jingoes, for she came forward conveniently just as the hollowness of the Russian bogey was being destroyed by the Japanese. This phase of Conservative opinion, with its appeal to the arrogant patriotism of the English, was largely responsible for the long periods of office which the Conservative party enjoyed for so many years. In 1905 the Liberals came into power committed to a policy of disarmament, and the scare of 1908 was perhaps necessary to redress the consequences of that policy.

The Liberal Press now claims most vociferously that the policy of Sir Edward Grey is a direct reversal of the traditional policy of England. Under his policy, and that of his immediate predecessors, we have come to view the progress of Germany with suspicion and have, as in the case of the Bagdad Railway and Morocco, done our best to thwart her. We seem to regard her as the heir of the Napoleonic tradition—as a menace to the stability and the peace of Europe—a power which, if not checked, will achieve supremacy in Europe, and bring all other nations within the orbit of her diplomacy, and we have decided to join the group of nations which has opposed itself to her and make their integrity a British interest. This has, they say, brought us into the vortex of European politics and into touch with a host of problems with which we have little direct interest, and, indeed, to the verge of a war with Germany. Sir Edward Grey does not deny that we have entered into a policy of alliances with France and Russia, and that we have been drawn into the European conflict. He confesses this, but pleads that we must have friends in Europe, otherwise all European nations will be our enemies. This is the least satisfactory part of Sir Edward Grey's case. It is not borne out by history. England has had few European alliances, and yet, though she has

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incurred the jealousy of European nations, such jealousy has done her little harm. Only on the gravest occasions in the history of the last 500 years has Great Britain so decidedly ranged herself against a great European nation from whom she has received no direct provocation. Phillip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, and Napoleon: these are the types of European tyrant who have drawn England into the arena. It will be noticed that when England steps into the arena war is always close at hand.

Taking, therefore, Sir Edward Grey's admission, it will be well to analyse more closely the disadvantages of the situation. In the first place, the mutual advantages of the *entente cordiale* are more apparent than real. Our assistance to France against Germany would be limited to a very small army and naval assistance, which could not hurt Germany in a vital spot. On the other hand, Germany has in her army a powerful weapon whose prestige alone gives it an incalculable influence. It is doubtful whether either France or Russia would take the risk of coming to England's assistance in a quarrel with Germany in which they were not directly involved. Captain Mahan says they would not do so, and it is a significant fact that the *triple entente* is an informal alliance with obligations of the vaguest character which would probably be interpreted far more sincerely by England than by her allies. The necessary foundation of mutual advantage seems to be lacking for these alliances. In the second place the responsibility for French or Russian policy is a grave one and may lead us to support actions quite at variance with British traditions. French politics are unstable and unsatisfactory; and while some of her colonies have been well managed there are scandals in connexion with others which rival those of the Congo. French diplomacy is restless, brilliant, and much more than a match for English. Russia, on the other hand, is on a different plane of civilization, and at the present moment a British Government seems to be encouraging Russia to stifle the liberties of Persia on a dishonest pretext. Apparently Sir Edward

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Grey is content not to receive any *quid pro quo* for his consistent support of Russia in Persia. This is a bitter pill for Liberals to swallow, and a Conservative like Lord Curzon, who has an intimate knowledge of Eastern problems, here strongly condemns the policy of Sir Edward Grey. Thirdly, the position is unsatisfactory in that it brings England into strong antagonism with Germany. Germany is the strongest power on the Continent, strongest not only from the military and naval point of view, but in effective population and in economic resource. Germany's strength is legitimate, not predatory like that of Phillip II of Spain, Louis XIV, or Napoleon. It is not dynastic lust of power but the expansion of a newly united people. She has earned her prestige and can justify what she aspires to. The fundamental justness of the essential claims of Germany are insisted on by the writer of the leading article in the December number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, who looks upon the conflict of England and Germany as a tragic conflict of right against right. Surely in such a case there is a narrow path of truth which can be discovered by two nations who lead the world in social, scientific, artistic, moral and intellectual achievements? It must be remembered, on the one hand, that Germany's strategic position is bad, and her power in Europe to-day is rather the triumph over great difficulties than a mood of mere aggression. There is no middle course for Germany: she must either be great or downtrodden. An alliance between France, Russia and England, if effective, is of peculiar danger to Germany. She is entitled to assume that such a mighty organized force may be used aggressively against her, and not merely for the purposes of defence, and she is justified not only in building up a force against it, but in using every diplomatic means to thwart and destroy the *entente*. The position is one of intolerable strain which may at any time reach the breaking-point.

The attitude of England towards Germany in such a position is not altogether creditable. England has treated herself well in the matter of territory, yet if it is announced

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that Germany has acquired territory in the South Pacific or in the South of Africa or the West Coast of Africa, a howl arises from the jingo party that Germany is acquiring a strategic point which will command a British Colony or trade route. It is idle for such arguments to be used against the progress of an expanding nation. The real reason, of course, is that British colonies are practically undefended, her trade routes are unprotected, and, to save herself the responsibility of their protection, she seems to be striving to hem in Germany in the North Sea. Great Britain has held undisputed command of the sea for so long that the possession of a comparatively small fleet in European waters has hitherto secured her everywhere. Now, with the expansion of other nations, the difficulty of the problems of defence are intensified, and she does not relish the idea of meeting these. But to try and avoid these problems by bottling Germany up in the North Sea is folly. It is like putting a dam against the rising tide. It is not only foolish in the sense of being ineffective, but it is the worst possible policy for England. The German danger is from a Germany concentrated in the North of Europe; Germany dispersed through the world, with interests in every land which are common with those of Britain, is not a dangerous foe. On the contrary, she would be an ally of Great Britain in the coming struggle with Eastern nations.

Prima facie, therefore, the criticism of the British foreign policy seems to be just. We have by our policy of alliances incurred the enmity of Germany and, on the other hand, lost that freedom and independence under which Britain developed her social system and became a beneficent influence in Europe. But much more remains to be said, about which Liberal papers rather disingenuously remain silent. They forget that when their party came into office it was pledged to a policy of disarmament and that the policy of alliances is the direct result of that policy of disarmament, such alliances being necessary in order to secure the protection for British interests which Britain will not give herself. They

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forget that if England would stand alone she must be responsible for her own protection, and that, *prima facie* at any rate, she must be stronger to be self-sufficient and independent than she need be if she gets so much of her interests protected by Japan in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, France in the Mediterranean and Russia in the Near East. Not even Mr Norman Angell would allege that it is not necessary for England, as matters now stand, to be ready to protect her interests from aggression.

The problem, therefore, changes ground, and we must ask ourselves whether the Empire can afford to incur the increased burdens which are necessary if the policy of splendid isolation is to be indulged. From the point of view of wealth, of individual efficiency and strategical advantage, England's position would be unassailable if she cared to make it so, and what is needed to make it impregnable is not so much additional expenditure as *organization*. It is no exaggeration to say that through lack of organization the inherent strategical strength of the Empire has been turned into a great strategical weakness. To take one instance, it is recognized by experts that a navy alone is not able to strike a vital blow at another nation: military forces are requisite to bring war to a successful termination. But this applies to a nation which is organized for defence. It would hardly apply to England, whose citizens have no military training whatever, the great majority of whom are town dwellers who could not wield a military weapon with any effect. A reverse of the British fleet accordingly would terminate the war at once, for Britain could make no effective resistance to an invasion. The result of this is that the British fleet is tied to the British shores to prevent the untoward results of the one possible chance reverse. Its offensive movements are, as Lord Roberts pointed out, hampered and its efficiency as a fighting machine reduced hopelessly. Again, the absence of a military force of any size diminishes enormously the weight of England in European diplomacy. She cannot strike a vital blow at her enemies; her value to

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her friends is diminished. This strategical weakness is intensified by the lack of economic organization in England. Economically the British nation is the result of the triumphs of short views, of the individual over the State. National aims and collective activities are sacrificed to the well-being of individuals. For the sake of cheapness in commodities and the profits that a few merchants and shipowners make upon the carriage, exchange and trans-shipment of goods, England has come to depend upon other countries for the chief necessities of life and the raw materials of manufacture. If the supplies of these were cut off she could not exist for more than a few weeks. To prevent this she has to have absolute and actual command of the sea; not merely potential command but the power to guarantee merchandise against capture. This enormous responsibility must be an additional handicap to the fleet, and it is certain that if war broke out almost its whole strength would be strenuously engaged in maintaining the command of the North Atlantic. This would be due not to any lack of resource, wealth, or individual power, but wholly to a policy in which the forces of disintegration have triumphed over national ideals. To realize the strategical necessities of her situation England must organize for defence and she must reorganize her economic system, so as to make her less dependent on the foreigner. A combined land and fiscal policy is required which will protect wage-earners and throw into the hands of the people for production of food and raw material the land now in idleness. It will be seen that neither of these measures involve a serious addition to the burdens of the taxpayer. Surely, if England refuses to adopt such obvious measures for her own organization, it is a piece of impertinence for her to thwart the growth of another nation.

So far we have dealt with England alone. There is the outer Empire to be considered; for if Germany came in full force into the South Pacific or South Africa England certainly could not leave her colonies in their present unde-

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fended condition. Here again we have strategical advantages turned into strategical weaknesses through lack of organization. It is ridiculous to suggest that a number of wealthy and populous colonies need fear the intrusion of Germany into their neighbourhood; yet in their present state such intrusion may raise great difficulties. The Empire is a loose aggregation of States without any organization or means of common action. It is confronted by organic problems, problems which affect the whole Empire through or by means of one part. The holding of one part by an enemy might render other parts wholly untenable by Britain. Thus the whole fabric might be disrupted through the failure of one link. On the other hand parts which, unorganized, are a source of danger would, if organized, be a source of mutual support. To take an example: Australia, Canada and India are almost equally interested in the question of Japan and China. If the resources of the three colonies were called forth to meet those of Japan the burdens on each would not be serious; if they remain unorganized, Japan holds them at her mercy. Australia has decided to carry out a scheme which will not alone be sufficient to meet Japan, and even this seems to be more than her fair share. By mutual statesmanlike organization the whole problem would be changed. The present system is the most extraordinary that any people who have to meet common dangers have ever acquiesced in. Mr Asquith talked of his opposition to Imperial concentration, but he forgot that almost the whole of the fleet is concentrated in the North Atlantic and the whole of the foreign policy of the Empire is concentrated in the English Foreign Office. There is no constitutional means of having the interests of a colony represented in the negotiation of any great question of foreign policy, and yet the decision of these questions may affect us for generations. On the other hand the act of an irresponsible government of New Zealand or Newfoundland may plunge the whole Empire into war. And in such a war there is no means of bringing the whole of the resources of the Empire in men and money into action.

The conclusion of the matter seems to be that there is

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no reason for any fear of Germany if we only take steps to realize to the full our potential greatness and organize our forces; and if Germany is not to be feared there is no reason to join a league of nations whose only object is to check her advance. If the Empire would stand alone there is no reason why Germany should not be welcomed into the world to take her share in the white man's mission of civilization, and there is every reason to feel that the world will be benefited by the different point of view—the power of organization which the German would bring to the solution of the Colonial problems. An Empire united and organized could hold the balance of power in the world. An Empire disorganized has to rely on the assistance of a power like Russia, stained with tyranny, to maintain her integrity.

The whole question is illustrated by the recent news about the acquisition of Timor by Germany. It certainly is advisable not to have foreign states too close to Australia, and a sphere of influence based on lines of strategical importance to Australia should be delineated. But, assuming that Timor is not within such lines at present, if Australia were adequately defended the presence of Germany in the South Pacific would be no menace to Australia. Germany can never maintain a fleet of any size in the Pacific, and in the event of a war between England and Germany these German Colonies would be so many plums which could be had by Australia for the plucking. In our present condition, however, the case is very different. We are so weak that any naval force in the South Pacific is a menace. It thus comes about that England, who does not want and could not develop further South Pacific colonies if she had them, must protest against the acquisition of such colonies by Germany who does want them, and could develop them, and simply because England has vast undefended interests in the vicinity. This is typical of what Germany complains of.

The dangers of the present system are terrible, because they lead to a *cul-de-sac*. The very alliance which Britain

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joins for her own protection is an alliance which Germany for her own protection must smash. There is an irreconcilable conflict here which must go on piling armament on armament till the crash comes. If we took the other way the incentive to war would gradually disappear.

Unfortunately party differences in England and the English national character stand in the way. The Liberals are in favour of a liberal policy towards Germany, as their acts have frequently shown, but they are traditionally opposed to all forms of organization, including Tariff Reform, Military Organization and Imperial Organization, the three things on which stress has been laid as the necessities of the situation. Germany does not make this mistake, and her greatest triumphs are due to skill in organization. Unfortunately the English national character does not take kindly to organization and co-operation. Individual initiative—the pioneer's habit of taking chances—these have certainly gone to the building of the Empire; but we are now in an era when more systematic methods are necessary. In the more democratic colonies, however, it is now realized that social and national organization is the correct method for the cure of all political problems, and if this spirit becomes powerful before it is too late it may do much to save the Empire.

Australia. June, 1912.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION

THE second session of the Union Parliament ended on June 23, having lasted almost exactly five months. The session will seem short to those who are used to the almost continual sittings of the Imperial Parliament; but both in its length and in the severity of the claims which it made on members, it was without precedent in this country. The conditions here are very different from those in Great Britain: we have no leisured class; we have, indeed, few men not engaged either in professional work or in business, who are still young enough to endure the strain of Parliamentary life in this country. The work, too, in the Parliament of South Africa falls on a comparatively small number of men. Out of the 121 members of the House of Assembly—the Lower House—many are men who are farmers by occupation, and who are little fitted for the intricate business of legislation. Not more than a third of the total number can take a very active share in that business. The result is that the men who do the work find their time continually occupied, day by day, in a task which is not too familiar even to them. Hence the end of the last session came to relieve a body of men who were thoroughly exhausted with their labours; and the rest of the members had long been anxious to get back to their farms. The last week or so of the session, therefore, saw a great deal of legislation hurried through both Houses in a way which shocked even those whose experience of Parliamentary life before Union had habituated them to the rapid legislative methods that find favour during the closing days of any session. In spite

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of this, the legislative record of the session is not so full as it might have been had there been more economy of time and better supervision on the part of those who are responsible for the arrangement of Parliamentary business.

The important bills which were passed may be allocated, for purposes of description, into two classes. First, consolidating measures, i.e., bills which were necessary to co-ordinate the existing statutes of the four uniting Colonies, or bills which expressed the effect of Union on the administration of the country in a legislative form. Second, measures of development, i.e., bills designed to help the progress of the country by advancing its legislative authority a step beyond the stage at which the four uniting Colonies had arrived at the date of Union. In the first class can be placed the bills regulating the administration and control of the public and railway services of the country. The necessity for having a separate measure governing the railway service arises from the fact that the South Africa Act directs that the administration of the railways and harbours of the country is to be kept quite apart from the general administration. In the same class may be placed the Irrigation Bill, a measure which at once consolidated and improved the existing legislation of the four Provinces in respect of the use of water for the purposes of agriculture. In the second class comes the Defence Bill, providing, as it does, for the internal defence of the country by a citizen army and a small local standing force, instead of by the Imperial troops at present stationed in South Africa. In this class, also, should be placed the Land Settlement Bill, a measure which, though liable to severe criticism on the ground that it may be used for the purpose of giving grants of land to the indigent white class of the country on the one hand, and, on the other, for making advances to farmers at a cheaper rate of interest than would be charged in the ordinary course of business, yet has potentialities for usefulness if a wise use is made of the powers which it bestows on the Government. Here, too, should come the Miners' Phthisis

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Bill, passed during last session in order to meet the need—universally acknowledged throughout the country—of making special provision for the compensation of those who contract the terrible phthisis which attacks the underground worker in the mines of the Witwatersrand.

These were the important Acts of the session, but they leave untouched many subjects which cry out for legislative action. Prominent among these neglected subjects are the question of the financial relations of the provincial administrations in this country with the Government of the Union, a subject which was exhaustively dealt with in the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, and the question of the restriction of immigration into South Africa. The Government made some show of dealing with both these subjects during the session, and bills were actually introduced. But the proposals contained in these bills aroused so much preliminary opposition that no real attempt was made to pass them through the Lower House. On the question of financial relations, the proposals of the Government departed in some material points from the recommendations made by the commission appointed to inquire into the subject. The recommendations of the commission were designed to extend to the other provinces of the Union some measure of the system of local self-government which had been developed in the Cape Colony before Union. But the essence of local self-government is some system of self-taxation for local purposes, and to this there was the strongest objection on the part of the two smaller provinces, Natal and the Orange Free State. The Government proposed to give way on this point and to supplement the local revenue of these two provinces by the grant of lump sums from the Treasury of the Union. These proposals awoke fierce resentment, especially among those who represent the Cape Province in the Union Parliament. The Government, therefore, found it expedient to shelve the Financial Relations Bill at least for a year, though no doubt when the Union Parliament next meets the urgency of the

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question will force it again to the front. The present system, by which the central Government supplies all the funds necessary for provincial administration, is extremely undesirable: it encourages a policy of grab among those who are responsible for provincial administration; it exacerbates those feelings of rivalry as between the inhabitants of the different provinces which should be allayed and not fostered by Union; and it hinders the development of local self-government in the more backward provinces by encouraging the idea that all that is necessary for local development is to wring as much as possible out of the Treasury of the Union.

The opposition to the proposals of the Government on the question of restriction of immigration into the Union was different in its nature but quite as effective in its results. The conviction of the great majority of the people of South Africa is that the immigration of Asiatics is undesirable from a social, and ruinous from a business point of view. In the Transvaal before Union this sentiment resulted in the passage of legislation in which differential treatment was imposed on Asiatics desiring to come into the Colony. Effective as this legislation may have been, it left a sense of hardship and a conviction of injustice in the minds of those to whom it applied, not only in the Transvaal but also throughout British India. To similar differentiation in the legislation of the Union the Imperial Government advanced strong objections. A way out of the difficulty was found by a clause in the Bill drafted by the Government of the Union, which, while not differentiating against the Asiatics, left very large powers of practical discrimination in the hands of the Immigration Department. It was admitted that the intention of the Act was to keep the Asiatic out of South Africa, but no mention of any such intention was made in the Act itself. This policy was accepted by the leaders of the Asiatic community in this country and satisfied the Imperial Government. But now another difficulty arose. The province of the Free State had always set its face with

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the utmost determination against the admission of the Asiatic, and its representatives in the Union Parliament refused to accept the suggested solution; nothing would satisfy them but the specific prohibition of the entry of Asiatics. Allied with the Free State members were a number of members from other provinces who feared that the almost absolute power which the Bill proposed to place in the hands of the immigration authorities might be used to do injustice to others than Asiatics desiring to enter the country. The experience of Australia seemed to show that the fears of the latter class of objectors were unreasonable, though it is true that many South Africans would refuse to accept the proposition that Australian experience is a trustworthy guide for those who have to deal with the present government of this country. Be that as it may, the objections which were raised to the Immigrants Restriction Bill were sufficient to bar its passage during the recent session, though the Government made a half-hearted attempt to rush it through almost on the last day, a course which was understood to be the result of the strong representations of the Imperial Government as to the necessity of the Bill being passed by the South African Parliament.

Such being the main legislative output of the session, a word as to the less tangible aspects of the work of the South African Parliament may not be out of place. As the session drew on it became more and more plain that the unreality of the present political divisions, to which attention was drawn in the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, was a very real obstacle to the efficiency of the Parliamentary machine. It is not too much to say that between the different sections of the Nationalist party there is a more real line of division than between the more advanced section of that party and the Unionists to whom they are nominally opposed. This deep-cut difference between the two wings of the party which supports the present Ministry is reproduced in the Ministry itself. Thus one section of the Cabinet is modern in its ideas, believes in the necessity of progress and development, and is

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prepared—so long as no sacrifice of political influence is entailed—to range itself on the side of the forces of advance. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that during the past session what may be called the progressive section of the Cabinet did not gain appreciably in influence. This was probably due to the emergence of a cross line of division which made itself felt to a far greater extent than in the first session of the Union Parliament. Originating in provincial feeling, this division appeared to paralyse the will of those ministers who have hitherto been noted for their energy and their efficiency. It is, of course, only natural that ministers who have continually to be thinking whether a course which commends itself to them will find favour with the different sections of their supporters, drawn from the various provinces, should be uncertain in their actions, prone to give way as soon as opposition develops in any unexpected quarter, and correspondingly ineffective in their management of the business which they have to pilot through the House. Certainly this was the case last session with both General Smuts and Mr Hull, who had marked themselves out during the preceding session as the two most efficient members of the Ministry. If proof is needed of this assertion it is to be found in the fact that almost all the important bills of the session went through examination by Select Committees and emerged from the committee-rooms almost completely transformed. A ministry which can calmly accept the complete recasting of its bills by Select Committees, the majority of whose members are drawn from its own followers, must be either very weak or very cynical. There are critics who say that the Botha Ministry is both; and there may be some justice in the accusation. No one objected when the Defence Bill was referred to a Select Committee; compared with the paramount necessity of providing for the internal defence of the country, all considerations of ministerial dignity or of party advantage were felt to be unworthy. But when the Government accepted at the hands of Select Committees the almost

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complete remodelling of such measures as the Miners' Phthisis Bill, the Public Service Bill, the Railway Service Bill (though it should be said that most of the work of the Select Committee on this Bill was done during the preceding session), and the Land Settlement Bill, all of them measures which raised clear issues of policy, it began to be clear even to indulgent critics that the Ministry was unable to make up its mind as to the principles by which it intended to stand even on such important topics as these, before it introduced to Parliament the bills in which those principles were embodied. And this judgment of the weakness of the present Ministry is not the judgment of a partisan, for it is admitted in private by many of the Ministry's own supporters.

II. MINISTERIAL DISSENSIONS

THE ministerial crisis which startled the political world of South Africa during the fourth month of the session showed that dissension was not confined to the rank and file of the Nationalist Party. Mr Hull's resignation came about with what appeared to be dramatic suddenness, but there is no doubt that it was the culmination of a long-standing difference of opinion. There were, it is true, elements of personal antagonism between Mr Hull, the first Minister of Finance of the Union, and Mr Sauer, the first Minister of Railways. Neither minister made any attempt to conceal this feeling of antagonism. On the other hand, the fundamental cause of the crisis which led to the resignation of Mr Hull was a question of principle. It may be true that some means of reconciling the differences between the two ministers, as far as those differences were concerned with the question of principle, would have been found if the personal antagonism between them had not made a reconciliation impossible. Nevertheless it is upon the matter of principle that stress should be laid, since that question

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deeply concerns the future good government of the Union. This matter can be very briefly summed up in Mr Hull's own words, used in the course of the statement in which he sought to justify his resignation before Parliament and the country. He said:

To state the matter quite shortly and concisely, the reason why I have retired from the Government is because I do not approve of either the methods or the policy which are being pursued with regard to the railways. That is the sole and only question upon which I am in disagreement with the policy of the Government. . . . Shortly, my objections may be put under two heads: Firstly, that the members of the Cabinet and certainly I, as Minister of Finance, have not been consulted on important matters affecting the Railways and their administration, and which I regard as of vital importance; and, secondly, that the provisions of the South Africa Act relating to the Railways are not being observed.

Developing this contention, Mr Hull pointed out that "if, owing to any error of judgment or other cause, the (railway) administration should become unable to meet its obligations, the burden would be shifted to the shoulders of the general taxpayer. But I should be in an impossible position if I had to face the country with taxation proposals to meet deficits for which I was in no way responsible."

So much for the question of the responsibility of the Minister of Finance for the financial policy of the railway department. But Mr Hull also insisted that the Cabinet as a whole, had not been properly consulted by Mr Sauer as to the policy adopted by him in developing the railways. On both these charges he went into considerable detail and Mr Sauer, in replying to these detailed charges, categorically denied much of their substance.

The difficulty between the two departments, and indeed between the railway minister and the Cabinet as a whole, first arose, no doubt, as a consequence of the provisions of the South Africa Act with regard to the administration of the railways. The Act lays it down (Section 127), that the "railways, ports and harbours of the Union shall be adminis-

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tered on business principles." The same section establishes the principle that railway profits are not to form part of the general revenue of the country. The estimates of expenditure for the railways are thus kept separate from the estimates of ordinary expenditure, and the control of the railways is exercised through a Board of not more than three Commissioners who cannot be removed except on cause assigned, which must be communicated specially to Parliament. Of this Board the Minister for Railways is chairman. There is no doubt that the result of these provisions has been to keep the administration of the railways very much apart from the general administration of the country. But it was the general opinion that, though this separation of administration was intended by the National Convention when it drew up the South Africa Act, there was much in Mr Hull's contention that general supervision should be exercised by the Treasury, and that the Minister for Railways, before he came to a decision on important points of policy connected with his department, should consult the Cabinet as a whole. Mr Sauer, indeed, did not contest the justice of these contentions. All that he did was to deny the correctness of Mr Hull's assertion that he had failed to do his duty in these respects. It must be said that Mr Hull's colleagues in the Cabinet, though they were very cautious in the statements which they made in the House of Assembly, were clearly of opinion that Mr Hull was correct, while the general opinion of Members of Parliament and others who were qualified to form an opinion on the matter also favoured Mr Hull rather than Mr Sauer.

Yet it was Mr Hull who was allowed to resign while Mr Sauer remained a member of the Botha Ministry. A word may therefore be said as to Mr Hull's tenure of office as the first Minister of Finance under the Union. There is no doubt that the office was one of exceptional difficulty. The conflicting financial methods of the four Colonies before Union had to be systematized and organized into a consistent policy. The administrative staffs of the four colonies

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had also to be welded into an instrument of Union administration, and, though this task was primarily placed in the hands of a commission appointed for the purpose, much depended on the supervision of the Treasury. Different systems of taxation in the four colonies had also to be reconciled, as far as possible, in the early days of Union. Those who give proper consideration to these and other problems, the solution of which fell to the share of the first Minister of Finance, are not likely to under-estimate the magnitude of the task which Mr Hull undertook. Acute but uncouth, courageous but rash, at times tactless in his utter disrespect for persons, yet none the less strong for that, Mr Hull was perhaps not in every way the most suitable person to undertake this task. He was, too, comparatively inexperienced in Parliamentary practice, and this lack of experience was a distinct handicap to him in his earlier days of office. To the last, indeed, he retained a pathetic faith in financial expedients of the cruder kind. This defect came out clearly during the last days of his tenure of office in his proposal to tax bearer shares and the shares of non-South African companies holding investments in this country. Yet, in spite of all these drawbacks, it cannot be said that Mr Hull was anything but a courageous and painstaking, if in no way a brilliant, Minister of Finance; and there is this to be said in his favour, that he was conscious of his inexperience, willing to learn from those—like Mr Merriman—who had had long Parliamentary experience, and ready to acknowledge the benefit which he had obtained from actual tenure of his office. He fell a victim to the exigencies of political tactics in a country which is apt to pass hard judgments on the shortcomings of its public men, to underestimate the value of the work which they undertake, and to be sceptical as to the very real sacrifices entailed by a public career in the case of men like Mr Hull, who abandon lucrative occupations to take on themselves the harassing and much less lucrative task of conducting the business of the country.

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III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MINISTRY

OBSERVERS who follow with intense interest every move in the game of politics did not fail to point out that the Prime Minister, faced by the crisis of irreconcilable disagreement between Mr Sauer and Mr Hull, had jettisoned the latter, although it was generally agreed that he had been in the right so far as the merits of the case were concerned. They also laid emphasis on the fact that Mr Hull was a close personal friend and associate of the Prime Minister, while Mr Sauer had always been the friend of Mr Merriman, General Botha's rival for the Premiership. They drew from these facts the conclusion that General Botha had only retained Mr Sauer because he was able to command a considerable number of votes, and they also predicted that for the future General Botha would be a cypher in his own Cabinet and that Mr Sauer would practically occupy the position of the dictator of the Nationalist party. There can, it is true, be little doubt that General Botha's retention of Mr Sauer was due to his having a considerable following; but the reconstruction of the Ministry, which has taken effect since the close of the session, shows that the position of Mr Sauer in the Nationalist party is by no means so overwhelming as some had imagined. In its new form the Ministry is composed of nine members, but it has been officially announced that one of these, Sir David Graaff, intends to resign shortly owing to ill-health. The Prime Minister is for the future to hold no other portfolio. The Department of Agriculture, which he has hitherto controlled, is now transferred to Mr Sauer, who hands over railways and harbours to Mr Burton. Mr Burton's portfolio, that of native affairs, now goes to General Hertzog, who will hold it in addition to his old portfolio of justice. General Smuts retains the control of the Department of Defence

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and becomes also Minister of Finance, while Mr Fischer takes over the Department of the Interior from General Smuts, adding it to that of Lands which he held previously. The other changes are comparatively unimportant and need no detailed mention.

Two things are irresistibly suggested by this reconstruction. The first is that the rearrangement of departments has resulted in a very ill-assorted assignment of duties. The combination of the Department of Finance with that of Defence is, as Mr Merriman has pointed out, particularly unfortunate, for the Defence Department is by its very nature prone to demand ever increasing expenditure, while it is the prime duty of the Minister of Finance to keep a rigid check on the disbursements of all the other departments. General Smuts is also naturally unsuited for the Ministry of Finance, having had no experience of either business or commerce and having no title whatever to hold any post demanding financial ability, though his efficiency in almost any other branch of administration is universally admitted. Mr Sauer is merely an amateur farmer; Mr Burton has not even the knowledge of a dilettante on the subject of railway administration; Mr Fischer's record as Minister of Lands inspires no confidence in his ability to control the Department of the Interior; and General Hertzog has publicly expressed views on the native question which rouse grave doubts as to the wisdom of giving him control of the department which deals with the native peoples of the Union. The second conclusion which is suggested by the reconstruction of the Ministry is that it is practically a defeat for Mr Sauer. Beyond question General Botha insisted on his relinquishing the portfolio of railways, and, though Mr Sauer was able to impose two conditions—that Mr Burton, his close friend in the Ministry, should succeed him in that office, and that he himself should act as Premier when General Botha was absent from the Union—the fact that he consented to be deposed from a department which both experience and inclination qualified him to fill shows that

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the Prime Minister was able, in the last resort, to impose his will even on so formidable a colleague. Whether the Ministry thus reconstructed will last for the remaining three years of the life of the present Parliament only time can show. But it is already certain that the reconstruction has not improved the efficiency of the Ministry as a body, and that the grave dissensions which made the reconstruction necessary cannot have been permanently remedied by the constraint which has been forced upon one of its most astute and experienced members.

South Africa. July, 1912.

NEW ZEALAND

I. CLOSER RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA

IN the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE* there appeared an article entitled "Commonwealth and Dominion," in which the question of the relations at present existing between the Commonwealth and Dominion was, to some extent, dealt with. In view of the importance of the matter to us Antipodeans, it is proposed to continue the discussion on broader and more elemental lines. The questions which we shall attempt to answer are as follows: Will the Dominion ultimately become part of the Commonwealth? If political federation is out of the question, is fiscal or commercial union more probable? Are the two youthful nations likely to join their forces for purposes of common (or Imperial) defence?

But first of all, in order that readers outside Australasia may appreciate the local conditions which are the factors of this threefold problem, it may be advisable to state concisely certain outstanding facts concerning the position in 1912 of Australia and New Zealand respectively.

Australia itself (apart from its adjacent islands) is a continent having an area of some 2,900,000 square miles, and is thus nearly three-fourths the size of Europe and twenty-four times as large as the United Kingdom. It has a population of about four and a half millions of white people, almost exclusively of British extraction, with a small sprinkling of black aborigines, degraded and disappearing. The northern half of the Australian Continent lies within the Tropics; the south only is in the temperate zone. The Commonwealth of Australia as a political unit came into existence on New Year's Day, 1901, through the

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voluntary federation of the Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania. The then Colony of New Zealand, after due deliberation, elected to remain outside the Federated Australian States, and has continued independent of the Commonwealth to this present year of grace.

Some 1,200 miles to the south-east of Australia lies New Zealand. Between the Commonwealth and the Dominion roll the lonely and stormy waters of that portion of the South Pacific Ocean known as the Tasman Sea. New Zealand proper consists of a group of three islands—North Island, South Island, and Stewart Island—divided by narrow straits. These islands together are more than twice the size of England, and contain slightly over one million people of British stock, as well as about 50,000 Maoris. The three islands are entirely outside the tropics, and naturally enjoy a cooler climate and a higher average rainfall than does the Continent of Australia. New Zealand was proclaimed a British possession in 1840, and formed part of the parent colony of New South Wales until 1841, when it was made a separate colony. It then remained a Crown Colony till 1852, in which year representative government was granted to the infant "Plantation" by the British Parliament. In 1907 the growth of the Colony in wealth and enterprise (as well as political ambition) caused it to be proclaimed as a full fledged Dominion.

Australia is now, of course, a Commonwealth composed of several federated States. New Zealand, on the other hand, remains a unitary State or "Dominion" as its politicians now prefer to call it. With the object of raising revenue, as well as to protect their youthful manufactures, both the Commonwealth and the Dominion have adopted high tariffs on imported goods. Both also give a small preference to imports from Britain and her Dominions over those from foreign countries, which pay higher duties.

Within the past few years Australia and New Zealand alike have become at last alive to their dangers and duties as

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isolated "Outposts of Empire" in the Pacific, and they are now both actively enforcing a system of compulsory and universal training, very much on the principles laid down by Lord Kitchener during his visit to Australasia in 1910. Regarding naval defence, Australia and New Zealand, unfortunately, are proceeding at present on somewhat different lines of policy. The Commonwealth is creating, under the title of the Australian Unit, a local navy for its own defence and at its own expense; New Zealand, on the other hand, contents itself meantime by increasing its yearly contribution to the British Navy from £40,000 to £100,000, besides presenting an armed cruiser to the King at a total cost of £2,000,000.

It will be gathered from the foregoing bald statement of facts that at present New Zealand and Australia are quite independent of each other, although both are within the Empire. Each "Nation in the Making" is a separate political entity, surrounded by a high tariff wall. It is true that either country has a citizen army *in posse*, if not *in esse*, but the two forces are under separate and local control. As we have mentioned, also, their respective ideas as to the best method of naval defence at present are widely divergent.

Mr Andrew Fisher, the Prime Minister of the present Labour Government in Australia, has recently announced in public more than once that this state of disunion at the Antipodes should not be allowed to continue, and, with great daring, he has ventured to prophesy that New Zealand will become a State within the Australian Commonwealth in less than twenty years. He thinks, also, that within the next five years there will be an agreement between the Commonwealth and the Dominion on matters of defence, and has further expressed his desire that there should be a freer interchange of products between the two countries "amounting even to free trade."

Whether these views of Mr Fisher are well founded or not, he is entitled to great credit for having put them

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forward. In some respects, indeed, he is clearly in advance of public opinion, a state of mind that is not too common among politicians at the Antipodes. From his utterances he appears to be a statesman who has the courage of his opinions, on inter-Dominion matters at all events, and we shall proceed to examine these opinions with the respect that they undoubtedly deserve.

First of all, then, is Mr Fisher's political prophecy likely to be fulfilled, that New Zealand will become a state within the Australian Commonwealth in less than twenty years?

As previously stated, New Zealand at its origin in 1840 formed a portion of the Colony of New South Wales. That it will again become a part (or a State) of Australia we do not believe. Politically it has little or nothing in common with the Australian Commonwealth; geographically the two countries are widely separated by the ocean. Between the Commonwealth and the Dominion there are some twelve hundred watery but effective reasons against Federation. It would, in fact, be waste of space to elaborate this point, which is already sufficiently obvious to the great majority of the inhabitants of both countries. The *New Zealand Herald* recently put the Dominion point of view in a few graphic sentences:

Although one thousand miles distant from Australia at the nearest point, although situated in a different climate and inevitably destined to display a different national temperament, although already possessed of a national character, national aspirations and national peculiarities,—although already served by Imperial affiliation much better than it could be served by any mere local federation, the Australian Prime Minister has no deeper insight than to predict the sinking of New Zealand into the *status* of a petty and subordinate Australian State. As we have frequently pointed out, there is nothing to prevent such closer commercial relations as may be mutually advantageous. But before New Zealand denies its independence under the Empire, and seeks shelter under the mantle of the Federal Parliament, there will be a new political heaven and a new political earth. At the present time the proposal is simply absurd.

The foregoing extract may be accepted as fairly typical of

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the tone of the press of New Zealand regarding the question of federation with Australia. And there can be little doubt that the newspapers in this respect represent the attitude both of the politicians and the people—two classes which do not always think alike. Our politicians, apart from higher motives, have no burning desire to step down from the exalted position of representing an autonomous Dominion, with a Governor, Prime Minister and High Commissioner of its own, to the subordinate *status* occupied by Parliamentarians in the several states of the Commonwealth. The people of this Dominion, or those of them who think at all on such matters, are of opinion—rightly or wrongly—that they have little to gain and possibly much to lose by becoming citizens of a petty state of Australia. Visions of being consistently outvoted on matters of purely domestic import blind the eyes of the plain man in this Dominion to the alleged advantages of the dazzling prospects of Federation held out by Mr Fisher.

We think, then, it may be taken for granted that New Zealand will not in our time become part of the Australian Commonwealth. Let us now proceed to inquire whether it be true that, as the *New Zealand Herald* has told us, "there is nothing to prevent such 'closer commercial union as may be mutually advantageous.'" How are Mr Fisher's public overtures in the direction of free trade between the Commonwealth and the Dominion likely to be received by us New Zealanders?

Some three hundred years ago Francis Bacon said concerning the "Plantations" of his day: "Let there be freedom from customs, till the plantations be of strength: and not only freedom from Customs, but freedom to carry their commodities where they may make the best of them." This sage advice has not yet been followed at the Antipodes, for not only have Australia and New Zealand erected a wall of tariffs against the outside world, but against each other. Recently, we are glad to say, people are beginning to protest against this unnatural condition of fiscal matters. As we have

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seen, Mr Fisher himself, the chosen high priest of organized Labour, has declared in public against it. He appears anxious to have reciprocity between the Commonwealth and the Dominion "amounting even to Free Trade." Is this a mere pious hope—a counsel of perfection—or is it a political aspiration likely to be realized?

On the whole we are of opinion that Mr Fisher is right in his views on this question. We think reciprocity between the two countries is eminently desirable in the interests of both, and that the more bold and comprehensive the scheme put forward the more likely it is to be accepted. It may savour of paradox to say that two avowedly Protectionist communities will adopt between them Free Trade more readily than a scheme of partial Reciprocity, but we believe it to be the case. Mr Fisher has been twitted in the local newspapers with the failure of the negotiations for Reciprocity between Australia and New Zealand in 1906. His explanation is a simple one, and we are satisfied is true: The proposals "did not go far enough." When two nations endeavour to arrange between themselves the complicated details of a Reciprocal Tariff Agreement, each of the "high contracting parties" naturally and almost inevitably tries to get the better of the bargain, and the result too often is disagreement. Such was the end of the late Mr Seddon's attempt at Reciprocity six years ago, and we fear that a similar fate would befall any fresh proposals on similar lines. But we do believe that, if the people of both countries would look at the project broadly and dispassionately, a free exchange of commodities between the Commonwealth and the Dominion could be brought about without haggling, to the immense advantage of both communities.

Let us glance for a moment at the present trade relations between Australia and New Zealand. Critically examined, they present all the elements of a sordid, and almost tragical, comedy of commerce. For here we have two island peoples of British stock living side by side, with different climates and varied commodities, each penalizing

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its own citizens by means of a tariff upon the produce of its neighbour. As the *Sydney Morning Herald* pertinently asked the other day in a leading article, why should two countries "bound together by ties of Nationhood set up mutual antagonisms for no apparent reasons, save perhaps the perverse reason of scientific Protection at all costs? The folly of the thing is becoming more and more obvious, however, and tendencies show an increasing desire for give and take." Australia requires, and must have, certain natural products and manufactured articles from New Zealand; New Zealand requires, and must have, certain manufactured articles and natural products from Australia. Why, in the name of common sense, should the unfortunate inhabitants of either country have to add to the cost and freight of goods so imported a heavy Customs duty? The expense of living, we are told, is going up year by year on both sides of the Tasman Sea. Why add to it by unnatural means? Why not rather seek to reduce it in one obvious way? No doubt during the period of conversion to even partial Free Trade certain manufacturers and their workmen would suffer from the dislocation of various industries at present "protected." But any loss thus sustained would be enormously outweighed by the benefits derived by the great mass of producers and consumers in both countries. So far as New Zealand is concerned, indeed, it has recently been estimated that the cost of our tariff is so much in excess of the wages paid in the industries it is designed to protect, that all the manual workers in those industries might be pensioned off on full pay, and the people of the Dominion would still be saving over half a million a year!

Nature itself seems to protest against this dual system of forced and unnatural "Protection." It is at once curious and instructive to note how the seasons differ in Australia and New Zealand. As a rule, a good summer for the farmer in New Zealand is a bad one for the farmer in Australia. Last year in New Zealand we had something approaching to a drought. One result was the prompt importation from

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Victoria and Tasmania of large quantities of farm produce, vegetables and fruit. This year the tables are turned and every steamer at present leaving the southern ports of the Dominion for the Commonwealth is laden with oats, fodder, potatoes, and onions for those parts of Australia where the rainfall for 1912 so far has been deficient. The net result is of course that Protection does not protect on either side of the water, and the unfortunate but "protected" working-man all over Australasia has to pay a heavy import duty upon the daily food his family demands. In view of this state of things, it is reassuring to note that Mr Laurenson, the present Minister of Customs in New Zealand, stated a few weeks ago that he was aware of Mr Fisher's desire "in a general way," and hoped there would be some arrangement made mutually satisfactory to the Commonwealth and the Dominion. Mr Laurenson added that "the Canterbury implement makers, who had established a reputation outside New Zealand for their product, had represented that under a reciprocal treaty with Australia they could do a very large trade with that country, as in fact they did before the Commonwealth tariff came into operation. New Zealand might respond by removing the duty from certain timbers peculiar to Australia and largely used in New Zealand. In times of scarcity in either country the inflation of prices in food products might be prevented if free exchange could be arranged."

The trade returns between the two countries over a series of years prove conclusively how the present war of tariffs has checked the growth of inter-Dominion business. During the past ten years (i.e. since the Commonwealth tariff) the total trade of the Dominion of New Zealand (export and import) has almost doubled, whereas the total trade between the Dominion and the Commonwealth has remained stationary. To quote the *Sydney Morning Herald* again, and in conclusion:

The Dominion has stoutly maintained its independent attitude in the matter of Federal overtures and that of joint navies. But mutual trade advantages are in another category, and the merest common

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sense, on a business foundation, should be all that is necessary to provide a basis of agreement.

So far, then, we have seen that Federation in our view is non-essential and therefore most unlikely to be brought about. We have ventured also to predict that a wide measure of Reciprocity in trade is so desirable as to be almost certain. The third and most important question remains still unanswered. What about Defensive Union? Is Mr Fisher right in thinking that within five years there will be an agreement between the Commonwealth and the Dominion on matters of defence? To that question there can be but one answer for any person who is familiar with the pregnant facts. In less than five years Australia and New Zealand will be *compelled* to agree in combining their naval and military forces for the better defence of their common Empire.

If two small nations ought ever to be bound together for self-defence by what Mr Kipling, in his kindly way, has termed "ties of common funk," surely the Commonwealth and the Dominion should now be so united. However loudly Pacifist and Socialist orators may bray at street corners about Universal Peace, there is no doubt that the large majority of our people at the Antipodes are now keenly alive to their risks and responsibilities as isolated, but loyal, children of the Empire. They realize that in the event of war practically all Britain's battleships would almost certainly be concentrated in European waters. They realize also that on the inhabitants of Australia and New Zealand themselves must devolve the task of defending their hearths and homes from foreign invasion. They are beginning to understand too that, with the opening of the Panama Canal and the possible ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in sight, it will shortly be more than ever necessary to have a strong and united British fleet in the Southern and Western Pacific. Readers of *THE ROUND TABLE* do not require to be told that we Britons at the Antipodes have for the past year or two been struggling towards the goal of efficient local defence, both on land and

CLOSER RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA

at sea. Australia and New Zealand alike have provided for their "internal defence" by insisting on compulsory military training, and each country is even now engaged in organizing its citizen army. As already pointed out New Zealand still remains faithful to the direct naval subsidy, while the Commonwealth is now busily building an Australian naval unit of its own to pass under the control of the Admiralty in time of war.

Thus we see that each of the two youthful nations is providing for its own territorial security, and at the same time is aiming at some measure of assistance to the Empire on the sea in time of need. The true Imperial spirit is willing in both countries. All that is lacking is co-operation, based on an enlightened and uniform policy.

To deal with the land forces first, it is clear even to the average civilian that the two countries should adopt homogeneous military systems, in order to be able efficiently to support one another in the event of national, or rather Imperial danger. As Lord Kitchener told us two years ago: "The desirability of such co-operation is evident by reason of the geographical position of the two countries." This essential homogeneity has, we understand, been carried out so far as the Australian and New Zealand Territorial Forces are concerned. But to the plain man it would appear that something more is required. The forces of the units of our Empire should be standardized. There should be some continuous point of contact between the Dominion forces and the Imperial Army, as there already is between the Navy and its units abroad. For such a plan as this we must perforce look to the War Office. The Imperial General Staff alone can formulate the organization requisite for linking up the scattered forces of our Empire.* We Anti-

* Some such scheme was formulated by the General Staff for the Defence Conference of 1909 and endorsed by its Members, excepting the representatives from South Africa who were unable to express adherence to any policy which might seem to bind the Government and Parliament of the Union of South Africa in anticipation of their establishment. Vide pp. 33-52 of papers dealing with the proceedings of the Conference. (Ed.)

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podeans are striving earnestly to put ourselves in a position to defend our Dominions from a possible army of occupation; from the Imperial General Staff we would welcome further light and leading as to the best method of attaining this result. Before these lines appear in print, the Empire Trade Commission will no doubt have entered upon its labours. Would it be too much to expect an Imperial Defence Commission on more modest and confidential lines, to visit and advise all our British Dominions? "Defence," as Adam Smith has told us, "is of much more importance than opulence."

Reverting to the Naval question, it is true that up to the present this Dominion (in the words of the *Sydney Morning Herald*) "has stoutly maintained its independent attitude in the matter of . . . joint navies." But that attitude is not of necessity a final one. Nor is it in any true sense the deliberate and well-informed judgment of the people of New Zealand. Even now the man in the street here does not know the real reasons that induced our Government of the day to adhere to a direct subsidy to the British Navy in place of joining Australia in setting up an Australasian Unit. It may be that responsible statesmen in the Dominion shared the fear (now happily groundless) of many Australians in 1907, and even later, that the Commonwealth policy tended in the direction of creating an independent navy. What is certain is that the underlying motive which prompted most of us in tacitly preferring the direct subsidy was one of loyalty to the Crown. The average New Zealander in 1909 assumed in his ignorance that all that was wanted from him then was an increased contribution to the funds of the Royal Navy, and that contribution he is still prepared cheerfully to augment. Our representatives at the Defence Conference in that year may have been better informed, but they did not take the public into their confidence. As events have turned out, it now appears that we may have made a mistake, and that we might have better served the Empire, and ourselves, by joining hands with our

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Australian brethren. It is not yet too late to do so; and we welcome the opportunity of hearing Mr Fisher's views regarding this vexed question on the occasion of his promised visit to our shores. It may be taken for granted that, if the people of New Zealand are once convinced that the Admiralty advisers would prefer them to combine with the Commonwealth in the creation and control of an Australasian Unit, that policy will at all cost be adopted and carried out. But here again we, the tax-payers of the Dominion, are largely in the dark, and we should welcome a clear lead from Whitehall on this momentous question.

The times are now ripe for the solution of this local aspect of the great problem of Imperial Defence. We know the Australian point of view, as put forward by Mr Fisher; we know, too, that Mr Myers, our present Minister of Defence, is not only a stanch supporter of compulsory training, but a sound and even enthusiastic Imperialist. Should the Mackenzie Ministry be replaced by a Massey administration, it is almost certain that Mr James Allen will become our Minister of Defence, a position for which he is admirably fitted by his long and practical experience in military and naval affairs. It is publicly known that Mr Allen holds strong views as to the urgent necessity for closer co-operation between the Dominions and the Motherland in matters of Defence. In these circumstances we look forward with confidence to an early agreement between the Commonwealth and the Dominion whereby each would contribute to the defence of the whole Empire according to some definite and well-ordered scheme.

In the result, then, the following conclusions emerge directly from our consideration of Mr Fisher's proposals: as between Australia and New Zealand, Federation is highly improbable, reciprocity "amounting to even Free Trade" is both desirable and likely; and Defensive Union in some form is imperative.

Apart from and yet underlying these direct conclusions on

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the immediate matters in hand, the student of politics at the Antipodes may discern the birth and growth of wider views, of more and truer Imperial thinking, amongst the "plain people" on both sides of the Tasman Sea. It has become obvious that the Commonwealth and the Dominion alike are now imbued with a self-conscious national life, that they both realize their duty of territorial defence on land and sea, and that they have begun to grasp the vital fact that if their common Empire is to endure it must be defended by the joint efforts and sacrifices of all its self-governing peoples. As we have seen, they dimly recognize that as two of these peoples they must combine their forces for common defence, but they are even now waiting for the best method of co-operation to be made plain to them, possibly by clear-cut suggestions from the War Office and the Admiralty.

II. THE POLITICAL CRISIS

THE results of the second ballots in the New Zealand General Election were known on December 15 last, and writing six months afterwards one is compelled to admit that even the immediate future is as hard to foretell now as it was then. Having scored a nominal victory on the Opposition's no-confidence motion in the short February session, with the aid of the Speaker's casting vote, the Ward Government, pursuant to the promise given by its leader during the debate, resigned. The resignation was delayed for a month after the critical division owing to the extraordinary difficulty of forming a new Liberal Government. By March 27, however, everything was ready; the Ward Government resigned, and the Mackenzie Government was sworn in. The most remarkable feature of the change was that, though representing the same party and avowedly the same policy, the new Government did not include a single member of the previous administration except Mr Thomas Mackenzie, who had been elected to the leadership by a Parliamentary caucus of the party. Mr Mackenzie himself,

THE POLITICAL CRISIS

moreover, was but a recent addition to the party, having only exchanged independence for service in the Liberal ranks less than five years previously. He undoubtedly made a good Minister of Agriculture in the Ward Cabinet, to which he was admitted in January, 1909, but he would have done equally well in a Cabinet of the opposite colour, for on the great test questions of land and labour his views approximate far more closely to those of the Opposition than to the more advanced ideals of the other side. Yet after Sir Joseph Ward had decided to retire, with the declared purpose of cementing more closely the Liberal-Labour alliance and had introduced the most Radical programme ever propounded in a Governor's speech, it was Mr Mackenzie who by the irony of fate was elected to succeed him.

The paradox is increased by the attitude of Mr J. A. Millar, who was Mr Mackenzie's most formidable competitor for the premiership. Mr Millar first made his mark as the organizer of the great maritime strike which in 1890 changed the face of New Zealand politics and enabled Mr Ballance to inaugurate the Liberal-Labour régime. Mr Millar was afterwards one of the first and sturdiest of Labour's representatives in the House, but in graduating from agitator and private member to Cabinet Minister he inevitably lost favour with the class that had originally monopolized his attention. Nevertheless his hard-headedness, force of character and length of service would have put his title to the Premiership beyond challenge if he had not recently seemed to fail both in industry and ambition.

But for this falling off, there was nobody better qualified to lead the party at a time when it wanted to emphasize its democratic character. Yet, now that he has failed to secure the leadership, Mr Millar, whose strength is in his Radicalism, has discovered that it is his duty either to promote a new party that will combine the moderately progressive elements of the existing parties or to force a dissolution. On what lines reconstruction can take place is probably no clearer to Mr Millar himself than it is to anybody else. The

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Opposition Party is far more homogeneous and solid than the other side, and shows no signs of a fissure through which room might be found for the admission of Mr Millar or other less important Liberal malcontents. Yet Mr Millar states definitely that he cannot join the Opposition. Chaos and dissolution seem, therefore, to be nearer than a reconstruction that would provide a reasonably stable equilibrium.

A Government which, even before Mr Millar's defection, was not expected by some to live for many days beyond the meeting of Parliament in the last week of June has naturally been described by its opponents as a "stop-gap Government." Nor has it had confidence enough in itself to act as though it had the ordinary expectation of life. The appointment on May 24, 25 and 27 of three Royal Commissions to deal with the Civil Service and the Cost of Living, and Education, has been condemned as a confession of weakness. The far-reaching importance of all these subjects, one of which is perplexing and defying the statesmanship of the world, makes them eminently suitable for authoritative non-political investigation, but the appointment of commissions to deal with such subjects in the last week of May with directions in each case to report by June 25, would seem to justify the gibe that it is not the conditions of an adequate inquiry, but the Ministry's expectation of life to which this precipitation is due.*

* The new Government, under the leadership of Mr Massey, came into power on July 10. The following are the members of the Cabinet :

Prime Minister	}	Mr W. F. MASSEY.
Minister of Lands		
Minister of Labour		
Minister of Defence	}	Colonel JAMES ALLEN.
Minister of Education		
Minister of Finance		
Minister of Railways	}	Mr W. H. HERRIES.
Native Affairs		
Attorney General	}	Mr A. L. HERDMAN.
Minister of Justice		
Minister of Public Works	}	Mr WM. FRASER.
Minister of Mines		

COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING

III. COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING

THERE is, however, one matter, and that, perhaps, the most important of all, in which the Ministry, despite its frail tenure and despite a bad start, has shown itself very much more satisfactory than its predecessor.

In 1909 the Ward Government, deferring to a very strong popular agitation and also influenced, it was supposed, by what its leader had learned at the Defence Conference of that year, undertook the responsibility of getting Parliament to sanction the principle of compulsory military training. The amendments necessary to give effect to Lord Kitchener's recommendations were passed in the following year, and as a proof of its sincerity the Government appointed as Commandant, Major-General Godley, an officer whose pre-eminent fitness for the position has been as freely acknowledged by the opponents of compulsory training as by its supporters. But when it came to enforcing the obligations of the Act against a small but noisy band of objectors, Sir Joseph Ward, with a general election a few months ahead, seemed to lose heart. The hopes with which the weak administration of the Act inspired the Anti-militarists and the manner in which they were dashed by the verdict of the electors in December last, were sufficiently described in the March number of *THE ROUND TABLE*. But the weakness developed in a more alarming fashion owing to the difficulties which embarrassed the last hours of the Ward Government. A week after the Government had been saved by the

Minister of Customs	}	Mr F. M. B. FISHER.
Minister of Marine		
Postmaster-General	}	Mr R. HEATON RHODES.
Minister of Telegraphs		
Minister of Internal Affairs	}	Mr F. H. D. BELL, K.C.
Leader of the Upper House		
Member of Executive Council	}	Dr MAUI POMARE.
Minister representing Native Race		

NEW ZEALAND

Speaker's casting vote a youthful Socialist who had elected to go to gaol rather than pay the fine imposed by the magistrate for his refusal to take the oath of allegiance was released by order of the Cabinet. In announcing the decision Sir Joseph Ward explained that this offender had already been imprisoned for a previous default, and that the Commandant approved of the action now taken by the Government. A few days before the Ward Government resigned other military defaulters were released without either of these or any other reason being alleged.

When the Government which had established the Training Scheme had thus been persuaded to shake it to its foundations it was natural to suppose that the Mackenzie Government, representing the same party and holding office under even more precarious conditions, would carry the destructive process even further. It is true that within a few days of its accession to power the Mackenzie Government proceeded to do exactly what its predecessor had done, but this initial blunder has never been repeated, a fact that is attributable to the firmness of one man, Mr Arthur M. Myers, the Minister of Defence. Conceding from the first that he would prefer to see some other punishment substituted for imprisonment, he has nevertheless insisted that as Minister he must enforce the law as he finds it. His denial that the Government contemplated a general remission or reduction of sentences was at first received with incredulity, but he has made it good. There has been no further tampering with the sentences and the Defence Act has been rescued from a very grave peril. Though the mind of the people is perfectly clear on the subject, the peril is liable to recur while the present even balancing of parties continues to give a few extremists a quite abnormal power over weak-backed politicians. But if the present Opposition takes office, it is expected to have in Mr James Allen as staunch a Minister of Defence as Mr Myers has proved himself. Both have a lively sense of Imperial responsibility in which they are equalled by few of our politicians.

LABOUR UNREST

IV. LABOUR UNREST

NEW Zealand during the last two or three years has had its full share of the unrest in the Labour world which appears to have been troubling every other civilized country.

Prophecies of a serious upheaval have not been wanting, and employers have been vaguely anticipating it as inevitable. The general attitude of the workers and the small strikes that have occurred from time to time have sufficed to demonstrate that our much vaunted Industrial, Conciliation, and Arbitration Act would prove but a broken reed in the day of Armageddon. But Armageddon has not yet arrived, and the prophets of evil are beginning to realize that the struggle which is proceeding in the ranks of labour itself will have to be settled first. A general description of the aims and methods of the rival Labour Organizations was given in THE ROUND TABLE for December. Revolutionary Socialism is represented by the New Zealand Federation of Labour, of which the Miners', Seamen's and Waterside Workers' Unions constitute the nucleus. Syndicalism, class warfare, repeal of the Arbitration Act, and the repudiation by the workers of any law or agreement that may for the time being prove inconvenient are among the chief articles of the Federation's creed.

Most of the Labour Unions however have affiliated themselves to the Trades and Labour Councils which have a socialistic but not a revolutionary or lawless programme. They assert the right to strike and even the right in the last resort to declare a general strike; but they do not glorify friction and disruption as such and they expressly favour "the settlement of industrial disputes on the lines of legally established agreements and awards by methods of conciliation and arbitration." The adoption in April of the Labour Unity Scheme to which Professor W. T. Mills of Milwaukee had devoted great eloquence and organizing power has resulted

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in the re-organization of this group under the name of the United Labour party.


The Wellington Municipal Tramway Strike in January and February brought the Socialist and the Unionist groups into active co-operation for the first time. The success of the strike, which was declared in deliberate violation of the law, and supported by threats of a general strike, added considerably to the prestige of the revolutionaries, but the advance has not been maintained. The Auckland City Council has fought them on a less dubious issue, and the general strike that was threatened if their organization was not given official recognition in the settlement of differences between the Council and its employees did not take place.

The same provincial district, Waihi, which is the chief centre of the gold mining industry of New Zealand, is at the time of writing the scene of the most interesting strike that the country has yet experienced. The Miners' Union at Waihi, which includes an overwhelming majority of the miners, and is affiliated to the Federation of Labour, cancelled its registration under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, owing to dissatisfaction with an award made by the Arbitration Court four years ago. Disliking the methods of the Union's executive officers, some 150 men recently seceded and formed an Engine-drivers and Winders' Union on their own account, and applied to have it registered under the Arbitration Act. Without notice the executive of the Miners' Union thereupon instructed its members to "down tools." The call was obeyed and the mines have accordingly been idle since May 13. The dissolution of the new union and the return of its members to the Miners' Union were stated to be the conditions of the resumption of work. Officers of the Miners' Union and the Federation of Labour complain bitterly that a union of 150 should be empowered by registration under the Act to get an award that would bind the 1,500 non-members. The new union is, as a matter of fact, confined to engine-drivers and winders of whom it includes a considerable majority. It will therefore

LABOUR UNREST

only have power to make an agreement and secure an award which will affect men in the same kind of employment; the miners as a whole will be unaffected. But even if the complaint were absolutely correct in its assumption, the answer would of course be that the 1,500 are free to come in when they please, but they cannot be allowed to repudiate the Act and get its benefits at the same time. The long-delayed decision of the Labour Department on June 5 that the new Union could not be refused registration has removed the Federation's last hope in that direction, but as yet there are no prospects of either a general strike or a settlement. The employers, of course, could not have desired anything better than the change of the normal issue between capital and labour into a struggle between the red revolutionaries and what they are pleased to term a "Scab" Union.

New Zealand. June, 1912.



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PRINTED AT THE ARDEN PRESS, LETCHWORTH, AND PUBLISHED
BY MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD, ST MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON, W.C

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